PROPERTY TESTS, DUE PROCESS TESTS AND REGULATORY TAKINGS JURISPRUDENCE

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Property Tests, Due Process Tests and Regulatory Takings Jurisprudence
By Steven J. Eagle∗

Abstract

The United States Supreme Court recently clarified in Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. that its often-expressed “substantially advance” formulation sounds in due process, and thus should be rejected as an appropriate takings test. The Court also explained that due process provides an independent and legitimate basis for attacking government deprivations of private property. Paradoxically, Lingle also reaffirmed as the Court’s principal takings test the ad hoc, multifactor formulation in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York.

The Article asserts that Penn Central itself is a due process test. Building upon Lingle, as the Court did not, the Article outlines separate and independent takings and due property tests. The proffered due process test is based on the need for meaningful scrutiny. The suggested takings test applies property law concepts in determining whether government arrogated private property to itself, and thus must compensate. Most particularly, the Article advocates the “commercial unit” as a necessarily objective measure of what constitutes a relevant interest for takings analysis.

I. INTRODUCTION.

The United States Supreme Court’s regulatory takings jurisprudence has long been infamous for its incoherence.1 The lack of cohesion in takings law was both exemplified and exacerbated by the Court’s 2005 decision in Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc.2 There, the Court reviewed its often-articulated statement, first made in Agins v. City of Tiburon,3 that compensation is required under the Takings Clause4 for a regulatory ac-

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1 See, e.g., Carol M. Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why the Takings Issue is Still a Mud-
dle, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 561, 561 (1984); Joseph L. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 Yale L. J. 36, 37 (1964) (“a welter of confusing and apparently incompatible re-
sults”).
4 U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.”).
tion that “does not substantially advance legitimate state interests.”5 In
Lingle, the Court unanimously renounced its prior standard as merely an
inapposite takings “formula.” The gravamen of the Court’s opinion was
that the “substantially advances” standard is a substantive due process
test, and that the application of such a test “is not a valid method of
identifying regulatory takings.”6

Even as it re-characterized the “substantially advances” as a due
process test, Lingle affirmed that an owner deprived of a property inter-
est has a separate due process cause of action.7 Thus, taken as a whole,
Lingle stands for the proposition that both asserted government takings
of property, and asserted government deprivations of property without
due process of law, raise separate, legitimate legal issues to be resolved
using different legal standards.

Yet the Court’s ipse dixit cannot banish substantive due process from
its regulatory takings jurisprudence, for the simple reason that the
Court’s own general takings test is based on substantive due process.8
The Court’s preoccupation with the property owner’s status is a signifi-
cant departure from the Court’s crisp 1893 observation that “just compen-
sation, it will be noticed, is for the property, and not to the owner.”9

This article first examines the substantive due process origins of the
Supreme Court’s takings jurisprudence.10 The article analyzes how the
Court’s principal regulatory takings doctrine, established in Penn Cent.
Transportation Co. v. City of New York,11 remains steeped in due process.12
The article also scrutinizes the due process tests employed by the United
States Courts of Appeals.13 These tests typically are based on the “egre-
gious government misconduct” test developed by the Supreme Court in
a different context.14 The article then proposes to replace the Court’s
ostensible takings test, embodied in Penn Central, with a takings test
properly grounded in relevant property law principles.

The concern for “fairness” that is the leitmotif of Penn Central focuses
on the relationship between property and the owner deprived of that

5 Id. at 260-61.
6 Lingle, 544 U.S. at 545. See infra Part I.A.1.
8 See infra Part II.
elaboration, see infra Part IV.D.
10 See infra Part II.
12 See infra Part III.B, III.D.
13 See infra Part V.C.
14 Id.
property. In other words, it focuses on deprivation. A true takings test would focus not on what the owner has been deprived of (other than as a measure of just compensation), but rather on what the government has taken. A property-based takings jurisprudence would focus on when government takes property. This article sketches how such a takings jurisprudence might work. In particular, it calls for adoption of a model of commercial viability to designate units of property amenable to Constitutional protection.

Finally, the article advocates that the Court adopt a due process test for property deprivations based not on a requirement that government misconduct be so egregious as to shock the conscience, but rather on the same meaningful scrutiny requirements that the Court has imposed in other land use regulation contexts.

II. THE SUPREME COURT’S REGULATORY TAKINGS JURISPRUDENCE IS GROUNDED IN DUE PROCESS PRINCIPLES.

The origins of the Supreme Court’s regulatory takings jurisprudence are based on substantive due process. This remains true despite the Court’s attempt to recast earlier precedents to fit into its current Takings Clause model. As Lingle acknowledged: “Agins’ reliance on due process precedents is understandable.”

A. A Millennium of Anglo-American Law and History.

As the United States Court of Federal Claims has observed: “The Anglo-American case precedent is literally made up of tens of thousands of cases defining property rights over the better part of a millennium.” The Framers regarded themselves as heirs to the historic “rights of Englishmen.” These rights included what Chancellor Kent referred to as

15 See infra Part IV.
16 See infra Part IV.
17 See infra Part IV.
19 See infra Part V.B.
20 See infra Part II.C.
21 Lingle, 544 U.S. at 542.
the inalienable right to be secure in “person, property and privileges.”  
Thus, the capacity to own property was regarded as an intrinsic and co-
herent characteristic of the individual.

John Adams declared, “Property must be secured or liberty cannot
exist.” Even critics of the Lockean perspective have been forced to
conclude, “[t]he great focus of the Framers was the security of basic
rights, property in particular, not the implementation of political lib-
erty.”

The increasing popularity of originalism in constitutional scholarship
led other scholars to mount a counterattack by turning to the theory of
Civic Republicanism. They aspired to demonstrate that the Framers’
generation was steeped in civic virtue, not Lockean individualism. The
classic articles by Professors William Treanor and John Hart met
with considerable acceptance. However, this view has been challenged
by more recent scholarship.

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28 See LAURA KALMAN, THE STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL LIBERALISM 139 (1996) (asserting that “[s]ome legal liberals determined to appropriate originalism for themselves. They would meet the proponents of original intent on the battleground of history. They would advance alternative interpretation of the Founding to justify legal liberalism.”).


31 See, e.g., Eric R. Claeys, Takings, Regulations, and Natural Property Rights, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1549, 1552 (2003) (reviewing 19th century caselaw and educing that “we make [the problem of takings jurisprudence] worse by assuming that regulatory takings law is a relatively recent invention”; David A. Thomas, Finding More Pieces for the Takings Puzzle: How correcting History Can Clarify Doctrine, 75 U. COLO. L. REV. 497, 520 (2004) (asserting that “the idea that compensation would be owed for deprivation of property rights short of complete appropriation was widely accepted, even if not often tested” in early cases and summarizing prior scholarship).
B. A History of Due Process and Property Deprivations.

The doctrine that natural limitations on the power of government are imposed by a higher law has a long history in English thought and in the American colonies. In the young American republic, for example, Justice Joseph Story averred to “principles of natural justice” and “fundamental laws of free government.”

Substantive due process is the basis for early judicial determinations that private property cannot be taken for private purposes. In the early case of *Baltimore & Ohio R.R. v. Van Ness*, a federal court noted that “[t]he [F]ifth [A]mendment of the [C]onstitution of the United States says, that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. But the objection [in this case] is that private property [has been] taken for private use, with just compensation; which is not within the prohibition of the constitution; although it would be an arbitrary proceeding.”

In perhaps the most important substantive due process decision of the nineteenth century, *The Slaughterhouse Cases*, a 5-4 Supreme Court majority upheld a state monopoly on butchering and rejected the notion that the Fourteenth Amendment and natural rights theory permitted individuals to follow lawful occupations. However, during the latter part of the century, in *Allgeyer v. Louisiana*, the Court addressed a narrow insurance regulation statute using broad dicta:

The “liberty” mentioned in [the Fourteenth] amendment means, not only the right of the citizen to be free from the mere physical restraint of his person, as by incarceration, but the term is deemed to embrace the right of the citizen to be free in the enjoyment of all his faculties; to be free to use them in all lawful ways; to live and work where he will; to earn his livelihood by any lawful calling; to pursue any livelihood or avocation; and for that purpose to enter into all contracts which may be proper, necessary, and essential to his carrying out to a successful conclusion the purposes above mentioned.

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34 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
35 *Allgeyer*, 165 U.S. 578, 589 (1897).
In *Lawton v. Steele*, the Court declared that the mere invocation of the police power as justification for a regulation was insufficient. This theme was carried forward in a case that has become known as the pinnacle of economic substantive due process cases, the now often reviled *Lochner v. New York*:

The mere assertion that the subject [of the law] relates though but in a remote degree to the public health does not necessarily render the enactment valid. The act must have a more direct relation, as a means to an end, and the end itself must be appropriate and legitimate, before an act can be held to be valid which interferes with the general right of an individual to be free in his person and his power to contract in relation to his own labor.

C. *The Due Process Origins of Regulatory Takings Law.*

As the Supreme Court recognized in *Kohl v. United States*, the power of eminent domain “is essential to independent existence and perpetuity.” The power is the offspring of political necessity; and it is inseparable from sovereignty, unless denied to it by its fundamental law. The Fifth Amendment implicitly recognized that the United States possessed this power. At the same time, it cabined the power to instances where the taking be for “public use” and upon payment of “just compensation.” Only after the Civil War, and the consequent ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, were these qualifications first applied to the states in *Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. v. City ofChicago*. *Lingle* briefly noted the application of the just compensation requirement to the states in *Chicago, B. & Q. R.R.*, but did not refer to its roots in substantive due process. *Chicago, B. & Q. R.R.* says:

If, as this court has adjudged, a legislative enactment, assuming arbitrarily to take the property of one individual and give it to another individual, would not be due process of law, as enjoined by the fourteenth amendment, it must be that the requirement of due process of law in that amendment is applicable to the direct appropriation by

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36 152 U.S. 133, 137 (1894) (“To justify the state in thus interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it must appear—First, that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require such interference; and, second, that the means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.”)


38 91 U.S. 367 (1875).

39 *Id.* at 371.

40 *Id.* at 371-72.

41 166 U.S. 226 (1897).

42 *Lingle*, 544 U.S. at 536-37.
the state to public use, and without compensation, of the private property of the citizen. The legislature may prescribe a form of procedure to be observed in the taking of private property for public use, but it is not due process of law if provision be not made for compensation.43

Thus, Chicago, B. & Q.R.R suggests that payment of just compensation is a procedural requirement for the provision of due process in the absence of the exercise of eminent domain. Long after Chicago B. & Q.R.R had been decided, Justice John Paul Stevens averred that the case contained “no mention of either the Takings Clause or the Fifth Amendment,” but rather “applied the same kind of substantive due process” as gave rise to Lochner.44 Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Rehnquist summarily responded that “there is no doubt that later cases have held that the Fourteenth Amendment does make the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment applicable to the States. Nor is there any doubt that these cases have relied upon Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. Co. v. Chicago to reach that result.”45

Justice O'Connor’s plurality opinion in Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel is another example of recasting an old precedent. The opinion discussed Calder v. Bull,47 known primarily for Justice Chase’s classic exposition of natural rights,48 and also for Justice Iredell’s assertion of the supremacy of positive law.49 Yet, O’Connor treated Calder as dealing with the Takings Clause only.

Likewise, substantive due process was not far from the surface in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,50 where the Supreme Court first upheld comprehensive zoning. Justice Sutherland indicated that zoning provisions would not survive a substantive due process challenge if they were

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43 166 U.S. at 236.
44 Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 405-06 (1994) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
45 Dolan, 512 U.S. at 384 n.5.
47 524 U.S. at 533-34, citing Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798). See also Part V.A.
48 Calder, 3 U.S. at 388. “The purposes for which men enter into society will determine the nature and terms of the social compact; and as they are the foundation of the legislative power, they will decide what are the proper objects of it: The nature, and ends of legislative power will limit the exercise of it.”
49 Calder, 3 U.S. at 399.
50 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
“clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare.”

In *Nectow v. City of Cambridge*, decided two years after *Euclid*, a small parcel thrust into a commercial area was zoned as “residential.” As Justice Sutherland categorized it: “The attack upon the ordinance is that . . . it deprived [the plaintiff] of his property without due process of law in contravention of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Justice Sutherland then cited his *Euclid* opinion for the proposition that the power of the government “to interfere by zoning regulations with the general rights of the land owner by restricting the character of his use, is not unlimited, and other questions aside, such restriction cannot be imposed if it does not bear a substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare.” He concluded that “the action of the zoning authorities comes within the ban of the [Due Process Clause of the] Fourteenth Amendment and cannot be sustained.”

Other cases also have demonstrated a lack of clear separation of takings and due process analysis by referring to deprivations of property without due process of law as “takings.”

These precedents were not unknown to the *Lingle* Court. To the contrary, Justice O’Connor cited to them in the course of explaining: “There is no question that the ‘substantially advances’ formula [in *Agins*] was derived from due process, not takings, precedents.”

III. PRESENT TAKINGS LAW REMAINS ENMESHED IN ITS DUE PROCESS ANTECEDENTS.

Given that the Supreme Court discerns that the Takings Clause should be separate and independent from the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clauses, it is germane to ask why takings law remains enmeshed in due process analysis. Why has a robust body of property-based takings law not emerged instead?

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51 *Id.* at 395.
52 277 U.S. 183 (1928).
53 *Id.* at 188.
54 *Id.* at 188 (citing *Euclid*, 272 U.S. at 395).
55 *Id.* at 189.
A. The Alleged Disintegration of In Rem Property.

The establishment of robust protection of property rights must begin with taking property seriously. However, at least in the academy, there is strong sentiment that the concept of “property” is outmoded and should be discarded. A seminal argument along these lines was made by Thomas Grey, who asserted the “disintegration of property.” 58 Grey argued that the everyday term “private property” is bereft of uniform meaning. 59 Indeed, among law and economics theorists, both “property” and “contract rights” have become conflated into a utilitarian notion of command over resources. 60 One property theorist concludes that there is “entropy in property,” explaining that “[p]roperty division creates a one-directional inertia: unlike ordinary transfers of rights from one individual to another, reunifying fragmented property rights usually involves transaction and strategic costs higher than those incurred in the original deal.” 61 In a broader sense, the denial that the term “property” has meaning might be viewed as a subset of the more general indeterminacy postulated by postmodernism. 62

B. Takings and the “Armstrong Principle” of Fairness

Correlative with a loss of faith in property as a right possessing internal integrity is the rise of the concept of “fairness” as an all-purpose remedy. In Armstrong v. United States, the Supreme Court declared that the Takings Clause was “designed to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.” 63 Armstrong, with its soft contours, is the predicate for the Court’s general takings test, first enunciated in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York:

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58 Thomas Grey, The Disintegration of Property, 163, in PROPERTY (J. Roland Pennock and John W. Chapman eds., NOMOS monograph no. 22, 1980;).
59 Id.; see also infra text accompanying note 198.
60 See, Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Essay, What Happened to Property in Law and Economics, 111 YALE L.J. 357 (2001). “[T]here is a tendency among economists to use the term property ‘to describe virtually every device—public or private, common-law or regulatory, contractual or governmental, formal or informal—by which divergences between private and social costs or benefits are reduced.’” (quoting RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 53 (5th ed. 1998)).
63 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
While this Court has recognized that the “Fifth Amendment’s guarantee . . . [is] designed to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole,” this Court, quite simply, has been unable to develop any “set formula” for determining when “justice and fairness” require that economic injuries caused by public action be compensated by the government, rather than remain disproportionately concentrated on a few persons.64

In her concurring opinion in *Palazzolo v. Rhode Island*, Justice O'Connor stressed that *Penn Central* remained the Court’s “polestar” in regulatory takings cases.65 Subsequently, in *Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency*, Justice Stevens emphasized O'Connor’s *Palazzolo* concurrence, quoting the “polestar” language,66 and referring, for the first time in a Supreme Court opinion, to the “Armstrong principle.”67

The emphasis that courts place on lack of fairness as the indicium of a regulatory taking resonates in much of the academic literature. In an early article stressing infirmities of process that redound to the detriment of individual property owners in land use determinations, Professor Robert Ellickson noted that “[a]ntigrowth measures have one premier class of beneficiaries: those who already own residential structures in the municipality doing the excluding.”68 Professor William Fischel subsequently warned of “majoritarianism,” which he deemed “the twentieth century’s parallel to Madison’s “democratick despotism.”69 According to Fischel, local governments in homogeneous suburbs can enhance the self-interest of the majority of residents, without concern for bicameral legislatures and separation of powers.70 Exclusionary zoning and other barriers to development can flourish, with little political cost to elected officials, “since those affected live outside the jurisdiction or belong to

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65 533 U.S. 606, 633 (2001) (O'Connor, J., concurring). The importance of the concurrence, agreeing that regulations antedating a purchase were not dispositive of the landowner’s rights, but that the existence of the regulations were important in some unspecified way, lies in the fact that O’Connor was the necessary fifth vote to Justice Kennedy’s majority.
67 Id at 321.
70 Id.
the small minority of citizens who own tracts that might be developed profitably.”71

C. The Penn Central Factors: Economic Impact, Expectations and Character.

As the Court acknowledged in Lingle, Justice Brennan’s opinion in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York72 carries over some of the Court’s older due process rhetoric.73 While Penn Central to a large extent departed from the Court’s earlier due process language, it has proven to be an incomplete break, and one that conflates takings and due process. Partly for that reason, the Penn Central line of cases provides insufficient protection to secure either Constitutional guarantee.

In Penn Central, the Court noted that it had been “unable to develop any ‘set formula’” for evaluating regulatory takings claims, but found “several factors” of “particular significance.”74

The economic impact of the regulation on the claimant and, particularly, the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment backed expectations are, of course, relevant considerations. So, too, is the character of the governmental action. A “taking” may more readily be found when the interference with property can be characterized as a physical invasion by government than when interference arises from some public program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common good.75

At the beginning, it was by no means evident that Penn Central would be a very deferential test which would benefit government. At least one eminent land use scholar, Professor Daniel Mandelker, thought that the “investment-backed expectations” doctrine might well augment the more stringent vested rights doctrine, which gives developers property rights in development in narrow circumstances, thus resulting in a “landowner tilt.”76 It certainly was not evident at the beginning that Penn Central would be the pivotal case in takings jurisprudence.77

71 Id.
73 Lingle, 544 U.S. at 541 (quoting Penn Central’s dictum, 438 U.S. at 127, that “‘[i]t is ... implicit in Goldblatt [v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962)], that a use restriction on real property may constitute a “taking” if not reasonably necessary to the effectuation of a substantial public purpose.’”).
74 Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124.
75 Id.
76 Daniel R. Mandelker, Investment-Backed Expectations: Is There A Taking?, C266 ALI-ABA 219 (1988). “Curiously, Justice Brennan did not mention either the es-toppel or vested rights doctrines in Penn Central. This omission may be an oversight,
In _Lingle_, however, the Court declared that _Penn Central_'s three-factor test constitutes the standard that still govern most regulatory takings challenges.\(^78\) It is instructive to consider, ad seriatim, the ramifications of these factors upon takings and due process law.

1. The “Economic Impact” Standard

The “economic impact” of a regulation refers to the impact upon the property owner. If the issue is fairness to the owner, this test is quite understandable. If the issue is whether the government took property, this standard seems irrelevant. To use the analogy of a criminal expropriation, whether a mugger’s victim had a large quantity of undiscovered cash in another pocket is not germane to the crime.

Likewise, “impact” measured by a given property owner’s possession of other assets has nothing to do with whether the asset taken was “property,” or whether government compensated for the taking.

2. The “Investment-Backed Expectations” Standard

_Penn Central_’s notion of “investment-backed expectations”\(^79\) has become, by far, the most important inquiry in regulatory takings cases.\(^80\) Justice Brennan described _Pennsylvania Coal_ as “the leading case for the proposition that a state statute that substantially furthers important public policies may so frustrate distinct investment-backed expectations as to indicate that investment-backed expectations must be considered even though they do not create an estoppel or a vested right. If this interpretation is correct, the expectations taking factor introduces a landowner tilt in taking theory that did not exist before. By emphasizing the property owner’s investment in his property, the Court favors the property owner’s rather than government’s interests. _Id._ at 223-24.

\(^77\) See, Transcript: Looking Back on Penn Central: A Panel Discussion with the Supreme Court Litigators, FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 287, (2004). The clerk who worked on the draft of the _Penn Central_ opinion much later reminisced: “At the time I thought Justice Brennan was making some modest efforts to bring a little content to an area of law that was . . . then quite formalist and in disarray. But I was trying very hard really to hold the Court, that was the number one objective when you were working on an opinion for Justice Brennan, to produce an opinion that at least five Justices would join that would hold the court. As I noted, other clerks had told me that the opinion better not say very much before I started work on the draft and in fact after it was circulated, Justice Stewart’s clerk read it and said he was pretty sure it doesn’t say anything at all. (Laughter). _Id._ at 307-08 (comment by David Carpenter, Esq.).

\(^78\) 544 U.S. at 538-39.

\(^79\) _Penn Central_, 438 U.S. at 124.

to amount to a ‘taking.’”81 Brennan noted that Justice Holmes deemed particularly important the reliance interest of the coal company, which had specifically reserved the right to mine coal, and the right of support of the surface, in its deed of sale of the surface land.82 Brennan cited as well a seminal article by Professor Frank Michelman in which the “investment-backed expectations” phrase originated.83 In discussing Holmes’s “too far” language in Pennsylvania Coal,84 Michelman declared:

[...]he test poses not nearly so loose a question of degree; it does not ask “how much,” but rather (like the physical-occupation test) it asks “whether or not”: whether or not the measure in question can easily be seen to have practically deprived the claimant of some distinctly perceived, sharply crystallized, investment-backed expectation.85

Michelman added:

The zoned-out apartment house owner no longer has the apartment investment he depended on, whereas the nearby land speculator who is unable to show that he has yet formed any specific plans for his vacant land still has a package of possibilities with its value, though lessened, still unspecified—which is what he had before.86

Yet such a narrow interpretation of reliance ignores the fact that the adaptability of property for new uses is one of its primary attributes.87 Neither Penn Central nor subsequent cases based upon it have contained the hint of a suggestion that an owner would have a less viable claim if the property were an inherited family business, a devise from a distant relative, or even a prize in a lottery. While it is difficult to ascertain exactly what Justice Brennan meant by the “investment-backed expecta-

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81 Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 127 (citing Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922)).
82 Id.
83 438 U.S. at 128 (citing Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundation of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1229-34 (1967)).
84 “The general rule, at least, is that while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking.” Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 415.
85 Michelman, supra note 83, at 1233.
86 Id. at 1234.
87 In re Jacobs, 98 N.Y. 98, 105 (1885) (noting that property’s “capability for enjoyment and adaptability to some use are essential characteristics and attributes without which property cannot be conceived. . . . [A]ny law which . . . takes away any of its essential attributes, deprives the owner of property.”). See Eric R. Claeys, Takings, Regulations, and Natural Property Rights, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1549, 1579-80 (2003).
tions,” at the least he undoubtedly was making an appeal to fairness in
the intuitive sense that the pang of a treasured right lost might be greater
than the pang of an anticipated gain not received.\textsuperscript{88}

The phrase itself has undergone a number of subtle changes. Professor Michelman used the term “distinctly perceived, sharply crystallized, investment-backed expectation.”\textsuperscript{89} This was reworded by Justice Brennan to become: “distinct investment-backed expectations” in \textit{Penn Central}.\textsuperscript{90} Then, without explanation, in a case strongly upholding the right to exclude others from private property, then-Justice Rehnquist introduced a new phrase, “reasonable investment-backed expectations.”\textsuperscript{91} Subsequently, the Court has often used this new formulation.\textsuperscript{92} The inclusion of the term “reasonable” seems to impose, on top of the task of discerning the property owner’s own subjective “expectations,” whether society is prepared to validate those expectations as being reasonable. Remarkably, neither Justice Rehnquist nor other members of the Court commented upon the change.

Yet it is not clear that “investment backed expectations,” whether unembellished or denominated as “crystalline” or “reasonable,” has any intrinsic meaning at all. As Professor Richard Epstein explained, “[n]either [Justice Brennan in \textit{Penn Central}] nor anyone else offers any telling explanation of why this tantalizing notion of expectations is preferable to the words ‘private property’ (which are, after all, not mere gloss, but actual constitutional text).”\textsuperscript{93} The genesis of the “expectations” language is not a desire to prevent the windfall of devises from unknown distant relatives, but rather the desire to treat as unworthy the property interests of speculators.\textsuperscript{94}

The most troubling aspect of “expectations” analysis is its self-referential quality. In Justice Kennedy’s opinion concurring in the judg-


\textsuperscript{89} Michelman, \textit{supra} note 83, at 1233.

\textsuperscript{90} \textit{Penn Central}, 438 U.S. at 124.

\textsuperscript{91} Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979).

\textsuperscript{92} \textit{See}, \textit{e.g.}, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1016 n.7 (1992); Nollan v. California Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 842 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting).


\textsuperscript{94} See Michelman, \textit{supra} note 83, at 1229-34.
ment in *Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council*,\(^5\) he conceded: “There is an inherent tendency towards circularity in this synthesis, of course; for if the owner’s reasonable expectations are shaped by what courts allow as a proper exercise of governmental authority, property tends to become what courts say it is.”\(^6\)

Perhaps anticipating such a ratcheting down of property rights, Justice Holmes observed in *Pennsylvania Coal* that, when the Fifth Amendment’s protection for private property “is found to be qualified by the police power, the natural tendency of human nature is to extend the qualification more and more until at last private property disappears. But that cannot be accomplished in this way under the Constitution of the United States.”\(^7\) Circuit Judge Stephen Williams recently put the matter more starkly:

> The majority’s analysis begs the question whether any landowner, in a world where zoning regulations are prevalent, could ever argue that a particular regulation was “unexpected.” The presumption is insurmountable: “Businesses that operate in an industry with a history of regulation have no reasonable expectation that regulation will not be strengthened to achieve established legislative needs.” . . . Although the Takings Clause is meant to curb inefficient takings, such a notion of “reasonable investment-backed expectations” strips it of any constraining sense: except for a regulation of almost unimaginable abruptness, all regulation will build on prior regulation and hence be said to defeat any expectations. Thus regulation begets regulation.\(^8\)

### 3. The Character of the Regulation Standard

The final *Penn Central* test, the character of the regulation, served in that case to distinguish physical from regulatory takings. Beyond the context of the case at bar, the test was curiously bereft of any explicit

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\(^6\) *Id.* at 1034 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment). He immediately added: “Some circularity must be tolerated in these matters, however, as it is in other spheres. *E.g.*, Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (Fourth Amendment protections defined by reasonable expectations of privacy). The definition, moreover, is not circular in its entirety. The expectations protected by the Constitution are based on objective rules and customs that can be understood as reasonable by all parties involved.” *Id.* at 1034-35.

\(^7\) Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).

connection between the sentence announcing the test\textsuperscript{99} and the sentence applying it.\textsuperscript{100} The suggestion appears to be that, on a continuum, where “interference” that might be “characterized” as a physical invasion approaches one end, and “adjusting” (i.e., tinkering with) “the benefits and burdens of economic life” is redolent with possibilities of reciprocity of advantage. The possibility that “character” simply was synonymous with “physical invasion” lost any relevance four years after \textit{Penn Central}, when the Court ruled that even a minor permanent physical occupation constituted a taking in \textit{Loretto v. Teleprompter}.\textsuperscript{101}

While it might be possible to read the tea leaves of \textit{Lingle} as suggesting a subtle demotion of the “character” test,\textsuperscript{102} the very same paragraph prefaced mention of the physical invasion vs. adjustment of economic benefits and burdens dichotomy with the words “for instance,” thus clarifying the dichotomy as merely an example of the character test.\textsuperscript{103}

A few recent cases have attempted to find new content for this test, such as its employment when government regulations, although ostensibly general in application, in fact specifically “targeted” an individual owner’s specific item of property.\textsuperscript{104} In \textit{American Pelagic}, one large and specialized fishing vessel was the explicit target of prohibitory legislation.\textsuperscript{105} While the targeting of one vessel, or parcel of land, might not be the norm, it is an extreme example of \textit{Armstrong’s} aspiration that “some people alone” should not unduly bear burdens.\textsuperscript{106} More generally, Professor Saul Levmore decried “singling out,” and posited a compensation

\textsuperscript{99} \textit{Penn Central}, 438 U.S. at 124 (declaring that one of three factors of “particular significance” is “the character of the governmental action.”).

\textsuperscript{100} \textit{Id.} (“A ‘taking’ may more readily be found when the interference with property can be characterized as a physical invasion by government than when interference arises from some public program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common good.” (internal citation omitted)).

\textsuperscript{101} \textit{Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.}, 458 U.S. 419 (1982).


\textsuperscript{103} \textit{Id.} at 539.


\textsuperscript{105} \textit{Id.} at 51 (declaring that “[a]ll of the legislation in question here was clearly targeted at the \textit{Atlantic Star}, as the predecessor bills to the appropriations riders indicate.”).

\textsuperscript{106} \textit{Armstrong v. United States}, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960). \textit{See supra} Part III.B.
remedy for those “burdened in a way that makes it unlikely that they can find political allies.”107

Yet, in the end, just as good government motives do not excuse a taking,108 bad government motives are more associated with depriving an owner of due process of law than with a taking as such.

D. Lingle’s Paradoxical Fealty to Due Process-Based Takings Law

In addition to rehearsing that the “substantially advances” formulation is a due process test and not a takings tests, Lingle also presents a summary of its jurisprudence in the area.109


In Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel,110 the Supreme Court considered a company’s challenge to the heavy financial imposition that Congress placed upon it as part of the bailout of a coal industry health benefits plan. In her plurality opinion Justice O’Connor explained that the Court’s earlier decisions “have left open the possibility that legislation might be unconstitutional if it imposes severe retroactive liability on a limited class of parties that could not have anticipated the liability, and the extent of that liability is substantially disproportionate to the parties’ experience.”111 She wrote that the Court should consider the government’s action through the lens of takings analysis:

That Congress sought a legislative remedy for what it perceived to be a grave problem in the funding of retired coal miners’ health benefits is understandable; complex problems of that sort typically call for a legislative solution. When, however, that solution singles out certain employers to bear a burden that is substantial in amount, based on the employers’ conduct far in the past, and unrelated to any commitment that the employers made or to any injury they caused, the governmental action implicates fundamental principles underlying the Takings Clause.112


108 See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922) “We are in danger of forgetting that a strong public desire to improve the public condition is not enough to warrant achieving the desire by a shorter cut than the constitutional way of paying for the change.” Id. at 416.

109 Lingle, 544 U.S. at 536-40.


111 Id. at 528-29.

112 Id. at 537 (emphasis added).
The upshot of *Eastern Enterprises* is that while the O'Connor four-justice plurality found the federal statute violative of the Takings Clause, four dissenters found the statute permissible using due process analysis, and the swing voter, Justice Kennedy, found it violative of due process. Thus, *Eastern* is regarded as a due process case.\(^{113}\)

In *Lingle*, Justice O'Connor remained content to use due process-type analysis in Takings Clause applications and Justice Kennedy, who wrote a short concurrence to the Court’s unanimous opinion, rehearsed his argument that due process and takings analysis are distinct.\(^{114}\)

2. “Permanent” Physical Invasions.

In *Lingle*, the Court noted that its “precedents stake out two categories of regulatory action that generally will be deemed per se takings for Fifth Amendment purposes. First, where government requires an owner to suffer a permanent physical invasion of her property—however minor—it must provide just compensation.”\(^{115}\) The Court explained that “physical takings require compensation because of the unique burden they impose: A permanent physical invasion, however minimal the economic cost it entails, eviscerates the owner’s right to exclude others from entering and using her property—perhaps the most fundamental of all property interests.”\(^{116}\)

The description of a government act as having a “unique” effect, like the description of a child as “very special,” is, at the same time, both emphatic and devoid of particularized substantive content. In fact, in a series of case involving government commandeering of leasehold interest during World War II, the Court ruled that “temporary” physical invasions too are compensable.\(^{117}\) Furthermore:

“(P)ermanent” does not mean forever, or anything like it. * * * If the term “temporary” has any real world reference in takings jurisprudence, it logically refers to those governmental activities which involve an occupancy that is transient and relatively inconsequential.

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\(^{114}\) 544 U.S. at 548 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“This separate writing is to note that today’s decision does not foreclose the possibility that a regulation might be so arbitrary or irrational as to violate due process.) (citing *E. Enters.*, 524 U.S. at 539 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment and dissenting in part)).

\(^{115}\) 544 U.S. at 538. (citing Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982)).

\(^{116}\) *Id.* at 2082 (citing Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979) and other cases).

\(^{117}\) *See*, e.g., United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373 (1945).
and thus properly can be viewed as no more than a common law trespass.” 118

In *Kaiser Aetna*, the Court proposed that “that the ‘right to exclude,’ so universally held to be a fundamental element of the property right, falls within this category of interests that the Government cannot take without compensation.” 119 Rather anomalously, however, the Court backtracked in *PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins*. 120 There, the Court held that a state could authorize third parties to speak and collect petition signatures within privately-owned shopping centers, against the will of the owners. 121 The Court acknowledged *Kaiser Aetna*, but added: “it is well established that ‘not every destruction or injury to property by governmental action has been held to be a “taking” in the constitutional sense.’” 122 The Court went on to say that the exercise of free expression in shopping centers would not “unreasonably impair the value or use of their property,” that the signature gatherers were “orderly,” and so on. 123 Thus, what started as a “per se” right ended up enmeshed in a generalized discussion of burdens.

3. Deprivation of “All Economically Beneficial Use.”

In *Lingle*, the Court asserted that “[a] second categorical rule applies to regulations that completely deprive an owner of ‘all economically beneficial use’ of her property.” 124 This rule does seem property-based, since the right to use a thing is a traditional property right, and the government has appropriated it. A property rights-based takings jurisprudence, however, would result in the simple recital that government had taken the right of use and not paid compensation.

As *Lingle* put it: “We held in *Lucas* that the government must pay just compensation for such ‘total regulatory takings,’ except to the extent that ‘background principles of nuisance and property law’ independently restrict the owner’s intended use of the property.” 125 This statement in *Lucas* was dicta writ large, because five years earlier Justice Scalia, writing

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120 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
122 Id. at 82 (quoting *Armstrong v. United States*, 364 U.S. 40, 48 (1960)).
123 Id. at 83.
125 544 U.S. at 538 (quoting *Lucas*, 505 U.S. at 1026, 1032).
for the Court, had found the right to construct a residence to be an intrinsic property right. 126

However, the upshot of Lucas might be quite different than an almost-categorical victory for landowners. As an aspect of takings law and property rights more generally, Lucas has become enmeshed in “the turn to history” and the battle over the fruits of originalism in American law. 127 The result has led two commentators recently to exclaim:

[S]urprisingly enough, Lucas’s chief effect has been to make the nature of a claimant’s property interest a threshold issue in all takings cases. Instead of increasing the likelihood of either landowner compensation or deregulation, Lucas’s principal legacy lies in affording government defendants numerous effective categorical defenses with which to defeat takings claims. 128

4. The “Parcel as a Whole” Rule.

In Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York, Justice Brennan declared:

“Taking” jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel into discrete segments and attempt to determine whether rights in a particular segment have been entirely abrogated. In deciding whether a particular governmental action has effected a taking, this Court focuses rather both on the character of the action and on the nature and extent of the interference with rights in the parcel as a whole. 129

The Court confessed in Lucas that “uncertainty regarding the denominator in our “deprivation” fraction has produced inconsistent pronouncements by the Court.” 130 The Court subsequently expressed

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126 See Nollan v. California Coastal Comm’n, 438 U.S. 825, 833 n.2 (1987) (noting that “the right to build on one’s own property . . . cannot remotely be described as a ‘governmental benefit.’”).

127 See Laura Kalman, Border Patrol: Reflections on the Turn to History in Legal Scholarship, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 87 (1997). Kalman discusses the clash between Cass Sunstein and other civic republicans and Richard Epstein and others who saw the Founders as “acquisitive Lockeans.” Id. at 97-98.


130 505 U.S. at 1016 n.7. See also City of Coeur D’Alene v. Simpson, 136 P.3d 310, 319 n.6 (Idaho, 2006) (noting that “even commentators have experienced much difficulty in ascertaining any definitive test for defining the denominator parcel” citing John E. Fee, Comment, Unearthing the Denominator in Regulatory Taking Claims, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1535 (1994))
“discomfort” with the “parcel as a whole doctrine.”131 Nevertheless, the Court pledged renewed fealty to “parcel as a whole” the following year, in Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency.132 In Tahoe-Sierra, the total deprivation of economic use for a limited period of time was considered in the context of the indefinite time for which it had value.133 Thus, the opposite rule now applies to regulatory takings from that in physical takings, where the commandeering of a leasehold interest still requires compensation.134 The parcel as a whole rule remains subject to numerous additional infirmities.135

IV. A TAKINGS JURISPRUDENCE SHOULD BE BASED ON ARROGATION OF PROPERTY.

In her Lingle opinion for the Court, Justice O’Connor declared that “[w]hile scholars have offered various justifications for [the Takings Clause], we have emphasized its role in ‘bar[ring] Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.’”136 O’Connor articulated no reason why the Court placed such emphasis on the fairness principle, as opposed to other justifications for the Takings Clause. She made no attempt to enumerate or discuss these alternatives.

A. Reasserting the Integrity of Property.

The Takings Clause focuses on acts of government with respect to property. When the State arrogates private property to itself, there is a taking. Property, in the common law tradition, is in rem and not in personam in nature.137 The in rem nature of property differentiates property jurisprudence from contract jurisprudence. Thus, takings law should not focus on the relationship between government and owners, or even necessarily upon the relationship between property and its ownership claim-

131 Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 631.
133 Id. at 331
134 Id at 322.
135 See infra part I.A.1.
136 544 U.S. at 537 (quoting Armstrong, 364 U.S. at 49) (emphasis added).
The relevant question is: Was there private property, and did government take it?

Presumably, the legal scholarship should concentrate upon property-based answers to property takings questions. Yet modern legal scholarship has not been particularly interested in property-based solutions to the regulatory takings conundrum. One explanation is the conventional wisdom among academics is that “property” is an “(almost meaningless) label.” Another explanation is the popular notion that “property is simply a label for whatever ‘bundle of sticks’ the individual has granted.” Furthermore, those in the academy who might be expected to take the concept of property most seriously, the law and economics scholars, focus not on traditional property concepts, but rather on undifferentiated command over resources.

While the nature of private property and its ethical and economic utility are intuitively understood, theorists have long had substantial problems in defining “property,” and jurists have marveled at the many forms that property takes.

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138 In condemnation law, for instance, “[w]hen there are different interests or estates in the property, the proper course is to ascertain the entire compensation as though the property belonged to one person, and then apportion this sum among the different parties according to their respective rights.” Stanpark Realty Corp. v. City of Norfolk, 101 S.E.2d 527, 534 (Va.1958) (quoting LEWIS ON EMINENT DOMAIN, § 716).

139 Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, What Happened to Property in Law and Economics?, 111 YALE L.J. 357, 357 (2001); see also supra III.A.


141 See Merrill & Smith, supra note 139 at 358 (asserting that “modern economists assume that property consists of an ad hoc collection of rights in resources”).

142 For a recent survey of issues and scholarship, see Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, A Theory of Property, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 531 (2005).

143 See, e.g., Fla. Rock Indus. v. United States, 18 F.3d 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (Florida Rock IV). “Property interests are about as diverse as the human mind can conceive. Property interests may be real and personal, tangible and intangible, possessory and nonpossessory. They can be defined in terms of sequential rights to possession (present interests—life estates and various types of fees—and future interests), and in terms of shared interests (such as the various kinds of co-ownership). There are specially structured property interests (such as those of a mortgagee, lessee, bailee, adverse possessor), and there are interests in special kinds of things (such as water, and commercial contracts).” Id. at 1570. This despite the restraint that the common law has placed upon property not conforming to the standard models. See generally, Thomas W. Merrill and Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1 (2000).
If courts were to use a jurisprudence based on property rights, resolution of an inverse condemnation claim would be a simple two-step process. The court would determine whether (1) government took property, and, if so, (2) did it tender just compensation to the owner? If the answer to the first question was “yes,” and the answer to the second “no,” it would have violated the command of the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause. The court does not need to determine whether the property interest belonged to a private individual or entity. The Takings Clause is even applicable where one unit of government takes property belonging to another.144

B. Bases for Constraining the Takings Power Not Considered by the Court.

While the Armstrong fairness principle, as amplified by Penn Central, serves as the basis for the Court’s regulatory takings jurisprudence, the Court has not attempted to explain why this approach is constitutionally mandated, or even why it is preferable to alternatives.145 To the extent that the Court fails to articulate why it views a provision of the Bill of Rights in one manner rather than others, it detracts from the credibility of its holdings. In any event, the Court’s “ad hoc” approach to regulatory takings jurisprudence has left the lower courts without much guidance.146

1. Property Protects Liberty

Property has a vital role in the protection of liberty. Walter Lippmann wrote that “the only dependable foundation of personal liberty is the personal economic security of private property. . . . Men cannot be made free by laws unless they are in fact free because no man can buy and no man can coerce them. That is why the Englishman’s belief that his home

144 See, e.g., United States v. Carmack, 329 U.S. 230, 242 (1946) (federal taking of property belonging to a State or political subdivision).
145 See supra text accompanying note 136.
146 See, e.g., Gideon Kanner, Making Laws and Sausages: A Quarter-Century Retrospective on Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York, 13 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 679 (2005). “Penn Central lacks doctrinal clarity because of its outright refusal to formulate the elements of a regulatory taking cause of action, and because of its intellectual romp through the law of eminent domain that paid scant attention to preexisting legal doctrine. Its aftermath has become an economic paradise for specialized lawyers, a burden on the judiciary, as well as an indirect impediment to would-be home builders, and an economic disaster for would-be home buyers and for society at large. Id. at 681 (citing RICHARD F. BABCOCK, THE ZONING GAME 101-106 (1966)).
is his castle and that the king cannot enter it . . . [is] the very essence of the free man’s way of life.\textsuperscript{147}

Justice Thurgood Marshall observed that “[t]he constitutional terms ‘life, liberty, and property’ . . . have a normative dimension . . ., establishing a sphere of private autonomy which government is bound to respect.”\textsuperscript{148} Justice Kennedy, in \textit{United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property},\textsuperscript{149} applied what he termed “an essential principle: Individual freedom finds tangible expression in property rights.”\textsuperscript{150}

2. Economic Efficiency.

One reason for the “just compensation” requirement is to prevent government from being wasteful with resources that it otherwise would obtain at no cost—meaning, no direct expenditure from the public fisc. Public officials may perceive that property taken without compensation to the owner is “free.” However, such a taking imposes opportunity costs, consisting of the fair market value of the asset, together with private losses of subjective value borne by the former owner.\textsuperscript{151} It also discourages investment in property through the imposition of “demoralization costs” on actual and potential property owners who empathize with the owner.\textsuperscript{152} Thus, uncompensated takings are apt to result in a net loss to society and a net reduction in the general welfare.

Unfortunately, the just compensation requirement does not eliminate these problems. For understandable practical reasons, constitutional “just compensation” is defined as fair market value, not the subjective value asserted by the owner.\textsuperscript{153} However:

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{147} \textsc{Walter Lippmann, The Method of Freedom} 100-102 (1934) (quoted in Loveladies Harbor v. United States, 28 F.3d 1171, 1175 n. 8 (Fed. Cir. 1994)).
  \item \textsuperscript{149} \textit{United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property}, 510 U.S. 43 (1993) (holding that absent exigent circumstances, the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment requires that the Government give notice and an opportunity to be heard prior to its seizure of real property subject to civil forfeiture).
  \item \textsuperscript{150} \textit{Id.} at 61.
  \item \textsuperscript{152} See Michelman, \textit{supra} note 83, at 1214. These costs are defined to include the dollar amount that would be necessary to offset the disutility accruing to losers and their sympathizers from the realization that no compensation is offered, together with the present value of lost future production caused by the demoralization of those who suspect that they might later be subject to similar treatment. \textit{Id.}
  \item \textsuperscript{153} \textit{United States v. 50 Acres of Land}, 469 U.S. 24 (1984).
\end{itemize}
Compensation in the constitutional sense is . . . not full compensation, for market value is not the value that every owner of property attaches to his property but merely the value that the marginal owner attaches to his property. Many owners are “intramarginal,” meaning that because of relocation costs, sentimental attachments, or the special suitability of the property for their particular (perhaps idiosyncratic) needs, they value their property at more than its market value (i.e., it is not “for sale”).

When government takes property, it destroys the owner’s subjective value. To the extent that this asserted value is merely conjectured as a strategic bargaining ploy, the aggregate wealth of society is none the worse off. However, the assumption that the owners asserted subjective value is merely a bargaining ploy might well be wrong. Presumably, the value of the parcel to the condemnor exceeds its market price. However, the value to the condemnee might be higher than either the market price or the value to the condemnor. There simply is no easy way to discern the owner’s subjective value.

Professor James Buchanan noted that our satisfaction with the beneficial results produced by individuals who trade within markets have been subject to a “subtle shift toward a teleological interpretation.” “[T]he market came to be interpreted functionally, as if something called ‘the economy’ existed for the purpose of value maximization.” Casual disregard of the wiping out of owners’ subjective (i.e., non-market) value as a by-product of condemnation is an excellent example of Buchanan’s insight that “[e]fficiency in the market allocation of resources came to be defined independently of the processes through which individual choices are exercised.”

3. Avoidance of Corruption.

In Calder v. Bull, Justice Chase declared, with reference to “a law that takes property from A and gives it to B: It is against all reason and

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155 See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, The Economics of Public Use, 72, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 61 (1986) (noting that amount of subjective losses often is small and that “basic model” of eminent domain does not take subjective losses into account).


158 Id.
As the Supreme Court noted in *Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff*, “[a] purely private taking could not withstand the scrutiny of the public use requirement; it would serve no legitimate purpose of government and would thus be void.” This language sounds in substantive due process.

Calder explains such forced transfers from an ex post perspective, in terms of arbitrary government conduct. While government-mandated exchange always contains the possibility of arbitrary terms, government review is generally neither needed nor desirable in consensual market transactions, since the consenting parties all regard themselves as gaining from it. Each party to the agreement prefers it to any alternatives and thereby has maximized value and minimized costs.

While the exercise of eminent domain for retransfer to private redevelopers often is justified on the grounds of market failure, public choice theory indicates that inducements dangled before, or demanded by, public officials may indicate government failure. Under this economic (or “interest group”) theory of law, “legislation is a good demanded and supplied much as other goods, so that legislative protection flows to those groups that derive the greatest value from it, regardless of overall social welfare.”

Local legislatures and officials might most often show bias in favor of established majorities (principally suburban homeowners), however, the high stakes involved and highly localized nature of the decision has long led to concern that American land use determinations are marked by questionable dealmaking and bias. “Whatever the merit of

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159 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 388 (1798)
162 The seminal works of public choice theory include Kenneth Arrow, Social Choice and Individual Values (1951); Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (1957); and James Buchanan & Gordon Tullock, The Calculus of Consent (1962).
165 See, e.g., Robert C. Ellickson & Dan Tarlock, Land Use Controls 236-38 (1981) (discussing dealmaking and land use regulation); Carol M. Rose,
such practices, they heighten the potential for personal abuse and undermine the perception of zoning legitimacy.\textsuperscript{166} While there is little systematic evidence, a 2003 study of Iowa localities indicated a skewing of occupational interests of local decisionmakers towards those that would favor development and a general lack of regulations regarding disqualification for conflict of interests in particular cases.\textsuperscript{167}

Nevertheless, the Supreme Court recently affirmed in \textit{Kelo} that private individuals may benefit from exercises of the eminent domain power, so long as the primary benefit is to the public.\textsuperscript{168} But any lawful and profitable private business must cater to the needs of the community and thereby generate public benefit. “To justify the exercise of eminent domain solely on the basis of the fact that the use of that property by a private entity seeking its own profit might contribute to the economy's health is to render impotent our constitutional limitations on the government's power of eminent domain.”\textsuperscript{169} The conflation of “public use” and “public benefit” will engender strategic alliances of private interests and public officials who will find mutual benefit in initiating eminent domain actions and in resisting reform of eminent domain laws.\textsuperscript{170}

A due process approach to the problem of arbitrary condemnation and arbitrary retransfer, based on fairness to individual landowners, is perfectly understandable and consistent with American law since Justice Chase's admonition in \textit{Calder} two centuries ago.\textsuperscript{171} However, a property based approach to this problem would stress not only the importance of


\textsuperscript{168} See, e.g., \textit{Kelo v. City of New London}, 125 S.Ct. 2655, 2666 n.14 (2005) (observing that “the achievement of a public good often coincides with the immediate benefitting of private parties.”).


\textsuperscript{170} See Joshua E. Baker, \textit{Quieting the Clang: Hathcock as a Model of the State-Based Protection of Property Which \textit{Kelo} Demands}, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 351, 373-74 (2005); Timothy Sandefur, \textit{The “Backlash” So Far Will Citizens Get Meaningful Eminent Domain Reform?}, SL049 ALI-ABA 703, 741-742 (noting that benefits conferred by the transfer of private property through eminent domain will be localized and concentrated, while the costs are broadly dispersed, leading to effective lobbying against reform).

\textsuperscript{171} \textit{Calder v. Bull}, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 388 (1798)
the Public Use Clause, but also the importance of discouraging “rent seeking” conduct, whereby private individuals expend resources on convincing public officials to provide them with private gain. Such conduct not only wastes highly compensated professionals’ time and other valuable resources, but also reduces the efficacy of government by increasing public cynicism about the motives of public officials. “Market forces provide strong incentives for politicians to enact laws that serve private rather than public interests and hence statutes are supplied by lawmakers to the political groups or coalitions that outbid competing groups.”

One might also say that lawmakers satisfy the desire of developers for eminent domain, a practice that Professor Thomas Merrill described in this context as “secondary rent seeking.”

4. Specific vs. General Arrogations (Takings and Taxation)

Professor John Fee asserts that

The right of just compensation accorded to every property owner by the Takings Clause is that the Takings Clause is fundamentally an antidiscrimination principle. This explains, for example, why general taxes have never been understood to violate the Takings Clause, although taxes do diminish a person’s private wealth for public use.

The antidiscrimination principle is an important element in judging the constitutionality of both taxation and takings. However, the antidiscrimination principle would be no more offended by general takings, which typically are compensated through reciprocity of advantage than by general taxes. Likewise, taxes which are not general, but rather targeted out of malice, may constitute unconstitutional bills of attainder.


173 Merrill, supra note 155, at 85-88 (discussing capture of assembly value, the gain in value derived from assembling many small parcels into one large one suitable for development.


175 Reciprocity of advantage concisely states that owners harmed by the imposition of a general regulation upon them, such as a neighborhood requirement that houses be set back a certain distance from the street, are correspondingly benefited by the application of the same regulation to their neighbors. See, e.g., City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976) (upholding stringent restrictions on changes in facades for mutual benefit of owners in the French Quarter of New Orleans). Justice Holmes invoked “reciprocity of advantage” in Jackman v. Rosenbaum Co., 260 U.S. 22, 30 (1922); and, six weeks later, in his seminal takings case, Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).

176 See, e.g., United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 315 (1946) (holding that “legislative acts, no matter what their form, that apply either to named individuals or to
Therefore, while we might accept the proposition that taxes, in practice, tend to be more evenly (fairly) distributed than takings, the key is how “general” the taxes are and how extensive the takings are.

Another, and perhaps more potent explanation for the different treatment of taxes and takings, is that the former is manifested in undifferentiated demands for payment and the latter in the arrogation of specific assets. In his swing opinion in *Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel*, Justice Kennedy asserted that Takings Clause analysis ought to be reserved for government demands that “operate upon or alter an identified property interest,” while Due Process Clause analysis is employed for allegedly impermissible demands for money. Noting that regulatory takings cases “are among the most litigated and perplexing in current law,” he added that “Until today, however, one constant limitation has been that in all of the cases where the regulatory taking analysis has been employed, a specific property right or interest has been at stake.”

Since a tax is payable from the taxpayer’s fungible assets, the government’s receipt ought to be the measure of the taxpayer’s loss. On the other hand, where specific property is taken, the prior owner loses idiosyncratic value. When an individual loses a house in which he or she has lived for many years, and often, in consequence, a neighborhood with friends, family, doctors, and house of worship, much is lost that could not be compensated by money. In any event, what is lost is not included in the constitutional measure of “just compensation.”

The dignitary interest of the individual is implicated as well. “When the state puts a person’s things to use, the individual does not merely suffer economic injury. A servitude is forced upon him. He is made in a small or large way an instrumentality of the state.”

C. The Nature of Property Rights.

The legitimacy of a property-based approach to takings depends upon the presence of a serviceable definition of “property.” While there

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178 *Id.* at 540 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment and dissenting in part).
179 *Id.* at 541 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment and dissenting in part).
180 See *Coniston Corp. v. Village of Hoffman Estates*, 844 F.2d 461, 464 (7th Cir. 1988) (noting that, for these reasons, “[c]ompensation in the constitutional sense is therefore not full compensation”).
is no definition that satisfies all theorists, the best should not be the enemy of the good. Many fundamental rights and important statutory codes are incompletely defined.182

1. Property Consists Not of Things, But Rights to Use, Exclude and Alienate

The term “property” arises in many contexts and, partly for that reason, is susceptible to many interpretations. The most basic referent is “property” as “physical thing,” of which, as Blackstone famously put it, an individual could have “sole and despotic dominion.”183 In Blackstone’s view, the elements of “property” were the “physicalist” conception that an “external thing” had to serve as the object of property rights.184

Professor Bruce Ackerman has distinguished the “ordinary observer,” who would envision property as physical objects, from “scientific policymakers” who would appreciate that property refers to rights in things vis-à-vis other people.185 Legal “things,” however, do not need to be tangible objects. Pollock and Maitland declared that “The realm of mediæval law is rich with incorporeal things. Any permanent right which is of a transferable nature … is thought to be a thing that is very like a piece of land.”186 Similarly, while Blackstone had sometimes referred to property as “things,” he treated both corporeal and incorporeal hereditaments as “property,” i.e., those “affecting the senses,” and those that “exist only in contemplation.”187 Professors Bell and Parchomovsky recently reiterated: “Property’s usage of the concept of ‘thing’ is capacious,

182 See, e.g., United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 176 (defining “religious belief” of a nonbeliever for conscientious objector to military service status to include a “sincere and meaningful belief which occupies in the life of its possessor a place parallel to that filled by the God”); Internal Revenue Code § 61(a) (enumerating principal categories of, but not completely defining, “gross income”).


185 Bruce Ackerman, Private Property and the Constitution 15 (1977) (contrasting the “Ordinary Observer’s physical understanding of property with the Scientific Policymaker’s abstract understanding).


187 2 William Blackstone, Commentaries *17 (1765) (available at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/blackstone/bk2ch2.htm). A “hereditament” is “whatsoever may be inherited.” Id.
including not just tangible items but also ideas and qualities. Accordingly, intangible goods such as ideas, expressions, or symbols may be proper subjects of property law.”

The term “bundle of rights” originated in the late nineteenth century.189 Wesley Hohfeld190 and A.M. Honoré191 developed the concept that property is a complex set of rights and duties among individuals. Unlike the unitary “sole and despotic dominion” posited by Blackstone, Hohfeld’s property owner possesses “a complex aggregate of rights, privileges, powers, and immunities against other persons.”192 The various sticks in the bundle owned by different landowners constitute “different classes of jural relations” which are “strikingly independent” of each other.193

The model quickly gained “broad acceptance” among legal scholars,194 and was accepted to the point where lawyers and judges shared a “near unanimous” agreement on the bundle-of-rights analysis.195 However, while the “bundle of rights” model remains popular with judges and lawyers, it has lost its cachet among property theorists.196

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189 The term seems to have originated in John Lewis, A Treatise on the Law of Eminent Domain in the United States 43 (1888) (“The dullest individual among the people knows and understands that his property in anything is a bundle of rights.”) (quoted in J.E. Penner, The “Bundle of Rights” Picture of Property, 43 UCLA L. REV. 711, 713 n.8 (1996).
190 Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16 (1913) [hereinafter Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions]; Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 26 YALE L.J. 710 (1917) [hereinafter Fundamental Legal Conceptions].
192 Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conception, supra note 190, at 746.
193 Id. at 747.
194 Vandevelde, supra note 184 at 361.
196 See Michael A. Heller, Three Faces of Private Property, 79 OR. L. REV. 417, 431-32 (2000) (describing the model as “waning” and naming leading scholars who are searching for a replacement that would “resonate with existing property debates” and “better describe new possibilities”).
Notably, Professor Thomas Grey argued that, in ordinary speech, the term “private property” has no uniform meaning, and that the term refers to, among other things, a parcel, the right to exclude others, or the right to resist or to be compensated for eminent domain.\textsuperscript{197}

The conclusion of all this is that discourse about property has fragmented into a set of discontinuous usages. The more fruitful and useful of these usages are those stipulated by theorists; but these depart drastically from each other and from common speech. Conversely, meanings of “property” in the law that cling to their origin in the thing-ownership conception are integrated least successfully into the general doctrinal framework of law, legal theory, and economics. It seems fair to conclude from a glance at the range of current usages that the specialists who design and manipulate legal structures of the advanced capitalist economies could easily do without using the term “property” at all.\textsuperscript{198}

Professor Heller attributes the “demise” of the property-as-thing metaphor in part to the fact that “it does not help identify boundaries of complex governance arrangements and modern intangible property.”\textsuperscript{199} He notes that, although the thing-ownership metaphor is “superseded in property theory,” it still resonates today in popular understanding.\textsuperscript{200}

Other commentators, however, have criticized Professor Grey’s approach.\textsuperscript{201} Professor Richard Epstein asserts that “[t]he great vice in Grey’s argument is that it fosters an unwarranted intellectual skepticism, if not despair. He rejects a term that has well-nigh universal usage in the English language because of some inevitable tensions in its meaning, but he suggests nothing of consequence to take its place.”\textsuperscript{202} Epstein cites Hanna Pitkin’s observation that “[a] varied usage is not the same thing as a vague usage. [T]he need for making distinctions is exactly contrary to the vagueness which results from failure to distinguish.”\textsuperscript{203}

\textsuperscript{197}Thomas Grey, \textit{The Disintegration of Property}, in \textit{PROPERTY} (J. Roland Pennock and John W. Chapman eds., NOMOS monograph no. 22, 1980).
\textsuperscript{198}Id. at 163.
\textsuperscript{199}Heller, \textit{supra} note 196, at 430.
\textsuperscript{200}Id.
\textsuperscript{201}See, e.g., STEPHEN R. MUNZER, A THEORY OF PROPERTY 31-36 (1990) (disapproving of the “claim that... the notion of property is too fragmented to allow for a general theory”).
\textsuperscript{203}Id. (quoting HANNA FENICHEL PITKIN, \textit{THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION} 8-9 (1967)).
The importance in a democratic society of freedom of expression is a powerful justification for not getting bogged down in the problem, at the margin, of discerning “speech” from conduct. Likewise:

If property is not a “thing,” not a special entity, not a sacred right, but a bundle of legal entitlements subject, like any other, to rational manipulation and distribution in accordance with some vision of public policy, then it can serve neither a real nor a symbolic function as boundary between individual rights and governmental authority. Property must have a special nature to serve as a limit to the democratic claims of legislative power.204

Professor Stephen Munzer, among others, shares this view.205 Moreover, the persistence of the strong associative link between “property” and “thing” is powerful testimony to its intuitive importance.206

2. Property is not a different concept for physical and regulatory takings.

In *Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency*,207 the Supreme Court found that a 32-month moratorium on all economically viable use did not constitute a taking. The physical occupation of the land by the Agency for a similar period clearly would have constituted a taking,208 as would a regulation of indefinite duration prohibiting all economically viable use.209 By way of explaining this apparent disparity, the Court stated:

The text of the Fifth Amendment itself provides a basis for drawing a distinction between physical takings and regulatory takings. Its plain language requires the payment of compensation whenever the government acquires private property for a public purpose, whether

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204 JENNIFER NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM: THE MADISONIAN FRAMEWORK AND ITS LEGACY 239 (1990). “Eliminate the sense of the term ‘private property,’ and it becomes easy to knock out the constitutional pillars that support the institution, thereby expanding both the size and discretionary power of government.” EPSTEIN, supra note 202, at 21.

205 STEPHEN A. MUNZER, A THEORY OF PROPERTY 31-36 (1990) (disparaging the “claim that... the notion of property is too fragmented to allow for a general theory”).

206 See, e.g., Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 142, at 577 ("The popular view, in fact, reflects the accurate perception that the law of property has an important relationship to things.").


208 Id. at 322 (citing United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373 (1945); United States v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372 (1946)).

209 Id. at 325 n.19 (citing Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1017 (1992)).
the acquisition is the result of a condemnation proceeding or a physical appropriation. But the Constitution contains no comparable reference to regulations that prohibit a property owner from making certain uses of her private property.

Our jurisprudence involving condemnations and physical takings is as old as the Republic and, for the most part, involves the straightforward application of *per se* rules. Our regulatory takings jurisprudence, in contrast, is of more recent vintage and is characterized by “essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries,” designed to allow “careful examination and weighing of all the relevant circumstances.”

The case regarding the Court’s decision to base its takings jurisprudence on the “Armstrong principal” was of this same “recent vintage,” and this reasoning also is an extended ipse dixit. The fact that the Fifth Amendment provides “a” basis for drawing a particular distinction does not imply that the distinction must, or even should, be drawn. The Court surely is on safe ground in suggesting that compensation is the necessary outcome of a judicial proceeding in which the State seeks title and where the Public Use Clause also is satisfied. Beyond that, the Court proceeds by analogies, the validity of which are not self-evident.

The Court defines “property” as the parcel of land, precisely the “vulgar” usage it earlier rebuked in *United States v. General Motors Corp.* Thus, it asserts that “plain language” requires compensation for a physical appropriation, that the Fifth Amendment includes “no comparable reference” to regulations prohibiting “certain uses.” But the distinction here between “property” and “use” is one not stated in “plain language”, but rather inferred from the Court’s language.

Similarly, the fact that cases involving physical takings are “as old as the Republic” and that regulatory takings cases are of “more recent vintage” may say more about the sweeping severity of recent regulations, particularly those pertaining to the environment, than they do about distinctions in modes of adjudication. In a footnote to the Court’s discussion, it adds that in the case of physical appropriation, “the fact of a taking is typically obvious and undisputed.”

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210 *Id.* at 321-22 (internal citations omitted).
211 See paragraph associated with note 136, supra. See generally, Part IV.B.
212 323 U.S. 373, 378 (1945) (warning against use of the term “property” “in its vulgar and untechnical sense of the physical thing with respect to which the citizen exercises rights recognized by law.”). Compare, Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 581 (1937) (first U.S. Supreme Court use of term “bundle of rights” with respect to property). “Indeed, ownership itself ... is only a bundle of rights and privileges invested with a single name.” *Id.*
214 *Id.* at 322 n.17.
contends a taking has occurred because a law or regulation imposes restrictions so severe that they are tantamount to a condemnation or appropriation, the predicate of a taking is not self-evident, and the analysis is more complex.215

Basic definitions of “property” and “takings” are not altered by the fact that determinations in some cases are more complex than in others. Furthermore, the fact that physical appropriations constituting a taking “typically” are obvious and undisputed downplays the fact that there are many instances in which they are not.216

D. The Takings Clause Relates to the Property Taken—Not Its Owners.

Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment speaks uniformly of the rights of “persons” and “citizens,” including the requirement that States shall not “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”217

Every element of the Fifth Amendment has as its immediate reference the protection of “persons,” except for the requirement for just compensation. As the Supreme Court articulated over a century ago, in *Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States*218:

> [T]his just compensation, it will be noticed, is for the property, and not to the owner. Every other clause in this [F]ifth [A]mendment is personal. ‘No person shall be held to answer for a capital or otherwise infamous crime,’ etc. Instead of continuing that form of statement, and saying that no person shall be deprived of his property without just compensation, the personal element is left out, and the ‘just compensation’ is to be a full equivalent for the property taken.219

To be sure, the owner of the property at the time of the taking is entitled to receive the compensation.220 Nevertheless, the Constitution

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215 Id.
216 See, e.g., Hendler v. United States, 952 F.2d 1364, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (noting the difficulty in distinguishing the “permanent” occupation constituting a taking from “occupancy that is transient and relatively inconsequential” so as to constitute common law trespass). See also, McCarran Int’l Airport v. Sisolak, 137 P.3d 1110 (Nev. 2006) (holding land use regulations limiting height of buildings adjacent to airport a per se regulatory taking).
217 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
218 148 U.S. 312 (1893)
219 148 U.S. at 326.
220 U.S. CONST. amend. V; *Palazzolo*, 533 U.S. at 628 (“[I]t is a general rule of the law of eminent domain that any award goes to the owner at the time of the
commands that the government’s taking of “private property” will trigger the government’s obligation to pay, not any characteristics of the owner of the property.

E. Moving from “Parcel as a Whole” to Objective Definitions of “Property”

1. The Inadequacies of the “Parcel as a Whole” Rule

In *Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York*, Justice Brennan declared that “[i]n deciding whether a particular governmental action has effected a taking, this Court focuses rather both on the character of the action and on the nature and extent of the interference with rights in the parcel as a whole”221 The Court soon added, though, that *Penn Central* “gave no guidance on how one is to distinguish a ‘discrete segment’ from a ‘single parcel.’”222

Indeed, in many cases, courts have mechanically defined the “property” as the full extent of contiguous land under a common ownership.223 Often the courts do this without conscious awareness.224 In its most extravagant form, the “relevant parcel” in *Penn Central* was deemed by the New York Court of Appeals to include all of the land that the railroad company owned for miles along Park Avenue, in addition to Grand Central Terminal, or the air rights above it.225

Even where the landowner has previously sold a part of his or her initial holding, some courts still regard the original contiguous land as the standard for takings fraction analysis.226 There is a cottage industry in ascertaining what effect the prior history of a parcel, sales involving parts of the parcel, the owners’ expectations, and other factors have on determining whether the “parcel as a whole” or some lesser “relevant

223 *See*, e.g., *John E. Fee, Comment, Unearthing the Denominator in Regulatory Takings Claims*, 61 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1535 (1994) (citing cases).
224 Id.
225 366 N.E.2d 1271, 1276-77 (1977), aff’d, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). *See* *Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council*, 505 U.S. 1003, 1016 n.7 (referring to this analysis as “extreme—and, we think, unsupportable”).
226 *See* Deltona Corp. v. United States, 657 F.2d 1184 (Ct. Cl. 1981) (treating as relevant the original 10,000-acre parcel acquired for residential development even thought the developer had previously sold off parts of the tract).
parcel” is appropriate for analysis in a given case.\textsuperscript{227} The nature of the property right taken may affect the court’s determination of the relevant parcel.\textsuperscript{228} Additionally, the “discreteness” of the property right will affect how broadly the court interprets the relevant parcel.\textsuperscript{229}

The Court noted its “discomfort” with the “parcel as a whole doctrine” in \textit{Palazzolo v. Rhode Island}.\textsuperscript{230} Nevertheless, the Court reaffirmed the importance of the concept the following year, in \textit{Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council v. Council v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency}.\textsuperscript{231} While Tahoe-Sierra acknowledged that the Court has long treated government arrogation of physical possession as compensable, regardless of the “parcel as a whole” rule,\textsuperscript{232} it found that more “complex” analysis was required in regulatory takings cases.\textsuperscript{233}

Critics claim that determinations of whether there have been regulatory takings must occur within a context of relative deprivation to the owner because of the insurmountable problem of “conceptual severance.”\textsuperscript{234} “[E]very regulation of any portion of an owners ‘bundle of sticks’ is a taking of that particular portion considered separately, price regulations ‘take’ that particular servitude curtailing free alienability, building restrictions ‘take’ a particular negative easement curtailing control over development and so on.”\textsuperscript{235}

This means that owners will assert that a given “property right” should be defined so narrowly as to closely correspond with the proscriptions of a governmental regulation. By identifying the right that is


\textsuperscript{228} \textit{Id.} at 412 (“When the right to exclude others is at stake, the courts have tended to find that the relevant parcel is insignificant or at least relatively insignificant.”).

\textsuperscript{229} \textit{Id.} (“with water, mining, grazing, billboards or similar property rights, most jurisdictions would find that the claimed right is separate from the land to which it is appurtenant, so the relevant parcel becomes insignificant in the face of the loss of the right.”).

\textsuperscript{230} 533 U.S. 606, 631 (2001).

\textsuperscript{231} 535 U.S. 302 (2002) (extending “parcel as a whole” to the temporal axis of ownership, so that the significance of a complete deprivation of viable economic use for a 32-month period was considered within the context of an indefinite time frame).

\textsuperscript{232} \textit{Id.} at 322 (citing United States v. Pewee Coal Co., 341 U.S. 114, 115 (1951).

\textsuperscript{233} \textit{Id.} at 322 n.17; See also supra text accompanying note 215.

\textsuperscript{234} See Margaret Jane Radin, \textit{The Liberal Conception of Property: Cross Currents in the Jurisprudence of Takings}, 88 COLUM. L. REV 1667, 1676 (1988)

\textsuperscript{235} \textit{Id.}
taken with the limitation the government imposes by regulation, there
will always be a complete taking. However, the same objections could be
made, mutatis mutandis, from the landowner’s perspective. Through
what I have termed “conceptual agglomeration,” 236 disparate parcels
would be argued to constitute the relevant parcel, for the purpose of
minimizing the owner’s loss. 237

What is needed is an objective definition of the property right, one
that neither favors nor readily could be manipulated by either owner or
government actor.

2. The “Commercial Unit” and “Independent Economic Viability” as
Objective Definitions of “Property.”

At least two plausible definitions embodying the needed clarity and
objectivity have been proposed. The employment of either would pre-
vent the need for arcane inquiries in which the provenance and disposi-
tion of all of the landowner’s holdings in the vicinity would be needed.

The first test, proposed by Professor John Fee, employs the standard
of “independent economic viability.” 238 “Under this standard, a taking
has occurred when ‘any horizontally definable parcel, containing at least
one economically viable use independent of the immediately surround-
ing land segments, loses all economic use due to government regula-
tion.’” 239 The other standard, advocated by the present author, 240 is
based on the idea of the “commercial unit,” as introduced into commer-
cial law by the Uniform Commercial Code. The commercial unit
“[m]eans such a unit of goods as by commercial usage is a single whole
for purposes of sale and division of which materially impairs its charac-
ter or value on the market or in use.” 241 Under this standard, an owner
could claim a taking of a particular property interest, but would have the
burden of demonstrating that the interest asserted is one actually recog-
nized as traded in a market in the community in which it is located.

237 See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1016 n.7 (1992)
(decrying the decision of the New York Court of Appeals in Penn Central to include
in the relevant parcel the “total value of the taking claimant’s other holdings in the
vicinity” as an “extreme—and we think, unsupportable—view of the relevant cal-
culus.” (citing Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 366 N.E.2d 1271,
1276-77 (N.Y. 1977), aff’d, 438 U.S. 104 (1978)).
238 John E. Fee, Comment, Unearthing the Denominator in Regulatory Takings Claims,
239 Id. at 1538.
241 U.C.C. § 2-105(6).
The “commercial unit” quite naturally fits into our concept of property. As an indicium of the integrity of the referent of takings law, the “single whole,” a measure of that which was appropriated by government, far surpasses its imperfect proxy, the “parcel as a whole.”\(^{242}\) The latter is a measure not of the property but of its owner, i.e., the landholdings attributable to the takings claimant at some earlier time.

In addition to being more related to the concept of ownership in the sense of more clearly reflecting the property taken, the “commercial unit” also is responsive to the concept of ownership through its fidelity to rectification to harm to the property of others through nuisance law. Justice Robert Braucher\(^{243}\) has explained who wrote from the bench that an aspect of the “commercial unit” standard was it worked to ensure that “good faith and commercial reasonableness must be used to avoid undue impairment of the value of the remaining portion of the goods.”\(^{244}\)

Under the “commercial unit” test, a government regulatory action affecting any interest in land might be asserted to constitute a complete\(^ {245}\) or partial\(^ {246}\) regulatory taking. The claimant, however, would have the burden to establish that the relevant interest was a commercial unit. This would mean that the claimant would have to obtain evidence, likely through expert testimony from appraisers or brokers, that a market for such units did exist in the community. Sales of lots possessing similar characteristics and sales of air rights above similar commercial parcels are illustrative.

Under the “independent economic viability” test, both the takings claimant and the government would be free to obtain appraisals showing that the proffered relevant interest did or did not possess freestanding economic value.


\(^{243}\) Braucher served as Reporter for the RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS, SECOND before being appointed to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, See Lance Liebman, In Memoriam – E. Allan Farnsworth, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1429, 1429 n.1 (2005).

\(^{244}\) Axion Corp. v. G. D. C. Leasing Corp. 269 N.E.2d 664 (Mass. 1971) (discussing the relationship between the “Commercial Unit” provision, U.C.C. § 2–105(6), and the “Buyer’s Rights on Improper Delivery” provision, U.C.C. § 2–601(c)).


Both the “commercial unit” and “independent economic viability” tests are intended to provide objective measures that would prevent owners from engaging in “conceptual severance,” but also prevent governmental bodies from engaging in what I have termed “conceptual agglomeration.”

V. DEPRIVATION OF PROPERTY AND MEANINGFUL SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS JURISPRUDENCE.

One month after she issued her opinion in *Lingle*, Justice O’Connor quoted James Madison’s observation: “[T]hat alone is a just government which impartially secures to every man, whatever is his own.” This notion of “securing” property evokes John Locke’s account that individuals have the executive authority to protect their lives and property, a part of which they delegate to the State.

Since notions of substantive due process are not readily defined by text, their invocation tends to arouse the suspicion of conservative judges and Supreme Court justices. At least with respect to areas of the law in which it is out of favor, substantive due process also occasioned the ire of liberal justices. One could legitimately observe that the

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247 See Radin, supra n. 234.

248 STEVEN J. EAGLE, REGULATORY TAKINGS § 7-7(b)(2) (3d ed. 2005).


250 See JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 330-31 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1690) (“The only way whereby any one devests himself of his Natural Liberty, and puts on the bonds of Civil Society, is by agreeing with other Men to joyn and unite into a Community, for there comfort, safe and peaceable living one amongst another, in their secure Enjoyment of their Properties, and a greater Security against any that are not of it.”).

251 For example, University of Chicago law and economics scholar Frank Easterbrook, after taking his seat on the Seventh Circuit, declared: “Now we have spent some time looking through the Constitution for the Substantive Due Process Clause without finding it.” National Paint & Coatings Ass’n v. City of Chicago, 45 F.3d 1124, 1129 (7th Cir. 1995).

252 See, e.g., United States v. Carlton, 512 U.S. 26, 39 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“If I thought that ‘substantive due process’ were a constitutional right rather than an oxymoron, I would think it violated by bait-and-switch [i.e., ‘curative’] taxation.”).

253 See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 602 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“I also agree with Justice Souter’s exposition of the radical character of the Court’s
Court’s 1937 “switch in time” simply substituted certain Constitutional values preferred by some to those preferred by others.  

A. Lingle Signals the Need to Refocus on Property Deprivations and Due Process.

1. Lingle Rejects the Agins “Substantially Advances” Takings Test.

In Agins v. City of Tiburon, the Supreme Court enunciated a two-prong test for determining “whether the mere enactment of the zoning ordinances constitutes a taking.” The first prong stated that an ordinance effectuates a taking if it “does not substantially advance legitimate state interests.” The second prong stated that an ordinance effectuates a taking if it “denies an owner economically viable use of his land.”

Some commentators have insisted that “substantially advances” is indeed a takings test. Others have insisted that it is a substantive due process test. In Lingle, the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously held that its “substantially advances” takings “test” is a discredited takings “formula.” The Court conceded that Agins applied the “substantially advances” language and that Keystone Bituminous Coal Assn. v. DeBenedictis “arguably” applied the language. The Court insisted that the formulation was never applied to invalidate an ordinance, and that the other

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254 See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 769 (2d ed. 1988) (noting that “the basic relation between federal judges and political bodies has continued, without real interruption, to be one in which general constitutional principles are regularly invoked to strike down governmental choices.”). Tribe added that “the error of decisions like Lochner v. New York lay not in judicial intervention to protect ‘liberty’ but in a misguided understanding of what liberty actually required in the industrial age.” Id.


256 Id. at 260-61, citing Nectow, 277 U.S. 183, 188 (1928) (basing decision on substantive due process analysis).


cases that discussed it did so only in dicta. Lingle attempted to distinguish other cases in which a “substantially advances” inquiry might have played a role.

In Lingle, Justice O’Connor began by implying that the Court in Agins simply had not thought its “substantially advances” language through. She concluded:

Although a number of our takings precedents have recited the “substantially advances” formula minted in Agins, this is our first opportunity to consider its validity as a freestanding takings test. We conclude that this formula prescribes an inquiry in the nature of a due process, not a takings, test, and that it has no proper place in our takings jurisprudence.

To be sure, the distinction between Takings and Due Process is not nearly as simple as Justice O’Connor suggests. From colonial times through the first third of the 20th century, the protection of individuals from government deprivation of private property was predicated on substantive due process. More recently, the Supreme Court has recast the Takings Clause as the source of property protection. In Lingle, the Court pointedly disavowed due process terminology in Takings Clause analysis. However, “[t]he past is never dead. It’s not even past.”

In United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, the Supreme Court “rejected the view that the applicability of one constitutional amendment preempts the guarantees of another.” In fact, the Constitution provides many protections for property rights, including the Contract Clause, the Commerce Clause, and the doctrine of enumerated powers.

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262 The Court distinguished Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825 (1987) and Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994) on the grounds that the conditions that the regulators imposed for development permits were the equivalent of the simple appropriations of an easement which, if demanded independently, would have constituted a per se physical taking. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 545-46.

263 Id. at 2077 (“On occasion, a would-be doctrinal rule or test finds its way into our case law through simple repetition of a phrase--however fortuitously coined.”).

264 Id. at 2082-83.

265 WILLIAM FAULKNER, REQUIEM FOR A NUN (1950).


267 U.S. CONST. art. I § 10.
As *Lingle* makes clear, the Court has not, and still does not, draw a bright line between its older due process analysis and the substance of its newer takings analysis.\(^{270}\) Regulatory “takings” are still defined in terms of deprivation suffered by property owners and not in terms of clearly defined “property” taken by government. The problem highlighted by *Lingle*, then, is not that the “substantially advances” test is a bad test, but that clarity in takings jurisprudence would be greatly enhanced by a test more attuned to traditional property law concepts.


One salutary aspect of *Lingle* is its clarification that substantive due process claims are viable and are not, as some courts have pronounced, subsumed in property owners’ regulatory takings claims. The Court declared:

Instead of addressing a challenged regulation’s effect on private property, the “substantially advances” inquiry probes the regulation’s underlying validity. But such an inquiry is logically prior to and distinct from the question whether a regulation effects a taking, for the Takings Clause presupposes that the government has acted in pursuit of a valid public purpose.\(^{271}\)

In *Graham v. Connor*,\(^ {272}\) the Supreme Court held that a claim for physical injuries, asserted to result from excessive force in a police investigatory stop, should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment’s “objective reasonableness” standard, as opposed to under the substantive due process standard.\(^ {273}\)

The Court reviewed this holding in *Albright v. Oliver*,\(^ {274}\) and upheld the dismissal of the petitioner’s claim that a police officer violated his substantive due process rights by arresting him without probable cause.\(^ {275}\) The plurality opinion quoted *Graham* in declaring: “Where a particular Amendment ‘provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection’ against a particular sort of government behavior, ‘that Amendment,
not the more generalized notion of “substantive due process,” must be the guide for analyzing these claims.”

Prior to Lingle, the Courts of Appeals disagreed on whether the Graham doctrine precluded substantive due process claims in property deprivation cases. In Sinaloa Lake Owners Association v. City of Simi Valley,277 a Ninth Circuit panel held that Graham does not bar a companion substantive due process claim which alleges that “the government has used its power in an abusive, irrational or malicious way.”278 However, the court came to a different conclusion when it reviewed the issue en banc in Armendariz v. Penman.279 “Graham makes clear,” the Ninth Circuit declared, “that the scope of substantive due process, however ill-defined, does not extend to circumstances already addressed by other constitutional provisions.”280 Some circuits concurred in the Ninth Circuit approach,281 while others disagreed.282 A third approach, apparently adopted by the First Circuit, denied the essential relevance of the inquiry.283

In the first post-Lingle case on point, Consolidated Waste Systems, LLC v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville,284 the court surveyed the pre-Lingle split in the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals, explained that it did not regard due process claims as subsumed within takings claims, and added:

The [Supreme] Court’s recent decision in Lingle solidifies our conclusion because the Court rejected the “substantially advances” test as part of a regulatory takings analysis and made it

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277 882 F.2d 1398 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding federal district court has jurisdiction over § 1983 due process claim where the plaintiff alleged that the city arbitrarily drained community lake).
278 Id. at 1408-09 n.10. Accord, Hoeck v. City of Portland, 57 F.3d 781 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding federal district court has jurisdiction over § 1983 due process claim where owner spent $1 million in attempted restoration of vacant hotel that subsequently was demolished by city because of a crime problem).
279 75 F.3d 1311, 1326 (9th Cir. 1996) (en banc).
280 Id. at 1325.
281 See, e.g., Montgomery v. Carter County, 226 F.3d 758, 769 (6th Cir.2000).
283 South County Sand & Gravel Co., Inc. v. Town of South Kingstown, 160 F.3d 834, 836 (1st Cir. 1998) (“there is no need to submit to a tyranny of labels. In this case, the district court considered the issue under the substantive due process rubric and both parties cling tenaciously to that characterization. Moreover, the distinction between the two modes of analysis is, in the present circumstances, largely a matter of semantics.”).
clear that the validity of a zoning ordinance as an exercise of the
government’s police power is to be tested under traditional due
process rational basis principles. . . . After explaining the histori-
cal basis for the “commingling” in Agins of due process and tak-
ings inquiries, the Court made it clear that the analytical under-
pinnings of the claims were different.285

The ultimate import of separate due process review, however, de-
pends upon the standard employed by the courts in evaluating property
rights due process claims. Generally, the standard has been based upon
the Supreme Court’s holding in County of Sacramento v. Lewis.286 In that
case, brought by the parents of a motorcycle passenger killed in a high-
speed police chase of the motorcycle, the Court stated that “the core of
the concept” of due process is “protection against arbitrary action” and
that “only the most egregious official conduct can be said to be ‘arbi-
trary in the constitutional sense[,]’”287 With respect to the denial of land
development approval, substantive due process constrains only “grave
unfairness,” such as “a substantial infringement of state law prompted
by personal or group animus, or [] a deliberate flouting of the law that
trammels significant personal or property rights.”288

In Kelo v. City of New London,289 the concurring opinion of Justice
Kennedy, whose vote was necessary to the 5-4 majority, urged the adop-
tion of “the meaningful rational basis review that in my view is required
under the Public Use Clause.”290 He also cited to City of Cleburne v. Cle-
burne Living Center, Inc.,291 a case associated with “covert heightened scruti-
ty.”292

In fact, scholars and judges have long considered concepts of fairness
and proportionality in connection with takings liability. Professor Saul
Levmore has suggested that takings claims are inherently more compel-
ing when the deprived party was singled out as a target of opportu-

285 Id. 2005 WL 1541860 at *22.
287 Id. at 845-46.
290 Id. at 2670 (Kennedy, J., concurring)
291 473 U.S. 432, 446-447, 450 (1985)
292 See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1612 (2d ed.
1988).
nity.\textsuperscript{293} He added that the Public Use Clause “hints” at the distinction between easily organized interest groups, which partake somewhat of a “public” character and can protect themselves in the political arena, and isolated individuals, whose protection from deprivations is dependent on the Fifth Amendment.\textsuperscript{294} Likewise, United States Court of Federal Claims Judge Eric Bruggink has stated that Congressional “targeting” of a stringent regulation so as to thwart the plans of a particular company is an indication that the “character” of the governmental regulation test should augur in favor of a \textit{Penn Central} partial taking.\textsuperscript{295}

The adoption of some form of meaningful due process review in property deprivation cases would go a long way towards placing property rights on a par with other individual rights.\textsuperscript{296}

B. \textit{Due Process and Proportionality}

In his well-known Supreme Court “Foreword” for the \textit{Harvard Law Review}, Professor Gerald Gunther urged a model of Constitutional interpretation that “would have the Court take seriously a constitutional requirement that has never been formally abandoned: that legislative means must substantially further legislative ends.”\textsuperscript{297} In \textit{Lingle}, the Court has reaffirmed the legitimacy of ends-means review as a means of ensuring substantive due process.\textsuperscript{298}


\textsuperscript{294} \textit{Id.}


\textsuperscript{296} \textit{See Dolan v. City of Tigard}, 512 U.S. 374, 392 (1994) (“We see no reason why the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, as much a part of the Bill of Rights as the First Amendment or Fourth Amendment, should be relegated to the status of a poor relation in these comparable circumstances.”)


\textsuperscript{298} 544 U.S. at 542.
The Supreme Court purports to use a three-tiered model of strict scrutiny,\textsuperscript{299} heightened scrutiny,\textsuperscript{300} and rational basis review, also called deferential scrutiny\textsuperscript{301} in evaluating burdens placed upon individuals by government regulation. As Sixth Circuit then-Judge Danny Boggs has explained, rational basis review “exists first and foremost as a way of insuring that the economic policy formulated by legislatures will not be struck down as unconstitutional because it does not comport with \textit{laissez-faire}.”\textsuperscript{302} Judge Boggs added that “[s]trict scrutiny, by way of contrast, is the post-New Deal Supreme Court’s way of affirming its view of which rights shine the brightest in the constitutional firmament.”\textsuperscript{303} “Intermediate scrutiny [reflects] the Supreme Court’s desire to fashion constitutional protections for women, a group that has been historically victimized by intense and irrational discrimination, but that cannot properly be called either ‘discrete’ or ‘insular.’”\textsuperscript{304} Judge Boggs noted that “The Supreme Court’s authority to delineate these different tiers of judicial review is not apparent. Justices from the entire range of ideological perspectives have expressed their concerns with tiered judicial review.”\textsuperscript{305}

In practice, the Court’s scheme for review has been more elastic. According to Professor Cass Sunstein, “[t]he hard edges” of tiered review “have softened, and there has been at least a modest convergence away

\textsuperscript{299} E.g., Lawrence v. Texas 539 U.S. 558, 593 (2003) (“Our opinions applying the doctrine known as ‘substantive due process’ hold that the Due Process Clause prohibits States from infringing \textit{fundamental} liberty interests, unless the infringement is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.”

\textsuperscript{300} See, e.g., Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983) (analyzing whether the classification under review is “narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest.”).

\textsuperscript{301} Bray v. Alexandria Women’s Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 295 (1993) (“A routine legislative classification is, of course, subject only to deferential scrutiny, passing constitutional muster if it bears a rational relationship to some legitimate governmental purpose.”). It suffices that the Court could conceive a plausible reason for the regulation. \textit{See}, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 487 (1955) (holding that the state legislature “might have concluded” that eye examinations were necessary to prevent eye disease so as to legitimate the requirement of an optometrist’s prescription before acquiring or duplicating a lens).

\textsuperscript{302} Montgomery v. Carr, 101 F.3d 1117, 1121 (6th Cir. 1996).

\textsuperscript{303} \textit{Id.} (quoting United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (raising the possibility that stricter judicial review should be reserved for legislative action impinging upon “discrete and insular minorities.”)).

\textsuperscript{304} \textit{Id.}

\textsuperscript{305} \textit{Id. at} 1122.
from tiers and toward general balancing of relevant interests.” Commentators have used names such as “covert heightened scrutiny,” “second order rational basis,” and “rational basis with bite” to describe a test that is more stringent than the rubber stamping required by the rational basis test. The crux of the argument for this test is that the court should examine not whether the regulation might be supportable under the police power in some conceivable circumstance, but whether the regulation is supportable under the police power in the specific circumstances of the case before the court.

City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center is probably the most well-known covert heightened scrutiny case. There, a Texas city had denied the special use permit for a group home for the mentally retarded, which had requested the permit pursuant to a municipal zoning ordinance requiring a permit for such a home. The site of the home was zoned such that apartment houses, boarding houses, apartment hotels, fraternity houses, and all hospitals, sanitariums, and nursing homes other than those for the insane, feeble minded, alcoholics, or drug addicts were allowed without request for a special permit. The district court determined that the ordinance was constitutional.

After refusing to recognize the mentally retarded as a protected class or “quasi-suspect class,” Justice White examined and dismissed each of the proffered arguments for treating homes for the mentally retarded different than other hospitals and nursing homes. The court ultimately determined that the ordinance should be invalidated because “the record [did not reveal any rational basis for believing that the . . . home would pose any special threat to the city’s legitimate interests.”

307 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1612 (2d ed. 1988)
311 Id. at 435.
312 Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 437 n.4.
313 Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 437.
314 Id.
315 Id. at 433.
The Court has used covert heightened scrutiny in several other cases in recent decades, including *Zobel v. Williams*,316 *Hooper v. Bernalillo County Assessor*,317 *Plyler v. Doe*,318 *Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Ward*,319 and *United States Department of Agriculture v. Moreno*.320 These statutes were struck down on the grounds they gave an advantage to long-time or at least existing state residents legally in the United States despite a lack of evidence that the state legislatures did not give the issues careful consideration or that their decisions were implausible.

In *Romer v. Evans*,321 the Supreme Court struck as violative of the Equal Protection Clause a Colorado constitutional amendment that prohibited all legislative, executive, or judicial action designed to protect homosexual persons from discrimination. Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court, declared that the Amendment’s “sheer breadth is so discontinuous with the reasons offered for it that the amendment seems inexplicable by anything but animus toward the class that it affects; it lacks a rational relationship to legitimate state interests.”322

The common thread in all of these cases is that they required the court to look beyond whether the State’s constitutional or statutory provision could conceivably be justified by the state’s police power. Rather, the Court analyzed whether the provision’s application was justified given the actual facts presented in the case.

C. Determining a Meaningful Due Process Standard.

1. The Need for a Property Interest.

In *Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth*,323 the Supreme Court held that a due process challenge to a governmental action must be predi-

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317 472 U.S. 612 (1985) (deeming tax exemption to Vietnam Veterans only if residents of state by date arguably related to end of war “irrational”).
319 470 U.S. 869 (1985) (finding no rational basis for an Alabama statute that gave lower tax rates to Alabama companies).
320 413 U.S. 528 (1973) (holding that the Food Stamp Act’s discrimination against unrelated persons living together was not rationally related to a legitimate government interest).
322 Id. at 632.
323 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
cated upon a “deprivation of interests encompassed by the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of liberty and property.” The U.S. Courts of Appeals have adopted varying standards for determining what constitutes the requisite property interest in land use cases.

The Third Circuit held, in DeBlasio v. Zoning Board of Adjustment, that an ownership interest in the land qualifies. Other courts have utilized a structural “entitlement” analysis, focusing on the degree of discretion permitted the regulator. Thus the Second Circuit, in RRI Realty Corp. v. Village of Southampton, noted that its post-Roth cases “have been significantly influenced by the Roth “entitlement” analysis.” The court noted that it had earlier “focused initially on whether the landowner had ‘a legitimate claim of entitlement’ to the license he sought and formulated the test for this inquiry to be that ‘absent the alleged denial of due process, there is either a certainty or a very strong likelihood that the application would have been granted.” Other circuits have adopted similar formulations.

In George Washington University v. District of Columbia, the District of Columbia Circuit analyzed these standards, and termed the entitlement analysis “a ‘new property’ inquiry.” The court concluded that the University had a protectable property interest in use of land under either the ownership interest or the “new property” standard.

2. What Governmental Action Should Constitute a Denial of Due Process?

In County of Sacramento v. Lewis, the Supreme Court stated that “the core of the concept” of due process is “protection against arbitrary action” and that “only the most egregious official conduct can be said to

324 Id. at 569.
325 53 F.3d 592, 601 (3d Cir. 1995)
326 870 F.2d 911 (2d Cir. 1989)
327 Id. at 917.
328 Id. (quoting Yale Auto Parts, Inc. v. Johnson, 758 F.2d 54, 59 (2d Cir. 1985)).
329 Gardner v. Baltimore, 969 F.2d 63, 68 (4th Cir. 1992); Bituminous Materials v. Rice County, 126 F.3d 1068, 1070 (8th Cir. 1997); Jacobs, Visconi & Jacobs Co. v. City of Lawrence, 927 F.2d 1111 (10th Cir. 1991); Spence v. Zimmerman, 873 F.2d 256, 258 (11th Cir. 1989).
331 Id. at 206-07 (citing Charles Reich, The New Property, 73 Yale L.J. 733 (1964)).
332 Id. at 207.
be ‘arbitrary in the constitutional sense.’”\footnote{\textit{Id.} at 845-46; \textit{see also supra} text accompanying note 287.} Quoting its earlier decision in \textit{Collins v. Harker Heights},\footnote{\textit{Lewis}, 523 U.S. at 847 (quoting \textit{Collins}, 503 U.S. at 128).} \textit{Lewis} added “we said again that the substantive component of the Due Process Clause is violated by executive action only when it ‘can properly be characterized as arbitrary, or conscience shocking, in a constitutional sense.’”\footnote{\textit{Lewis}, 523 U.S. at 847 (quoting \textit{Collins}, 503 U.S. at 128).} It is understandable that the Supreme Court would be reluctant to impose on police officers and their departments liability for split-second close calls in life or death matters. However, it is not apparent that the same standard should apply to situations where government officials have substantial periods of time to consider their actions and the court generally has power to put the plaintiff in the same position he was in before the complained of government action.

Many circuits have adopted the “shocks the conscience” standard in land use cases.\footnote{\textit{See}, e.g., \textit{Torromeo v. Town of Fremont}, 438 F.3d 113, 118 (1st Cir. 2006), \textit{cert. denied}, ___ S.Ct. ____, 2006 WL 2066643 (Oct. 2, 2006). (“We recently explained the limits on substantive due process claims arising from land-use disputes . . . ‘[s]ubstantive due process prevents governmental power from being used for purposes of oppression, or abuse of government power that shocks the conscience[].’”) (quoting \textit{SFW Arecibo Ltd. v. Rodríguez}, 415 F.3d 135, 141 (1st Cir.2005),).} In \textit{United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc. v. Township of Warren},\footnote{316 F.3d 392 (3d Cir. 2003).} then-Judge Samuel Alito held that the allegation that local officials denied a permit to a theater that refused to pay a very high impact fee, and granted the permit to a theater that would pay the fee, stated a cause of action under the “shocks the conscience” standard. Recently, in \textit{County Concrete Corp. v. Town of Roxbury},\footnote{442 F.3d 159 (3rd Cir. 2006).} the Third Circuit held that while \textit{United Artists} applied the “shocks the conscience” standard in a case involving executive action, the appropriate standard for legislative action was different. The court quoted then-Judge Alito in this point as well:

“‘[T]ypically, a legislative act will withstand substantive due process challenge if the government “identifies the legitimate state interest that the legislature could rationally conclude was served by the statute.’” On the other hand, non-legislative state action violates sub-

\begin{quote}
\footnote{\textit{Id.} at 845-46; \textit{see also supra} text accompanying note 287.} \footnote{\textit{Lewis}, 523 U.S. at 847 (quoting \textit{Collins}, 503 U.S. at 128).} \footnote{\textit{Lewis}, 523 U.S. at 847 (quoting \textit{Collins}, 503 U.S. at 128).} \footnote{\textit{See}, e.g., \textit{Torromeo v. Town of Fremont}, 438 F.3d 113, 118 (1st Cir. 2006), \textit{cert. denied}, ___ S.Ct. ____, 2006 WL 2066643 (Oct. 2, 2006). (“We recently explained the limits on substantive due process claims arising from land-use disputes . . . ‘[s]ubstantive due process prevents governmental power from being used for purposes of oppression, or abuse of government power that shocks the conscience[].’”) (quoting \textit{SFW Arecibo Ltd. v. Rodríguez}, 415 F.3d 135, 141 (1st Cir.2005),).} \footnote{316 F.3d 392 (3d Cir. 2003).} \footnote{442 F.3d 159 (3rd Cir. 2006).} v.1.5.07
stantive due process if "arbitrary, irrational, or tainted by improper motive," or if "so egregious that it 'shocks the conscience.'"\textsuperscript{340} While "shocks the conscience" appears a near insurmountable bar, the Third Circuit’s treatment of the test in practice is suggests a more meaningful level of scrutiny.

The First Circuit adopted a similar standard in \textit{Creative Environments, Inc. v. Estabrook},\textsuperscript{341} where it noted that “[a]pplication of the ‘shocks the conscience’ standard in this context also prevents us from being cast in the role of a ‘zoning board of appeals.”\textsuperscript{342} Other cases, especially older ones, do not necessarily include the “shocks the conscious” or “egregious” label.\textsuperscript{343}

Unlike the police chase in \textit{County of Sacramento v. Lewis},\textsuperscript{344} property rights cases typically involve determinations that are reviewable by supervisors and local officials at their leisure, and with the assistance of the city attorney. As such, the final rendition of decisions based on arbitrary or capricious behavior may be seen as premeditated ratification of such misconduct.

Meaningful substantive due process review would not necessarily require that burdens be placed upon the regulator in the nature of heightened or strict scrutiny. All that meaningful substantive due process review would be require is basic ends-means analysis and some showing of proportionality. The bar would be low, but unlike the situation with deferential rational basis review, the locality would have to meet it.

In \textit{Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A.},\textsuperscript{345} the Court did not repudiate its pronouncement, first made in \textit{Agins v. City of Tiburon},\textsuperscript{346} that a regulation does not pass muster if it “does not substantially advance legitimate state interests.”\textsuperscript{347} To the contrary, it ratified that formulation—not as a takings test—but rather as a test to determine if landowners have been accorded due process. The simple comparison of the asserted interests and how they would be advanced with the facts that was employed by the

\textsuperscript{340} \textit{Id.} at 169 (quoting Nicholas v. Pennsylvania State Univ., 227 F.3d 133, 139 (3rd Cir. 2000)).

\textsuperscript{341} 680 F.2d 882, 883 (1st Cir. 1982).

\textsuperscript{342} \textit{Id.} at 883.

\textsuperscript{343} \textit{See, e.g., Estate of Himelstein v. City of Fort Wayne, 898 F.2d 573, 577 (7th Cir. 1990)} ("[i]n an arbitrary and unreasonable [manner] bearing no substantial relationship to the public health, safety or welfare").

\textsuperscript{344} 523 U.S. 833 (1998).

\textsuperscript{345} 544 U.S. 528 (2005).

\textsuperscript{346} 447 U.S. 255 (1980).

\textsuperscript{347} \textit{Id.} at 260-61.
Supreme Court in cases such as Cleburne\textsuperscript{348} and Zobel\textsuperscript{349} would exemplify the “meaningful” requirement.

VI. CONCLUSION

It is understandable, given that land use regulation is highly local and fact-intensive in nature, that federal courts might be hesitant to vindicate individual Takings and Due Process Clause rights in this area. However, in \textit{Cohens v. Virginia}, Chief Justice Marshall declared: “It is most true that this Court will not take jurisdiction if it should not: but it is equally true, that must take jurisdiction, if it should. . . . We have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given than to usurp that which is not given.”\textsuperscript{350}

The Supreme Court recently quoted this “famous caution[]” in the first sentence of a case\textsuperscript{351} that pruned back the so-called “probate” exception to federal jurisdiction. It is instructive to compare that treatment, in a highly technical and compact subject matter area with the Court’s unwillingness to decide property rights cases.

It would be ironic if the current Supreme Court, clinging as it does to the “Armstrong principle of fairness,” would shirk in its duty to clearly state effective due process and takings tests for application by federal and state courts.

\textsuperscript{348} 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
\textsuperscript{349} 457 U.S. 55 (1982).
\textsuperscript{350} 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821).