PUBLIC USE IN THE DIRIGISTE TRADITION: PRIVATE AND PUBLIC BENEFIT IN AN ERA OF AGGLOMERATION

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Public Use in the Dirigiste Tradition:
Private and Public Benefit in an Era of Agglomeration


By Steven J. Eagle*

Abstract

This article analyzes the development of eminent domain law, focusing on the U.S. Supreme Court and the New York Court of Appeals’ approach to the requirement that takings be for “public use.” It asserts that the Supreme Court’s public use doctrine is conceptually incomplete. In applying that doctrine and its own precedents, the Court of Appeals acts in the State’s tradition of dirigisme, and subordinates constitutional protections for private property to centralized development. Its recent Goldstein and Kaur opinions, uncritically supporting development for economic agglomeration, are the culmination of this approach.

The article also discusses implications for public policy arising from condemnation for transfer for private redevelopment, as hastened by government efforts to stimulate agglomeration. These include a lack of transparency, secondary rent seeking, possibilities of corruption resulting from crony capitalism, and the inefficient use of public and private recourses.

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This Article is about dirigisme, the “policy of state direction and control in economic and social matters,” as it relates to state control of land use. It also is about the Public Use Clause, its evasive conceptualization by the U.S. Supreme Court, and the New York Court of Appeals’ reflexive application of the Supreme Court’s public use cases. As the French proverb would put it, the Court of Appeals’ abrogation of its duty, together with an underlying policy that takes us down the path of inefficient land use and crony capitalism, is worse than a crime, it is a blunder.

The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in *Kelo v. City of New London* makes clear that the exercise of eminent domain no longer is constrained by traditional concepts of use by the public and the prevention of harm. The New York Court of Appeals had reached that conclusion over forty years earlier, by *Cannata v. City of New York*. However, the majority in *Kelo* expressly assured that courts would confront abuses of eminent domain, when and if they arise.

In *Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank*, the Supreme Court implicitly assured that federal courts would review claims that state and local governments took private property in violation of the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause, although those claims first would have to be “ripened” in state court. Yet, as it turns out, the doctrine of collateral estoppel means that the very act of ripening a case for

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1. SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 692 (6th ed. 2007).
3. 182 N.W.2d 395, 397 (N.Y. 1962) (upholding condemnation of mostly vacant area subdivided as to “prevent effective economic development”).
5. *Id.* at 186.
federal judicial review precludes its merits from being considered by the federal court. As Professor Thomas Roberts observed, the landowners “understandable reaction” is that this “perpetrates a fraud or hoax.”7 “Ironically, an unripe suit is barred at the moment it comes into existence. Like a tomato that suffers vine rot, it goes from being green to mushy red overnight. It is never able to be eaten.”8 Roberts was not troubled by this apparent bait-and-switch, being dismayed only by the fact that it “is surprising to those who are misled by the language of ripeness, which suggests that the state law suit is merely preparatory to a federal suit.”9

The State of New York has a tradition of strong government in many areas, including land use regulation and takings.10 The New York Court of Appeals has a tradition of deference to legislative and administrative actions.11 Recent decisions by the Court of Appeals in Goldstein v. New York State Urban Development Corp.,12 and Kaur v New York State Urban Development Corp.,13 together with a U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit decision in the related Goldstein v. Pataki,14 forebode that the Supreme Court’s assurances in Kelo that courts will confront eminent domain abuse will prove as evanescent as the Williamson tomato that turns from green to mushy red.

Ultimately, Goldstein and Kaur represent a continuation of the late Chief Judge Charles D. Breitel’s declaration, in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New

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8 Id.
9 Id. Roberts characterized the state compensation prong of Williamson “as a forum restricting rule, rather than a ripeness rule, provides more accuracy and safety.” Id. at 39.
12 921 N.E.2d 164 (N.Y. 2009).
14 516 F.3d 50 (2nd Cir. 2008).
that the State commands “the accumulated indirect social and direct governmental investment” that provided most of its value to physical property.\textsuperscript{16}

I. Dirigisme and New York

Dirigisme has long antecedents in New York law and policy, dating to the philosophical underpinnings of the State’s constitution and law.\textsuperscript{17} It is perhaps best associated with the economic policies of New York’s Alexander Hamilton, who was convinced of the need and desirability of government involvement in the state and national economy.\textsuperscript{18} Hamilton wanted a “government that would actively participate in the economy, regulating it and creating monopolies as it saw fit…. [seeking]… not to create an economy based on free enterprise, but one based on regulation and government intervention.”\textsuperscript{19} Despite Hamilton’s untimely death, his economic philosophy survived and prospered, and was put to almost immediate use in the state’s support for the Erie Canal.\textsuperscript{20} Hamilton’s successors such as DeWitt Clinton saw great potential economic benefits in completing the massive infrastructure project, and when private attempts to finance and construct the Erie Canal failed, they were eager to step in and direct the development in the direction they saw fit.\textsuperscript{21} A successor to Governor Clinton, William H. Seward, declared:

\begin{quote}
[I]t is not only the right but the \textit{bounden duty} of the legislature to adopt measures for overcoming physical obstructions to trade and commerce in this state, and for furnishing to each region, as far as reasonable, practicable facilities of access to
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{16} \textit{Id.} at 1272-73 (emphasis added). \textit{See infra} Part IV.A.1 for discussion.
\textsuperscript{18} STEPHEN F. KNOTT, ALEXANDER HAMILTON AND THE PERSISTENCE OF MYTH, 43, 54 (2002).
\textsuperscript{20} New York State Canal History: The Story of The New York State Canals Governor Dewitt Clinton's Dream (\textit{available at} http://www.canals.ny.gov/cculture/history/finch/index.html (last visited Jan. 24, 2011)).
\textsuperscript{21} \textit{Id.}
the great commercial emporium of the Union, fortunately located within our own borders.\textsuperscript{22}

In addition to sparking enthusiasm for major internal improvements, the Erie Canal significantly altered the development of New York law. “Despite the previous century's insistence on natural rights, of which property ownership was one, American citizens began to realize that this interpretation of property rights would impede the country's ability to expand and prosper economically. To achieve this new economic development, it was necessary for private individuals to sacrifice their property for the canal.”\textsuperscript{23} The requisition of private land by canal contractors produced a broader definition of “public use,” as well.\textsuperscript{24}

In the area of education, another form of infrastructure or capital, the French tradition of dirigisme actually was imported from New York. The state early administered “Regents Examinations,” a precursor to what much later became commonplace standardized testing.\textsuperscript{25} Since 1784, the Regents have presided over the University of the State of New York, and “are responsible for the general supervision of \textit{all} educational activities within the State”\textsuperscript{26} It “is the nation's most comprehensive and unified educational system.”\textsuperscript{27} While it traces its antecedents to a 1784 statute establishing the Regents as a corporation empowered to govern Columbia College (now University) and subsequently es-


\textsuperscript{23} Green, supra note 10, at 1169 (quoting CAROL SHERIFF, THE ARTIFICIAL RIVER 80-81 (Arthur Wang ed., 1996)).

\textsuperscript{24} Jerome v. Ross, 7 Johns. Ch. 315 (1828).

\textsuperscript{25} Regents examinations in selected high school subjects were authorized in 1876. See New York State Education Department, http://www.p12.nysed.gov/osa/hsgen/archive/rehistory.htm (last visited, Jan. 3, 2010). The exams were responsive to the perceived “danger of superficiality and misdirection in the range of secondary study.” \textit{Id.} (quoting Dr. John E. Bradley).

\textsuperscript{26} See New York State Board of Regents, http://www.regents.nysed.gov/ (last visited, Jan. 3, 2010) (emphasis added.)

\textsuperscript{27} \textit{Id.} The University “consists of all elementary, secondary, and postsecondary educational institutions, libraries, museums, public broadcasting, records and archives, professions, Vocational and Educational Services for Individuals with Disabilities, and such other institutions, organizations, and agencies as may be admitted to The University. The concept of The University of the State of New York is a broad term encompassing all the institutions, both public and private, offering education in the State.” \textit{Id.}
tablished colleges, the provenance of the University of the State of New York is even more fascinating.

This unique university was not a single institution of higher learning as at Paris or Oxford. Rather, it served largely as a way of governing schools, colleges and universities in a \textit{centralized, secular system of state control}. In addition, it controlled admission to higher education through the regents examinations given to secondary school children. This type of university had been advocated unsuccessfully in France for over two hundred years.\textsuperscript{28}

It is “no mere coincidence” that Napoleon’s University of France (1808) took similar form. “If France may claim to have given New York the ideal of a symmetrical state system of learning, New York may claim to have returned to France the practical form of such a system, in its all-inclusive university corporation.”\textsuperscript{29}

This article is not about dirigisme in education, but rather about the conflict between the duty of New York courts to enforce the State’s guarantees of private property rights,\textsuperscript{30} and its deference to centralized control of ownership and direction of land use. The New York and Federal constitutions both state: “Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation,”\textsuperscript{31} The Courts of New York have generally interpreted this provision quite broadly in favor of the government, a trend continued since my last review a dozen years ago, in connection with the Court of Appeals’ 1997 quartet of regulatory takings cases.\textsuperscript{32}

At the time of the American Revolution, the immemorial power of the sovereign to condemn private property for the health, safety, and welfare of the people devolved upon the State. “The right to take private property for public purposes does not depend upon any express provision in the charter of government, but is an inherent attribute of sovereignty, existing in every independent state.”\textsuperscript{33} With the creation of entities like the


\textsuperscript{29} Id. at 237.

\textsuperscript{30} NY Const. Art. 1, § 7

\textsuperscript{31} NY Const. Art. 1, § 7(a).


\textsuperscript{33} Heyward v. New York, 7 N.Y. 314 (1852).
Erie Canal Commission in 1817, New York State took an active role in promoting commerce and economic growth through their direction and instigation of the means of that growth.  

Though not all were Federalists, the leading politicians of New York State shared Alexander Hamilton’s belief in the end for strong government direction and support of industry. In his major economic work Report on the Subject of Manufactures, Hamilton strongly argued against Adam Smith’s perspective and the ability of free markets to effectively produce economic growth. In Manufactures, Hamilton argued as an alternative to the unregulated free market that an integrated agricultural and industrial economy, in which the government promotes infrastructure development (canals and roads, at that time) aiding in the growth and prosperity of the populace, speeds technological growth and improves national security. This economic perspective inspired adherents throughout the nation, but nowhere more than in Hamilton’s home state, New York, where the role of government in improving the “public good” was fully enshrined even at the beginning of the nineteenth century.

In New York State, a massive expansion of the breadth and use of eminent domain powers for projects such as the Erie Canal and subsequent infrastructure projects was justified based upon the potential public benefits such projects were expected to provide. Specific changes such as an alteration in the judicial definition of the term public use (as applied from the Fifth amendment) were introduced, with term being “was nar-

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35 Governor Dewitt Clinton, the driving force behind the Erie Canal was a Democratic Republican.
38 See generally, Hamilton, supra note 36.
40 Green, supra note 10, at 1172 (citing Jerome v. Ross, 7 Johns. Ch. 315, 341-2 (1823)).
rowly construed before the canal [but] after the canal …construed broadly." The preeminence of economic development interests was continued at the expense of individual property interests in the remedies available for a wrongful taking as well, as “even when construction companies took property without a state or court order for use in the canal's construction, they were required to pay damages rather than return the property.”

The phrase “Empire State” came into general usage as a nickname for New York upon the completion of the Erie Canal. The completion of that waterway provided the first direct waterborne link between the Hudson River at Albany and the Port of New York, and the rich agricultural regions of western New York and the Great Lakes. This made the state the ideal conduit for trade between east and west, and thus the keystone of a North American “empire.” As time went on and the US economy shifted from overwhelmingly agricultural to largely industrial, this transport corridor, augmented by the New York Central Railroad and, later, the New York State Thruway, fed economic development in Upstate New York and the Midwest, carrying steel, coal and the finished products of heavy industry. The change in economic focus did not, however, change New York State’s means of promoting it, and the dirigiste philosophy that had supported the growth of trade in agriculture simply was adapted to industry.

The prototypical twentieth century dirigiste administrator was New York’s Robert Moses, the eternal proponent of government directed infrastructure development. Coming to prominence in the 1920’s and 30’s, Moses believed adamantly in his vision of the form economic development in New York City and other parts of the state should take,

41 Id. at 1171 (citing Jerome v. Ross, 7 Johns.Ch. 315 (1823).
42 Id.
43 Id. at 1167.
44 Id. at 1169.
45 See, e.g., Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870 (N.Y. 1970). In this staple of first-year property and torts classes, the Court of Appeals refused to grant the traditional remedy of injunction against a cement plant that emitted dust and noise to the detriment of neighbors. Instead, it awarded permanent damages on the grounds that the defendant’s investment in the plant and the number of its employees made that use more valuable.
and used government taking power to shape the outcomes to that vision.\textsuperscript{47} In place of the piecemeal development of small businesses and houses in neighborhoods like the South Bronx, Moses advocated for, and imperiously achieved, the creation of a centrally planned network of highways and bridges. This, in his view, enhanced overall economic development, and the “public good.”\textsuperscript{48}

The “public private hybrid” development model was chiefly Moses’ invention.\textsuperscript{49} He used the Tri-Borough Bridge Authority, which had ill-defined powers, to help direct massive amounts of government money into the projects which he supported, essentially turning him into the man with control of the money to finance infrastructure improvements which no other person or authority in the state had.\textsuperscript{50} Moses displacement of many people and businesses, and his brusque personal style, resulted in vehement protests and eventually caused the city government to turn against him.\textsuperscript{51}

Despite Moses’ fall, the mind set in favor of large-scale development through eminent domain takings, against the wishes of property owners, and masterminded by quasi-public organizations, remained undisturbed. A classic case is the ill-fated World Trade Center Project, which had its genesis in concerns after the Second World War about New York City retaining its financial leadership in a world of globalized commerce.\textsuperscript{52} The movers behind the project were New York Governor Nelson A. Rockefeller and Chase Manhattan Bank Chairman David Rockefeller, his brother. The Port of New York Authority was brought in because it possessed bonding power, “mean[ing] that

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{47} ROBERT A. CARO, THE POWER BROKER, 4-9 (1974) (magisterial biography of Moses).
\textsuperscript{48} Id. at 850.
\textsuperscript{50} CARO, supra note 47, at 386-92, 617-18.
\textsuperscript{51} See generally JANE JACOBS, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT AMERICAN CITIES (1961). Jacobs herself had been radicalized by Moses’ plan to run a highway through Washington Square Park.
\textsuperscript{52} See Mary L. Clark, Lessons From the World Trade Center for Open Space Planning Generally and Boston’s Big Dig Specifically, 32 B.C. ENVTL AFF. L. REV. 301, 301-02 (2005).
\end{flushleft}
Rockefeller did not have to carry the enormous cost of the project on his state budget.”

Also, the Port Authority had the power of eminent domain, which was exercised against a neighborhood of small shop owners, and which was upheld by the Court of Appeals in the highly publicized case of *Courtesy Sandwich Shop, Inc. v. Port of New York Authority.*

Dirigisme in New York remains alive and well today, as demonstrated by Atlantic Yards Project, and similar ventures throughout the State, sponsored by its redevelopment agency, the Empire State Development Corporation.

Illustrative of this tendency to centralism in land use and development is the State Environmental Quality Review Act (“SEQRA”), which requires review of “virtually all discretionary acts taken by state agencies and local governments in New York.”

SEQRA encompasses not only actions undertaken by government agencies or involving government funding, but also those private projects that require agency approvals. The Act has been interpreted as to require detailed review of the economic impact that a commercial enterprise may have on neighborhood character.

Thus, the Court of Appeals has held that the “potential acceleration of the displacement of local residents and businesses is a secondary long-term effect on population patterns, community goals and neighborhood character such that [SEQRA] requires these impacts on the environment to be considered in an environmental analysis.” In cases where there is a governmental “larger plan” for development, the cumulative impact of

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55 See generally Goldstein v. Pataki, 516 F.3d 50 (2nd Cir. 2008).

56 A list and summary are available at http://www.empire.state.ny.us/Subsidiaries_Projects.html.

57 ECL Art. 8.


59 Id.


all other pending proposals must be taken into account in the review of any particular development application.\(^\text{62}\)

In recent years, upstate New York State has fallen on hard economic times,\(^\text{63}\) and manufacturing in New York City has declined, with corresponding heavy reliance on the financial and service sectors.\(^\text{64}\) The relative decline of New York State is illustrated by census data. The 1960 census resulted in New York having 41 representatives in Congress. Florida had 12 representatives. As a result of the 2010 census, both have 27 representatives. California supplanted New York as the most populous state in the 1970 Census, with Texas also surpassing New York’s population in 1994.\(^\text{65}\) Florida is expected to supplant New York in the 2015 as the nation’s third most populous state.\(^\text{66}\) The dirigiste system seems to be in danger not due to any successful attempts to tame it or do away with it, but simply due to a shift in the economic needs of the state and a failure to keep up.

The declining relative importance of manufacturing in American cities, together with tremendous growth in the importance of information,\(^\text{67}\) suggest a change in focus for the State’s dirigiste inclination. While eminent domain was the lynchpin of the Atlantic Yards project,\(^\text{68}\) it also was employed to obtain the site for the new headquarters building


\(^{63}\) US Census Bureau, Buffalo City (Quick facts), Available at http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/36/3611000.html (showing the decline in population and a median household income almost half that of New York State as a whole).


\(^{67}\) See infra note 64 and associated text.

\(^{68}\) See infra Part II.C.
of an important information purveyor, the *New York Times*. Given the interlocking of economic actors and interests, it is perhaps not a coincidence that *The Times* has been an avid booster of the controversial use of condemnation for Atlantic Yards and Columbia University.

The mindset that first flowered in the governance structure for Columbia College soon after Independence may have reached its culmination in the partnership between the State and what is now Columbia University. In 2010, the New York Court of Appeals endorsed, without effective qualification, that the State’s imprimatur permits it to appropriate parcels belonging to its neighbors and then re-convey them to Columbia.

In a statement released shortly after his recent swearing-in as governor, Andrew M. Cuomo pledged to serve the people of New York “and make it the Empire State once again.” That promise hints that the State’s interventions in the economy will continue, and perhaps grow. If so, reconciling the State’s role in urban revitalization with transparency, the prevention of crony capitalism, and private property rights, will become more

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70 *See id.* (noting that The New York Times Company partnered on its midtown headquarters building with Forest City Ratner, the developer of Atlantic Yards). The Times coverage, in turn, was not critical of the Atlantic Yards Project. *Id.* The Times also editorialized that the Court of Appeals’ decision upholding the use of eminent domain Atlantic Yards in *Goldstein* was the “right decision,” and that the Appellate Division’s opinion in *Kaur*, finding the Manhattanville Project advocated by Columbia University to be pretextual was “misguided[]” and “weakly reasoned.” *See* Editorial, *Eminent Domain in New York*, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2009, A30. Most recently, a Times architectural review has lavished praise on the new Columbia science building that will serve as the gateway to the campus extension that was the subject of *Kaur* as “superb architecture” and a means of “reinforcing the university’s public mission.” It is also, not incidentally, a work of healing. Seen in the context of Columbia’s often tense relationship with its Harlem neighbors, including recent battles over its plans to build a new 17-acre campus in West Harlem, the building is a gleaming physical expression of the university’s desire to bridge the divide between the insular world of the campus and the community beyond its walls.” Nicolai Ouroussoff, *A Building Forms a Bridge Between a University’s Past and Future*, N.Y. TIMES, February 8, 2011 C2.


important than ever. It is incumbent upon the New York Court of Appeals to make its
review of litigation arising from this process more conceptually sound and practically as-
tute.

II. Takings and Public Use Law

A. Takings Law

The right of the State to take private property for public use is an attribute of so-
vereignty that does not depend on any constitutional provision.73 The United States Con-
stitution says that “nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just comp-
pensation.”74 The U.S. Supreme Court described the Takings Clause as a “tacit recogni-
tion of a pre-existing power to take private property for public use, rather than a grant of
a new power.”75 The corresponding New York provision is in substance exactly the
same: “Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.”76

The exigencies of government do not permit uncompensated takings, even if gov-
ernment has great need. Justice Holmes warned in the seminal case of Pennsylvania Coal
Co. v. Mahon that “We are in danger of forgetting that a strong public desire to improve
the public condition is not enough to warrant achieving the desire by a shorter cut than
the constitutional way of paying for the change.”77 Likewise, the New York Court of Ap-
peals warned that “no matter how pressing a problem may be, private property may not
be so interfered with as to amount to taking without compensation even for public pur-
pose or to advance general welfare.”78 Other cases reinforced this admonition.79 Within

73 Hanson Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 581, 587 (1923); Heyward v. New York, 7 N.Y. 314
N.Y.S.2d 400, 183 N.E.2d 684 (N.Y. 1962) (noting that power of eminent domain antedates the
state and federal Constitutions, survived their adoption, and is subject only to restrictions that tak-
ing shall be for authorized public use and that just compensation be paid owner).
74 U.S. CONST. Amend. V.
76 N.Y. CONST. § 7(a) (McKinney).
77 260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922).
these constraints, however, the New York Court of Appeals has stated that the power of eminent domain is legislative, and it is legislature that determines necessity for and time and manner of its exercise.80

In 1835, the Supreme Court of Judicature of New York, the State’s highest court of law, held in the case of In re Albany Street81 that a statute authorizing the condemnation of an entire lot was invalid, when only part of the land was required for the establishment of a street and the landowner did not consent.

If this provision . . . is to be taken literally, that the commissioners may, against the consent of the owner, take the whole lot, when only a part is required for public use, and the residue to be applied to private use, it assumes a power which, with all respect, the legislature did not possess. The constitution, by authorizing the appropriation of private property to public use, impliedly declares that for any other use, private property shall not be taken from one and applied to the use of another. It is in violation of natural right, and if it is not in violation of the letter of the constitution, it is of its spirit, and cannot be supported.82

In another possible reflection of John Locke’s famous declaration “their lives, liberties, and estates, which I call by the general name property,”83 the Supreme Court of Judicature declared in 1843, in Taylor v. Porter & Ford:84

It will be seen that the same measure of protection against legislative encroachment is extended to life, liberty and property; and if the latter can be taken without a forensic trial and judgment, there is no security for the others. If the legislature can take the property of A. and transfer it to B., they can take A. himself, and either shut him up in prison, or put him to death. But none of these things can be done by mere legislation. There must be “due process of law.”85

79 See, e.g., In re Cheesebrough, 78 N.Y. 232 (1879) (holding that, despite the State’s interest in the health of its citizens, a permanent sewer could not be installed on private land without payment of just compensation).
81 In re Albany St. 11 Wend. 149 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1834).
82 Id. at 151.
84 4 Hill 140 (N.Y. 1843).
85 Id. at 147.
During the nineteenth century, the U.S. Supreme Court at first required compensation only where the State divested the landowner of title, but subsequently extended the concept to instances where governmental actions worked a permanent appropriation. However, it drew the line at cases where the regulation was an application of the police power, designed to prevent harm, in *Mugler v. Kansas*. Likewise, New York courts have recognized that reasonable land use restrictions imposed under the police power do not constitute takings merely because the land’s value is substantially reduced.

In 1922, in *Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon*, the U.S. Supreme Court held for the first time that regulation of property use, as well as physical appropriation, could require just compensation under the Takings Clause, if the regulation went “too far.” *Pennsylvania Coal* remains “the foundation” of regulatory takings law, and its “too far” language has been adopted in New York.

The most general test employed by the Supreme Court in determining whether a regulatory taking has occurred is contained in *Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York*. That case, decided in 1978, provided for an ad hoc, multi-factor balancing test. *Penn Central* remains the “polestar” of the Court’s takings jurisprudence. Not subjected to *Penn Central* balancing are “categorical” takings, in which land is deprived of

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88 123 U.S. 623 (1887) (loss of value in brewery building after prohibition imposed).


91 *Pennsylvania Coal*, 260 U.S. at 415.


93 Rochester Tel. Corp. v. Village of Fairport, 446 N.Y.S.2d 823, 825 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982) (“If the regulation goes too far, the municipality’s action will be treated as a public taking for which compensation is required.”).


all economic use, or instances of permanent physical occupation, however slight. The Court reiterated and summarized these rules in 2005, in *Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc.*

In New York, the principal Court of Appeals’ application of *Penn Central* has been a quartet of cases decided in 1997, *Basile v. Town of Southampton*, *Kim v. City of New York*, *Gazza v. New York State Dept. of Environmental Conservation*, and *Anello v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of the Village of Dobbs Ferry*. “Viewed as a whole, this ‘takings quartet’ makes it significantly easier for the State of New York and its subdivisions to resist the takings claims of private landowners.”

In *Anello*, the Court of Appeals held that the challenge to a permit denial occasioned by a “steep slope” ordinance “must fail,” since the “restriction thus encumbered petitioner's title from the outset of her ownership and its enforcement does not constitute a governmental taking of any property interest owned by her.” In *Gazza*, a development variance required by a wetlands ordinance antecedent to the plaintiff’s purchase was denied. The Court of Appeals declared that “[t]he relevant property interests owned by the petitioner are defined by those State laws enacted and in effect at the time he took title.” Alternatively, petitioner's “reasonable expectations” at the time of his purchase “were not affected when the property remained restricted” and that “the alleged diminution of value and limitation of property uses caused by the environmental regulations would fall well within constitutional boundaries.”

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100 681 N.E.2d 312 (N.Y. 1997).
102 678 N.E.2d 870 (N.Y. 1997).
104 *Anello*, 678 N.E.2d at 871.
105 *Gazza*, 679 N.E.2d at 1040.
106 *Id.* at 1043.
In *Basile*, tidal lands were subject both to wetlands regulations and to a covenant whereby plaintiff’s predecessor in title recited that the parcel “may consist of wetlands and may not be suitable for erection of a dwelling” and no building shall be erected “unless and until” the parcel is “approved as a building lot” by the Town.\(^\text{107}\) The Court of Appeals noted that “[t]he wetlands regulations at issue in this case did not deprive claimant of any interest in the property that had not already been encumbered’ by virtue of the covenants . . . .”\(^\text{108}\) Finally, in *Kim*, owners of a gas station claimed a physical taking by dint of city construction of a high earthen wall filling some of their parcel and blocking access to some of the rest. The court decided that they were put on notice of a change in the adjoining avenue’s grade by a map filed in the county engineer’s office a decade before, and that the city’s actions saved them the cost of a similar structure to provide the avenue with the required lateral support.\(^\text{109}\)

More recently, in *Consumers Union of U.S., Inc. v. State*,\(^\text{110}\) the Court of Appeals summarized its regulatory takings jurisprudence, borrowing heavily from the U.S. Supreme Court’s summary in *Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc.*\(^\text{111}\) “Governmental regulation of private property,” it said, “effects a taking if it is ‘so onerous that its effect is tantamount to a direct appropriation or ouster’”\(^\text{112}\) “To determine whether a regulation is proper or goes ‘too far,’ a court must consider the factors identified in *Penn Central* . . . . The primary, but not exclusive *Penn Central* inquiry turns on ‘the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations’”\(^\text{113}\)

\(^{107}\) *Basile*, 678 N.E.2d at 490.

\(^{108}\) *Id.* at 491.


\(^{110}\) 840 N.E.2d 68 (N.Y. 2005).

\(^{111}\) 544 U.S. 528, 536-540 (2005).

\(^{112}\) 840 N.E.2d at 84 (quoting *Lingle*, 544 U.S. at 537).

B. Public Use

In *Kelo v. City of New London*, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld, as consistent with the Public Use Clause, the condemnation of sound residences for retransfer for private urban revitalization. In explaining the Court’s holding, Justice Stevens’ majority opinion was careful to adumbrate that “it has long been accepted that the sovereign may not take the property of A for the sole purpose of transferring it to another private party B, even though A is paid just compensation.” “A purely private taking could not withstand the scrutiny of the public use requirement; it would serve no legitimate purpose of government and would thus be void.” The Public Use Clause has its genesis in substantive due process, as permeates the Court’s early discussion in *Calder v. Bull*:

> [A] law that takes property from A. and gives it to B: It is against all reason and justice, for a people to entrust a Legislature with SUCH powers; and, therefore, it cannot be presumed that they have done it. The genius, the nature, and the spirit, of our State Governments, amount to a prohibition of such acts of legislation; and the general principles of law and reason forbid them.

Similarly, “The people cannot, as long as the Constitutions of the state of New York and of the United States remain in their present form, take private property for use of other than the people, even if they pay just compensation.”

In *Taylor v. Porter & Ford*, although the plaintiff succeeded in preventing a road from crossing his property without permission, the judge opined that “the legislature is not supreme,” and could not “transfer the property of A. to B.”

I shall not be understood as saying that a trial and judgment are necessary in exercising the right of eminent domain. When private property is taken for public use, the only restriction is, that just compensation shall be made to the owner. But

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114 545 U.S. 469 (2005)
115 U.S. CONST. Amend. V (“nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation”).
116 *Id.* at 477.
117 *Id.* (quoting Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 245 (1984)).
118 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 388 (1798) (*quoted* in *Kelo*, 545 U.S. at 478 n.5).
120 4 Hill 140 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1843).
121 *Id.* at 144.
when one man wants the property of another, I mean to say that the legislature cannot aid him in making the acquisition.”122

Other than “law and reason,” two factors militate against condemnation of property from private party A solely for the benefit of private party B. The first is injury to A, who loses the subjective value he or she places on ownership above fair market value. Since it is impractical to pay condemnees their asserted subjective value of their land, the Supreme Court has decided that payment of fair market value is the measure of “just compensation.”123 The sentimental value of a family long residing in a house and the goodwill and customization of premises used by business are familiar examples of uncompensated losses, since “market value is not the value that every owner of property attaches to his property but merely the value that the marginal owner attaches to his property.”124 That subjective value represents a real loss to owners, however, as does the uncompensated costs in time and money expended in searching for substitutes premises and moving. For these reasons, “[c]ompensation in the constitutional sense is therefore not full compensation.”125 A separate reason for disallowing condemnations producing purely private benefit is the inevitable corruption and undermining of the fabric of a democratic society that would result.126

At least as early as 1837, New York’s highest court ruled that private parties could derive incidental benefit from the exercise of eminent domain,127 a point made explicitly in its 1878 case of In re Ryers.128 New York long has given great discretion to legislative decisions. In 1835, in Varick v. Smith,129 the Chancery Court of New York noted the primacy of the legislature in deciding what constituted a public purpose. In

122 Id. at 147 (emphasis added).
125 Id.
127 Bloodgood v. The Mohawk and Hudson R.R. Co., 18 Wend. 9 (1837) (upholding delegation of eminent domain power to railroads with incidental benefit to them).
128 72 N.Y. 1 (1878).
129 5 Paige Ch. 137 (N.Y. Ch. 1835).
connection with the disposition of waters from a dam constructed to facilitate a state canal, it stated “the legislature is the sole judge as to the expediency of making police regulations, interfering with the natural rights of the citizens of the state; and as to the expediency of exercising the right of eminent domain, for any public purposes.”  

A 1914 Court of Appeals case held that it is not objectionable that a grant of the right of eminent domain originated in and was designed to subserve private interests, so long as the use is public.  

Adopting a broad construction of the term “public use,” the New York Court of Appeals held, in Denihan Industries v. O’Dwyer, that “[a]n incidental private benefit, such as a reasonable proportion of commercial space, is not enough to invalidate a project which has for its primary object a public purpose.”

In defining permissible “public use,” the Supreme Court’s Kelo opinion stated the two conflicting views of the subject. The narrow view defined “public use” as “use by the public,” by which was meant use by the general public, by government agencies, and by common carriers that were heavily regulated and obligated to serve the public.

While many state courts in the mid-19th century endorsed “use by the public” as the proper definition of public use, that narrow view steadily eroded over time. Not only was the “use by the public” test difficult to administer (e.g., what proportion of the public need have access to the property? at what price?), but it proved to be impractical given the diverse and always evolving needs of society.

Instead, Justice Stevens stated, “when this Court began applying the Fifth Amendment to the States at the close of the 19th century, it embraced the broader and more natural interpretation of public use as ‘public purpose.’”

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130 Id. at 137.
133 Id. at 238.
134 Kelo, 545 U.S. at 479.
135 Id.
136 Id. at 480.
Justice Stevens recognized that the broad “public purpose” test he propounded was susceptible to abuse. Situations where a “private purpose was afoot” could be “confronted if and when they arise. They do not warrant the crafting of an artificial restriction on the concept of public use.”

In the Court of Appeals’ recent decisions in Goldstein v. New York State Urban Development Corp., and Kaur v. New York State Urban Development Corp., the possibility of abuse indeed has arisen. That problem is exacerbated by the U.S. Supreme Court’s hazy jurisprudence of “pretextuality,” and by daunting procedural impediments to ascertaining whether that condition exists.

C. Maximum Deference in Goldstein and Kaur

The principal New York public use case decided since the U.S. Supreme Court’s Kelo decision was Goldstein v. New York State Urban Development Corp. There, the Court of Appeals upheld the condemnation of private parcels to facilitate construction of Atlantic Yards, a 22-acre mixed-use development in downtown Brooklyn proposed by private developer Bruce Ratner. According to the court’s summary:

The project is to involve, in its first phase, construction of a sports arena to house the NBA Nets franchise, as well as various infrastructure improvements—most notably reconfiguration and modernization of the Vanderbilt Yards rail facilities and access upgrades to the subway transportation hub already present at the site. The project will also involve construction of a platform spanning the rail yards and connecting portions of the neighborhood now separated by the rail cut. Atop this platform are to be situated, in a second phase of construction, numerous high rise buildings and some eight acres of open, publicly accessible landscaped space. The 16 towers planned for the project will serve both commercial and residential purposes. They are slated to contain between 5,325 and 6,430 dwelling

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137 Id. at 487 (internal citations omitted).
141 921 N.E.2d 164 (N.Y. 2009).
142 See Levine & Oder, supra note 70 (providing detailed account of the politics, social dynamics, and economics of the Atlantic Yards Project).
units, more than a third of which are to be affordable either for low and/or middle income families.\textsuperscript{143}

The project was challenged on the grounds that the Atlantic Yards project was intended to facilitate private economic gain, albeit with possible incidental public benefit.\textsuperscript{144} The Court of Appeals acknowledged that the alleged blight in the project area “did not begin to approach in severity the dire circumstances of urban slum dwelling” present in \textit{New York City Housing Authority v. Muller},\textsuperscript{145} the 1936 case in which it first recognized blight as grounds for condemnation.\textsuperscript{146} Nevertheless, it stated that subsequent cases upheld blight condemnations where “a substantial part of the area” was “‘substandard and insanitary’ by modern tests.”\textsuperscript{147}

“Gradually, as the complexities of urban conditions became better understood, it has become clear that the areas eligible for such renewal are not limited to ‘slums’ as that term was formerly applied, and that, among other things, economic underdevelopment and stagnation are also threats to the public sufficient to make their removal cognizable as a public purpose.”\textsuperscript{148}

The court “stress[ed] that lending precise content” to general terms such as “blight” “has not been, and may not be, primarily a judicial exercise,” and that the Legislature had left the “actual specification” of public uses “largely . . . to quasi-legislative administrative agencies.”\textsuperscript{149} “It is only where there is no room for reasonable difference of opinion as to whether an area is blighted, that judges may substitute their views as to the adequacy with which the public purpose of blight removal has been made out for those of the legislatively designated agencies.”\textsuperscript{150}

Judge Smith’s dissenting opinion challenged both the “self-serving” determination by the State redevelopment agency that petitioners lived in a “blighted” neighbor-

\textsuperscript{143} 921 N.E.2d at 166.
\textsuperscript{144} \textit{Id.} at 170.
\textsuperscript{145} 1 N.E.2d 153 (N.Y. 1936).
\textsuperscript{146} 164 N.E.2d at 171.
\textsuperscript{147} \textit{Id.} (quoting Kaskel v. Impellitteri, 115 N.E.2d 659 (1953)).
\textsuperscript{148} \textit{Id.} at 172 (quoting Yonkers Community Dev. Agency v. Morris, 335 N.E.2d 327 (N.Y. 1975).
\textsuperscript{149} \textit{Id.}
\textsuperscript{150} \textit{Id.}
hood, and that the majority was “much too deferential” to that finding. The legal implications of majority opinion and dissent in *Goldstein* are analyzed elsewhere in the Article.

Soon after *Goldstein* was decided, the Appellate Division held, in *Kaur v New York State Urban Development Corp.*, that condemnation by the Empire State Development Corporation for the purpose of extending the Columbia University campus in West Harlem did violate the public use requirement. While *Goldstein* primarily discussed the extent to which urban disamenities constituted “blight” under New York law, the Appellate Division in *Kaur* described the blight designation as “mere sophistry,” and approached the case primarily in the context of pretext.

The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that ESDC’s “findings of blight and determination that the condemnation of petitioners' property qualified as a ‘land use improvement project’ were rationally based and entitled to deference.” The court noted that in *Goldstein* it had “reaffirmed the long-standing doctrine that the role of the Judiciary is limited in reviewing findings of blight in eminent domain proceedings.” It restated the “objective data utilized by ESDC,” and that, given Court of Appeals precedent, the Appellate Division’s de novo review of the record was “improper.”

It concluded that, “On the ‘record upon which the ESDC determination was based and by which we are bound’ it cannot be said that ESDC's finding of blight was irrational or baseless.

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151 *Goldstein*, 921 N.E.2d at 186 (Smith, J., dissenting).
152 See infra Part III.C.
154 *Id.* at 10.
156 *Id.* at 730.
157 *Id.* at 731.
158 *Id.* (quoting *Goldstein*, 921 N.E.2d at 166, citing Levine v. New York State Liq. Auth., 245 N.E.2d 804 (1969)).
The Appellate Division also had held that the alternative basis upon which the Manhattanville Project could be upheld, that it was a “civic project,” could not be met because the expansion was of a university that was private.159 The Court of Appeals rejected this distinction as lacking statutory support,160 adding, “the advancement of higher education is the quintessential example of a ‘civic purpose.’”161

III. Vitiation of Public Use in Theory and Practice

At its outset, this article postulated that the combination of *Kelo* and *Kaur* is worse than a crime; it is a blunder. The present section explores the “crime” itself, why the U.S. Supreme Court’s reasoning in *Kelo v. City of New London*,162 as brought to fruition in *Kaur v New York State Urban Development Corp.*,163 effectively reads the Public Use Clause out of the U.S. and State Constitutions.164 The subsequent section discusses why this development constitutes a blunder from a public policy perspective.165

A. Kelo’s Demonstrates the Need for a Limiting Principle

In *Kelo*,166 the Supreme Court found that the condemnation of a sound moderate- and middle-income residential neighborhood, for retransfer for private urban revitalization, did not violate the Fifth Amendment’s Public Use Clause. The Court specifically rejected the “narrow” interpretation of public use, which limits eminent domain to instances of intended use by the general public, a government agency, or a highly regulated

159 892 N.Y.S.2d at 20.
160 933 N.E.2d at 733-34.
161 Id. at 734.
164 U.S. CONST. Amend. V. ("nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation"); N.Y. CONST. § 7(a) (McKinney) (“Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.”).
165 See infra, Part III.D.3.
common carrier obligated to serve the public. Instead, it adopted a “broad” view that equates “public use” with “public benefit.”

The problem with the broad view is that “public benefit” is an indeterminate term. Justice O’Connor, who wrote the principal opinion for the four dissenters, earlier had stated, in Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, that “[t]he ‘public use’ requirement is . . . coterminous with the scope of a sovereign’s police powers.” In Kelo, she drew back from the sweeping implications of that formulation, and from Justice Douglas’ similar earlier proclamation, in Berman v. Parker, that “[o]nce the object is within the authority of Congress, the right to realize it through the exercise of eminent domain is clear. For the power of eminent domain is merely the means to the end.” Justice O’Connor distinguished those cases, noting that the “extraordinary, precondemnation use of the targeted property inflicted affirmative harm on society.” In Berman, she explained, government responded to a blighted neighborhood that was injurious to health, and in Midkiff to dramatic concentration of land ownership. “Because each taking directly achieved a public benefit, it did not matter that the property was turned over to private use. In Kelo, however, the city never claimed that the petitioners’ ‘well-maintained homes are the source of any social harm.’

B. The Unsatisfactory Adoption of Pretextuality

The Supreme Court’s Kelo analysis began by juxtaposing two “polar propositions.” While the State “may not take the property of A for the sole purpose of transferring it to another private party B, even though A is paid just compensation,” it “may trans-

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167 Kelo, 545 U.S. at 479. See supra notes 134-136 and associated text.
168 Id. at 494-505 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (joined by Roberts, C.J., and Scalia and Thomas, JJ.).
170 Id. at 240.
172 Kelo, 545 U.S. at 500 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
173 Id.
174 Id.
175 Id.
176 545 U.S. at 477.
fer property from one private party to another if future ‘use by the public’ is the purpose of the taking.”177

As a corollary to this proposition, the State cannot “take property under the mere pretext of a public purpose, when its actual purpose was to bestow a private benefit.”178 Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion in Kelo added: “A court applying rational basis review under the Public Use Clause should strike down a taking that, by a clear showing, is intended to favor a particular private party, with only incidental or pretextual public benefits.”179

Kelo is the first case in which the Supreme Court has endorsed the “notion of a ‘pretext’ claim.”180 Why did the Court adopt a standard based on intent, and is that standard workable?

1. Why Should Motive Matter?

“Pretextuality” refers to the proffer of an ostensible motive for conduct in order to hide the speaker’s actual motive. There are many areas in which motive is important. The criminal law, which focuses on punishment, naturally is concerned with moral culpability. “The late Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes once pointed out the distinction between criminal and non-criminal intent by stating: ‘Even a dog distinguishes between being stumbled over and being kicked.’”181 On the other hand, injury to property is the purview of the law of tort, where rectification and indemnification is the focus, and not punishment of the party causing the harm.

This point was well articulated in Justice O’Connor’s dissent in Kelo:

Even if there were a practical way to isolate the motives behind a given taking, the gesture toward a purpose test is theoretically flawed. If it is true that incidental public benefits from new private use are enough to ensure the “public pur-

177 Id. at 478.
178 Id.
179 Id. at 491 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
180 Goldstein v. Pataki, 516 F.3d 50 (2nd Cir. 2008).
pose” in a taking, why should it matter, as far as the Fifth Amendment is concerned, what inspired the taking in the first place? How much the government does or does not desire to benefit a favored private party has no bearing on whether an economic development taking will or will not generate secondary benefit for the public. And whatever the reason for a given condemnation, the effect is the same from the constitutional perspective—private property is forcibly relinquished to new private ownership.182

Justice O’Connor was correct, but the anomaly she describes was one she was complicit in establishing. It was she who declared that “Our polestar ... remains the principles set forth in Penn Central,” the case wherein the Court substituted its ad hoc, multifactor test for regulations,183 based heavily on expectations.184 Justice Stevens quoted her concurring opinion and its “polestar” formulation as persuasive to the Court that even the complete deprivation of all economic use for a substantial period of time should be judged under the flexible Penn Central formulation instead of under the Lucas standard.185 At its heart, Penn Central is not a takings test; it is a due process test.186 Due process concerns proportionality (ends-means analysis) and fairness.187

In Armstrong v. United States,188 the U.S. Supreme Court stated that the Takings Clause was “designed to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.” Penn Central quoted this language, and immediately added that “this Court, quite simply, has been unable to develop any ‘set formula’ for determining when ‘justice and fairness’ re-

182 Kelo, 545 U.S. 469, 502-03 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
187 See, e.g. Lassiter v. Department of Social Services of Durham County, 452 U.S. 18, 24 (1981) (due process “expresses the requirement of ‘fundamental fairness’”).
quire that economic injuries caused by public action be compensated by the government, rather than remain disproportionately concentrated on a few persons.”189 Subsequently, in Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency,190 the Court referred to this dictum as the “Armstrong principle.”191

When the government condemns or physically appropriates the property, the fact of a taking is typically obvious and undisputed. When, however, the owner contends a taking has occurred because a law or regulation imposes restrictions so severe that they are tantamount to a condemnation or appropriation, the predicate of a taking is not self-evident, and the analysis is more complex.192

Tahoe-Sierra thus stated that the subtlety of analysis required to discern whether regulations are so severe that fairness requires just compensation makes categorical rules unsuitable, and directs us back to the ad hoc, multifactor analysis of Penn Central. There, the Court found that “factors that have particular significance” are “the economic impact of the regulation on the claimant,” whether it interferes with “distinct investment-backed expectations,” and the “character of the regulation.”193

There are distinct advantages in the alternative of examining objective intent. In Goldstein v. Pataki,194 for instance, the Second Circuit quoted an observation in a dissenting opinion by Justice Scalia that “discerning the subjective motivation of [a legislative body] is, to be honest, almost always an impossible task. . . . To look for the sole purpose of even a single legislator is probably to look for something that does not exist.”195 On the other hand, the opinion added that Justice Scalia prefaced his remark by noting “it is possible to discern the objective ‘purpose’ of a statute (i.e., the public good at which its provisions appear to be directed).”

190 535 U.S. 302 (1902).
191 Id. at 321.
192 Id. at 322, n.17.
193 Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124.
194 516 F.3d 50 (2nd Cir. 2008).
Perhaps the Supreme Court predicates its public use jurisprudence on intent for the same reason that it predicates its regulatory takings jurisprudence on intent. Examinations of subjective motivation permit the Court to circumvent the direct questions that it must face under the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause. Did the plaintiff own property? Did the government take the property? Was just compensation paid? The Court could establish bright line rules for deciding these questions, relying, for example, upon proposed objective standards such as the “independent economic viability” standard for any “horizontally definable parcel,”196 or any set of property rights selected by the owner so long as its recognized as a “commercial unit” in a recognized market.197

The Court in \textit{Penn Central} did not define the “character of the regulation” test, but merely illustrated it by observing that “[a] ‘taking’ may more readily be found when the interference with property can be characterized as a physical invasion . . . than when interference arises from some public program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common good.”198 However, four years later, the Court held, in \textit{Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.},199 that a permanent physical invasion constitutes a categorical taking, without regard to the \textit{Penn Central} balancing test. Thus, the “character of the regulation” test was deprived of its only clear content. It would seem, however, that unfairness is an aspect of its meaning.

In \textit{American Pelagic Fishing Co., L.P. v. United States},200 newly enacted statutes precluded one large, advanced, and specialized fishing ship from plying its trade, as if that one entry in a large fishing fleet “had been identified by name in the text of the acts.”201 The U.S. Court of Federal Claims stressed that the new law’s severity, essential

\begin{itemize}
\item[196] See John E. Fee, Note, \textit{Unearthing the Denominator in Regulatory Taking Claims}, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1535, 1538 (1994) (“any horizontally definable parcel, containing at least one economically viable use independent of the immediately surrounding land segments, loses all economic use due to government regulation.”).
\item[197] See STEVEN J. EAGLE, \textit{REGULATORY TAKINGS} § 7-7(e)(5) (4th ed.) (Lexis Publishing, 2009) (noting that the term is adopted from U.C.C. § 2-608(1)).
\item[198] \textit{Id}.
\item[199] 458 U.S. 419, 426-27 (1982).
\item[200] 49 Fed. Cl. 36 (2001).
\item[201] \textit{Id}. at 51.
\end{itemize}
retroactivity, and specific targeting justified a finding that there was a regulatory taking under the “character of the regulation” test. The Federal Circuit reversed on other grounds, and the point has not been definitively decided.

It might be that, as Professor Mark Fenster put it,

Ultimately, the character factor serves as a judicial escape hatch. . . . A properly functionalist judge should assess the conflicting human values at stake in the litigation, appraise the social importance of existing precedent, consider all of the relevant evidence that would bring light to the conflict, and reject the use of abstract legal concepts that would direct the decision away from the particular dispute and the prevalent norms of social and commercial behavior in the relevant field. . . . To the extent that the character factor allows a judge to make this consideration explicit, it will enable her to more candidly decide the issue.

The Court chose to submit functional takings of property rights not involving physical appropriation to the *Penn Central* test, in which the owner’s subjective “expectations” predominates, except when those turn out to be objectively unreasonable. It’s justification for separate bodies of physical takings and regulatory takings law rest largely on its observation that the former “usually represent a greater affront to individual property rights.” It is hard to discern from that truism a valid Constitutional distinction. Parenthetically, when it came to “just compensation,” the Court has rejected any attempt to measure subjective value, and adopted a “fair market value” standard instead.

Similarly, “pretextuality” makes sense only as a fairness equivalent sounding in substantive due process. It seems paradoxical that the Supreme Court has eschewed using

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202 379 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (holding fishing permits not property).
204 See, e.g., Consumers Union of U.S., Inc. v. State, 840 N.E.2d 68, 84-85 (N.Y. 2005) (noting that the “primary, but not exclusive *Penn Central* inquiry turns on ‘the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations.’”) (internal citation omitted).
205 See *Kaiser Aetna v. United States*, 444 U.S. 164, at 175 (1979). Then-Justice Rehnquist gave no explanation for his opinion’s change in terminology from *Penn Central*’s “distinct investment-backed expectations.”
substantive due process in property rights deprivations cases,\textsuperscript{208} while at the same time using light and ineffectual variants of substantive due process as tests for uncompensated takings and takings not for public use.

2. The Assumptions Underlying Pretext are Counterfactual

In 99 Cents Only Stores v. Lancaster Redevelopment Agency,\textsuperscript{209} a U.S. district court found that the justification given for the condemnation, the fabricated explanation that 99 Cents’ parcel was “blighted,” clearly was not the actual reason for the city’s act. But, as I elaborate elsewhere,\textsuperscript{210} there was no showing that the city condemned 99 Cents’ parcel to enhance private welfare at the expense of public benefit. The parcel was condemned at the behest of 99 Cents’ competitor Costco, to which it was to be transferred. As the trial court noted, the city viewed Costco as a lynchpin of its economic development plans, and were “fearful of its relocation to another city.”\textsuperscript{211} As Lancaster’s city attorney later told the \textit{Wall Street Journal}, Costco provided ten times the sales tax revenues to the city that 99 Cents did. “You tell me which was more important.”\textsuperscript{212}

Just as cultivated inscrutability might mask virtue as well as vice, pretextuality might mask an agent’s desire to achieve public benefit. It might be argued, correctly, that 99 Cents Only Stores would have been the “victim” of Costco’s apparent scheme to use extortion against the city to oust its competitor. 99 Cents Only Stores might have had a meritorious tort claim against Costco for interference with relational interests.\textsuperscript{213}

Thus, although pretextuality might have been an element in the city abetting Costco’s wrongful scheme, it would not indicate that the city had an underlying wrongful


\textsuperscript{211} \textit{99 Cents}, 237 F.Supp.2d at 1127.


purpose. One could argue that pretextuality in *Kelo* was shorthand for “pretextuality for bad purpose.” Akin to the Catholic theological concept of “double effect,” the premise would be that the government action in cases like *99 Cents Only Stores* should be regarded as privileged because of the legitimacy of its dominant purpose.

The broader point, however, is that courts rightly should be concerned when private actors have the opportunity to leverage eminent domain to the disadvantage of competitors, and other possible victims of what might rise to legalized extortion. In *99 Cents Only Stores*, an exaction could be had from only the landowner whose property was taken. In *Didden v. Village of Port Chester*; however, the redeveloper to whom eminent domain powers had been delegated could exact money from many landowners, in exchange for condemning other parcels in the redevelopment district.

3. The Manichean Distinction Between Public and Private Benefit

Justice Stevens began his analysis in *Kelo* by stating that government may not condemn land belonging to A for the “sole purpose” of benefitting B, and that a “purely private taking could not withstand the scrutiny of the public use requirement; it would serve no legitimate purpose of government and would thus be void.” Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion declares that “transfers intended to confer benefits on particular, favored private entities, and with only incidental or pretextual public benefits, are forbidden by the Public Use Clause.”

Official acts that public officials perform to benefit themselves, their family, and those who bribe them, are punishable by criminal law. State actions executing the scheme are arbitrary and capricious, and hence run afoul of the Due Process Clauses of

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216 *Kelo*, 545 U.S. at 477.
217 *Id.* (quoting Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 245 (1984)).
218 *Kelo*, 545 U.S. at 469, 491 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.\textsuperscript{220} However, every public official knows that private firms enter into the redevelopment process precisely because of the possibility of their private gain, and that post-contractual attempts to thwart such gain would give the city the reputation of an unreliable redevelopment partner. In that sense, a government entity embarking on condemnation for retransfer for private redevelopment objectively must desire private gain.

Justice Stevens’ opinion in \textit{Kelo} suggests the Manichean distinction that gains could be purely public or private. Justice Kennedy’s concurrence suggests that, while there could be both private and public gains, one would be incidental to the other. Stevens’ assertion seems wrong in theory. Kennedy’s, alas, seems incapable of application.

Citing the eminent Michigan jurist Thomas Cooley, the state’s supreme court rejected economic revitalization takings in \textit{County of Wayne v. Hathcock}.\textsuperscript{221} That case overruled the court’s \textit{Poletown} doctrine, which countenanced the condemnation of an entire ethnic neighborhood for an auto assembly plant.\textsuperscript{222}

Every business, every productive unit in society, does, as Justice Cooley noted, contribute in some way to the commonwealth. To justify the exercise of eminent domain solely on the basis of the fact that the use of that property by a private entity seeking its own profit might contribute to the economy’s health is to render impotent our constitutional limitations on the government’s power of eminent domain. \textit{Poletown}’s “economic benefit” rationale would validate practically any exercise of the power of eminent domain on behalf of a private entity. After all, if one’s ownership of private property is forever subject to the government’s determination that another private party would put one’s land to better use, then the ownership of real property is perpetually threatened by the expansion plans of any large discount retailer, “megastore,” or the like.\textsuperscript{223}

\textsuperscript{220} \textit{See, e.g.}, Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 584 (1972) (“noting that “the protection of the individual against arbitrary action is the very essence of due process”) (ellipses, punctuation, and internal citations omitted).

\textsuperscript{221} 684 N.W.2d 765 (Mich. 2004).


\textsuperscript{223} \textit{Hathcock}, 684 N.W.2d at 786. Perhaps this paragraph was the inspiration for Justice O’Connor’s much more widely quoted lines. “For who among us can say she already makes the most productive or attractive possible use of her property? The specter of condemnation hangs over all property. Nothing is to prevent the State from replacing any Motel 6 with a Ritz-Carlton, any home with a shopping mall, or any farm with a factory.” \textit{Kelo v. City of New London}, 545 U.S. at 503 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
Justice Kennedy’s formulation, “transfers intended to confer benefits on particular, favored private entities, and with only incidental or pretextual public benefits,”\(^{224}\) does not make clear whether or not the proscribed intent would have to encompass incidental public benefits. Either way, “intent” regarding the future is as ephemeral as *Penn Central*’s “expectations” about the future.

Justice Thomas noted that New London’s project, which stated a “vague promise of new jobs and increased tax revenue,” also was “suspiciously agreeable to the Pfizer Corporation.”\(^{225}\) But the Fort Trumbull redevelopment undoubtedly contemplated future consequences of its decisions as well as present ones.

The immediate function of Fort Trumbull redevelopment was to build the infrastructure that would be synergetic with Pfizer’s adjoining research center, so that the company would benefit from the restaurants, shops, hotels, and upscale housing that would provide amenities and lodging for its key personnel and visitors. The redevelopment tenants, in turn, would benefit from the patronage of Pfizer and its employees and invitees.

The second purpose of the redevelopment was to serve as a catalyst for the creation of jobs and needed economic activity in New London and Connecticut, partly through encouraging other corporations to relocate. For decisionmaking executives of these companies, the minutiae of Fort Trumbull negotiations and the ensuing contract provisions were hardly relevant. They would be greatly interested in the basic economic terms the city and state would offer them, to be sure. Beyond that, however, the bottom line question would be posed to their Pfizer counterparts at business roundtable and trade meetings: “Was New London agreeable to meeting your needs?” Not only was complying with the informally expressed needs of Pfizer officials not inimical to the best interest of the city, it affirmatively furthered the economic development of the city.

Justice O’Connor’s explanation that “private benefit and incidental public benefit are, by definition, merged and mutually reinforcing,” and that “any boon for Pfizer or the

\(^{224}\) *Kelo*, 545 U.S. at 469, 491 (Kennedy, J., concurring).

\(^{225}\) *Kelo*, 545 U.S. at 506 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
plan's developer is difficult to disaggregate from the promised public gains in taxes and jobs” is exactly on point.226

4. Practical Objections to Pretextuality

*Calder v. Bull* described the pure government transfer of property from A to B as “against all reason and justice.”227 But where the benefits are “merged and mutually reinforcing,” the principle that government should not arbitrarily favor one citizen to the detriment of another has to do with an evaluation of ends and means.

*Calder* presents a zero-sum game. B now has the property and A does not. While this sequence of events does not, ex post, affect third parties, it is clear, ex ante, that society would be a net loser. Property owners like A would expend time and money attempting to thwart or buy off officials who might facilitate grabs of their property. Correspondingly, predators like B would devote their talents and cash to bringing about such untoward results. As is the case with outright theft, the costs are in both effectuating and preventing redevelopment transfers, and also, as Professor Frank Michelman described, in the demoralization of rightful owners that would discourage productive investment.228

However, “pretextual” takings involve not actions, but rather variance between articulated motives and actual motives. Unlike *Calder* transfers, pretextual transfers might, or might not, involve losses to society. They might well provide benefit to the city engaging in them. Besides, demoralization costs are present in any exercise of eminent domain.

Assume that Smith is mayor of a small city, and Jones is a developer who has contributed to Smith’s reelection campaigns. Jones proposes that the city undertake a redevelopment project that will require condemnation, and will benefit the city in the

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226 *Kelo*, 545 U.S. at 502 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
227 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 388 (1789).
228 Frank I. Michelman, *Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law*, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 1165 (1967). “Demoralization costs” are defined as the total of (1) the dollar value necessary to offset disutilities which accrue to losers and their sympathizers specifically from the realization that no compensation is offered, and (2) the present capitalized dollar value of lost future production (reflecting either impaired incentives or social unrest) caused by demoralization of uncompensated losers, their sympathizers, and other observers disturbed by the thought that they themselves may be subjected to similar treatment on some other occasion.” Id. at 1214 (internal footnote omitted).
amount of $20X. Assume that the benefit to Jones will be 10X. On its face, there is no
evidence to suggest that Jones would have offered a sweeter deal, or that the city could
have obtained more than $20X from anyone else. Now, let’s assume instead that, other
facts remaining the same, Jones derived $30X in benefit, which is more than the city did.
Let’s further assume that, in the latter case, fears of charges of “pretextuality” led the city
to accept a redevelopment project from Clark, instead. Clark would derive $8X in value,
and the city would derive $15X.

Why should the city have to derive $5X less in value by dealing with Clark, simp-
ly to avoid Jones obtaining a greater return than the city? This analysis suggests that the
real problem with pretextuality is not that government is acting for bad motives, but ra-
ther that it is acting for opaque motives. Perhaps its actions are for the best, and perhaps
they are not. We just do not know, and that does not seem fair. As a prophylactic, we
might want to ban government officials from taking part in non-transparent transac-
tions.229

It might be, as in the case of offenses deemed “hate crimes,” that society decides
to enhance the punishment accorded a wrongful act because of its motives. The fear of
victimization by a criminal motivated by racism, xenophobia, or a similar motive imposes
psychological and deterrence costs upon potential victims in excess of those imposed
upon other potential victims of similar crimes. Likewise, uncompensated losses arising
from pretextual condemnation might engender a heightened sense of injury in the con-
demnee, who would ascribe his injury to predation rather than to the random chance of
government necessity. In the case of “pretextual” condemnation, such an enhanced level
of injury might justify as an appropriate preventative, as Justice Kennedy suggested, a
higher level of judicial scrutiny in appropriate types of situations.230

229 This was a reason offered by Professor Thomas Merrill for cities assemble parcels through
eminent domain rather than adopt “private developers’ ‘guile.’” See Thomas W. Merrill, The
Economics of Public Use, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 61, 81 (1986). See infra notes 390-391 and asso-
ciated text for discussion.
230 See infra note 274 and accompanying text.
C. Vitiating the Public Use Clause – Goldstein and Kaur

In *Marbury v. Madison*, the U.S. Supreme Court declared that “[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.” The Court more recently stated that “the question [of] what is a public use is a judicial one.” To the extent the New York Court of Appeals unduly defers to the political branches of government, it not only makes it almost impossible for a landowner to win on public use grounds, it also deprives the Public Use Clause of any independent significance.

1. The Court of Appeals Regards “Public Use” as Redundant

The lesson of *Goldstein* and *Kaur* is that the New York Court of Appeals will enforce the Public Use Clause only where it is unnecessary. Through its vague and open ended definitions of crucial concepts such as “blight,” “civic purpose,” the court’s jurisprudence implicitly is founded on the notion that a governmental entity or its chosen redeveloper’s exercise of eminent domain will be held not to be for public use only under circumstances in which it would lose on independent grounds. In other words, where other aspects of the taking comport with constitutional and statutory requirements, public use always would be found. Conversely, where a taking is set aside on public use grounds, it could be set aside for another reason. The result is that the Public Use Clause *never* is outcome determinative.

2. An Open-Ended View of “Blight

The alluring notion of “blight,” at its most expansive, permeates both *Goldstein* and *Kaur*. In *Goldstein*, Chief Judge Lipmann noted that the “removal of urban blight” is sanctioned in the court’s 1936 decision in *New York City Housing Authority v. Muller*,

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231 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
232 *Id.* at 177.
234 *See infra* Part IV.B for discussion.
235 Goldstein, 921 N.E.2d at 171 (citing Muller, 1 N.E.2d 153 (N.Y. 1936)).
and in the State Constitution, for the alleviation of “substandard and insanitary areas.”\textsuperscript{236} He added, though, that by 1975, in \textit{Yonkers Community Development Agency v. Morris},\textsuperscript{237} urban renewal had progressed from the alleviation of “slums” to dealing with other “threats to the public sufficient to make their removal cognizable as a public purpose,” including “economic underdevelopment and stagnation.”\textsuperscript{238}

In his dissenting opinion in \textit{Goldstein}, Judge Smith reviewed the court’s caselaw, including \textit{Muller} and \textit{Morris}, and concluded:

> While these cases undoubtedly expanded the old understanding of public use, they did not establish the general proposition that property may be condemned and turned over to a private developer every time a state agency thinks that doing so would improve the neighborhood.\textsuperscript{239}

The majority provided a half-hearted defense.

> It may be that the bar has now been set too low—that what will now pass as “blight,” as that expression has come to be understood and used by political appointees to public corporations relying upon studies paid for by developers, should not be permitted to constitute a predicate for the invasion of property rights and the razing of homes and businesses. But any such limitation upon the sovereign power of eminent domain as it has come to be defined in the urban renewal context is a matter for the Legislature, not the courts.\textsuperscript{240}

This admission is remarkable, first, for its passive construction, referring to the possibility that the standard was “set too low” and how the lack of constraint “has come to be defined.” More important, it seemed to treat the “sovereign power of eminent domain” as the prerogative of the Legislature, as if the sovereign people had not had not in their constitution provided for the judicial department as well as the legislative department.\textsuperscript{241} The Court of Appeals’ perspective on blight seems to be a function of the Geor-

\textsuperscript{236} \textit{Id.} (citing N.Y. CONST. Art. XVIII § 1).

\textsuperscript{237} \textit{Goldstein}, 921 N.E.2d at 171-72 (citing \textit{Morris}, 335 N.E.2d 327 (N.Y. 1975)).

\textsuperscript{238} \textit{Id.} at 172.

\textsuperscript{239} \textit{Id.} at 172 (Smith, J., dissenting).

\textsuperscript{240} \textit{Id.} at 172.

\textsuperscript{241} \textit{Compare supra} notes 231-233 and associated text.
gist view of property ownership and the State’s claims first enunciated by Chief Judge Breitel.242

3. Pretext in Goldstein and Kaur

The Court of Appeals’ opinion in Goldstein v. New York Urban Development Corp. did not mention the issue of pretext at all,243 but it was raised in Judge Smith’s dissent.

According to the petition in this case, when the project was originally announced in 2003 the public benefit claimed for it was economic development-job creation and the bringing of a professional basketball team to Brooklyn. Petitioners allege that nothing was said about “blight” by the sponsors of the project until 2005; ESDC has not identified any earlier use of the term. In 2005, ESDC retained a consultant to conduct a “blight study.” In light of the special status accorded to blight in the New York law of eminent domain, the inference that it was a pretext, not the true motive for this development, seems compelling.244

The majority emphasized that the court was limited in its review to the record developed by the ESDC,245 a principle well established in New York law.246 Given that the controlling record was made by the agency fostering urban renewal, however, and Judge Smith’s characterization that the agency’s determination was “self-serving,”247 it is important that it be considered in that light.

Judge Smith noted that only the northern part of the Atlantic Yards project area could be described as “blighted,” and that the southern part, where the plaintiffs lived, appeared to be “a normal and pleasant residential community.”248 “Choosing their words carefully, the consultants concluded that the area of the proposed Atlantic Yards devel-

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242 See supra Parts IV.A through IV.C for discussion.
244 Id. at 188 (Smith, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
245 Id. at 166 (citing Levine v. New York State Liquor Auth., 245 N.E.2d 804 (1969).
246 Trump-Equitable Fifth Ave. Co. v. Gliedman, 443 N.E.2d 940, 942 (N.Y. 1982) (“A fundamental principle of administrative law long accepted by this court limits judicial review of an administrative determination solely to the grounds invoked by the agency, and if those grounds are insufficient or improper, the court is powerless to sanction the determination by substituting what it deems a more appropriate or proper basis”).
247 Id. at 186 (Smith, J., dissenting).
248 Id. at 189-90 (Smith, J., dissenting).
development, taken as a whole, was ‘characterized by blighted conditions.’" He concluded that “It is clear to me from the record that the elimination of blight, in the sense of substandard and unsanitary conditions that present a danger to public safety, was never the bona fide purpose of the development at issue in this case.”

For its part, the majority stated facts in the record supporting the determination, and noted that, when administrative bodies “‘have made their finding, not corruptly or irrationally or baselessly, there is nothing for the courts to do about it, unless every act and decision of other departments of government is subject to revision by the courts.’”

As noted earlier, in the aftermath of the New York Court of Appeals decision in Goldstein, the Appellate Division held in Kaur v New York State Urban Development Corp. that condemnation by the Empire State Development Corporation for the purpose of extending the Columbia University campus in West Harlem violated the public use requirement. The Appellate Division described the blight designation in Kaur as “mere sophistry.” It stated that the designation “was utilized by ESDC years after the Manhattanville Project was hatched to justify the employment of eminent domain, but this Project has always primarily concerned a massive capital project for Columbia. Indeed, it is nothing more than economic redevelopment wearing a different face.” The court noted that, in his concurring opinion in Kelo, Justice Kennedy “placed particular

249 Id. at 190 (Smith, J., dissenting).
250 Id. at 189 (Smith, J., dissenting).
251 Id. at 172 (quoting Kaskel v. Impellitteri, 115 N.Y.2d 659, 661 (1953). Judge Smith pointed out that Kaskel was a taxpayer’s suit, brought under a section of municipal law requiring corruption, fraud, or a total lack of agency power in order to succeed. Id. at 188 (Smith, J., dissenting).
252 See supra Part II.C.
255 Id. at 10.
256 Id.
emphasis on the importance of the underlying planning process . . . and laid out in detail the elements of the New London plan that ensured against impermissible favoritism.”  

The Appellate Division stated that the “contrast between ESDC’s scheme for the redevelopment of Manhattanville and New London’s plan for Fort Trumbull could not be more dramatic.” It enumerated elements by which the Manhattanville plan diverged from New London’s, including Master Plan findings that Manhattanville was experiencing a “renaissance of economic development” prior to the proposed project; that “Columbia underwrote all of the costs of studying and planning for what would become a sovereign-sponsored campaign of Columbia’s expansion;” and that the redevelopment agency’s commitment to rezoning Manhattanville was “not for the goal of general economic development or to remediate an area that was ‘blighted’ before Columbia acquired over 50% of the property, but rather solely for the expansion of Columbia itself.”

The Court of Appeals reversed on the grounds that ESDC’s “findings of blight and determination that the condemnation of petitioners' property qualified as a ‘land use improvement project’ were rationally based and entitled to deference.”

D. Meaningful Scrutiny and Procedural Roadblocks

Promises in *Kelo* that instances of public use condemnation abuse “can be confronted if and when they arise,” and that “[a] court applying rational basis review . . . should strike down a taking that, by a clear showing, is intended to favor a particular private party, with only incidental or pretextual public benefits,” are effective only if implemented. As Justice Kennedy noted in his concurrence, “meaningful rational basis review” requires that courts “conduct[] a careful and extensive inquiry” into primary and

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257 *Id.* at 12-13 (quoting *Kelo* v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 491-93 (2005) (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
258 *Id.* at 13.
259 *Id.* at 13-14.
262 *Id.* at 491 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
incidental benefit.” 263 Unfortunately, there is significant tension between that goal and the insulation of legislative decisionmaking from overly-intrusive judicial review.

1. Public Use and “Meaningful” Judicial Scrutiny

While Justice Kennedy joined the majority opinion as the necessary fifth vote in *Kelo v. City of New London*, 264 his concurring opinion urged the adoption of “the meaningful rational basis review that in [his] view is required under the Public Use Clause.” 265 He cited favorably to *City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc.*, 266 a case in which group homes for the retarded were given less favorable zoning treatment than other multifamily housing, such as hotels and fraternity houses. While purporting to use rational basis review, the Court actually examined the proffered bases for the distinction instead of asserting that the city must have had a plausible basis. The case is a leading example of “covert heightened scrutiny.” 267

Justice Kennedy accepted the premise that eminent domain should be upheld if “rationally related to a conceivable public purpose.” 268 However, he suggested that this takings standard was parallel to, and not an application of, similar standards developed by the Court in other contexts. 269

A court applying rational-basis review under the Public Use Clause should strike down a taking that, by a clear showing, is intended to favor a particular private party, with only incidental or pretextual public benefits, just as a court applying rational-basis review under the Equal Protection Clause must strike down a gov-

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263 Id. at 491-92.
265 Id. at 492 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
266 Id. at 491 (Kennedy, J., concurring); see *City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc.*, 473 U.S. 432, 446-47, 450 (1985).
267 See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1612 (2d ed. 1988); Eagle, supra note 208, at 951-54 (discussing *Cleburne* line of cases).
268 *Kelo*, 545 U.S. at 490 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoting Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 241 (1984)).
269 Id. (“This deferential standard of review echoes the rational-basis test used to review economic regulation under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses”) (emphasis added).
ernment classification that is clearly intended to injure a particular class of private parties, with only incidental or pretextual public justifications.270

The “clear showing” of favoritism and disproportional private benefit standard, as Justice Kennedy employed it, seems far less burdensome than a judicial refusal to find substantive due process applicable to deprivations of property at all,271 or application of a “shocks the conscience” standard.272

In order to give the condemnee a chance to make this “clear showing,” a “court confronted with a plausible accusation of impermissible favoritism to private parties should treat the objection as a serious one and review the record to see if it has merit, though with the presumption that the government's actions were reasonable and intended to serve a public purpose.”273 Where there is a “plausible accusation,” then, the first object of judicial inquiry is not to decide if the taking has some legitimate public purpose, but rather to see if the record indicates pretext or disproportional benefit.

“The record,” for these purposes, should be defined for this purpose in connection with Justice Kennedy’s next point.

My agreement with the Court that a presumption of invalidity is not warranted for economic development takings in general, or for the particular takings at issue in this case, does not foreclose the possibility that a more stringent standard of review than that announced in Berman and Midkiff might be appropriate for a more narrowly drawn category of takings. There may be private transfers in which the risk of undetected impermissible favoritism of private parties is so acute that a presumption (rebuttable or otherwise) of invalidity is warranted under the Public Use Clause.274

The category of takings comprising transactions where the transferee initiated the condemnation, or was hand-selected by officials ordering the taking, would benefit substantially from the taking, and benefitted from a complex and perhaps opaque administra-

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270 Id. at 491 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
271 Greenbriar Village, L.L.C. v. City of Mountain Brook, 345 F.3d 1258 (11th Cir. 2003).
272 See Mongeau v. City of Marlborough, 492 F.3d 14 (1st Cir. 2007); United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc. v. Township of Warrington, 316 F.3d 392 (3rd Cir. 2003).
273 Kelo, 545 U.S. at 491 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
274 Id. at 493 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
tive process, presents precisely the possibility of “undetected impermissible favoritism” with which Justice Kennedy was concerned.

In such a situation, it is not unlikely that officials and their selected redeveloper work together to shape an administrative record that appears unblemished on its face. A court reviewing this record would find ample references to legitimate public purposes and no substantial evidence of favoritism, disproportionality, or pretext. But, under these circumstances, that court would not be taking the condemnee’s accusation seriously. That, in essence, marks the flaws in the New York Court of Appeals review of \textit{Goldstein} and \textit{Kaur}. In this regard, as in other aspects of the \textit{Kelo} case, Justice O’Connor’s reservations seem prescient:

\begin{quote}
The Court protests that it does not sanction the bare transfer from \textit{A} to \textit{B} for \textit{B}’s benefit. It suggests two limitations on what can be taken after today’s decision. First, it maintains a role for courts in ferreting out takings whose sole purpose is to bestowed a benefit on the private transferee—without detailing how courts are to conduct that complicated inquiry. For his part, Justice Kennedy suggests that courts may divine illicit purpose by a careful review of the record and the process by which a legislature arrived at the decision to take—without specifying what courts should look for in a case with different facts, how they will know if they have found it, and what to do if they do not. Whatever the details of Justice Kennedy’s as-yet-undisclosed test, it is difficult to envision anyone but the “stupid staff[er]” failing it.\textsuperscript{275}

If the “\textit{Armstrong principle}” of fairness\textsuperscript{276} is the leitmotif of the Takings Clause, it entails that individuals should not be singled out to bear burdens, and that the burdens imposed upon them should not be disproportional to the burdens imposed on others similarly situated or to the burdens that their actions impose on the community.

Scholars and judges have long considered concepts of fairness and proportionality in connection with takings liability. A classic article by Professor Robert Ellickson discussed the tendency of government to impose development exactions on landowners


lacking political power.277 Similarly, Professor Saul Levmore observed that takings claims are more compelling when the condemnor was singled out as a target of opportunity.278

Meaningful rational basis review, the “more stringent” standard that Justice Kennedy advocated for questionable categories of public use takings,279 requires that rational basis inquiry be conducted with regard to actually proffered justifications for government acts, and not conjectural or plausible ones. This was the standard used in the Cleburne case, to which Justice Kennedy referred, and similar cases in which there was a possibility of abuse.280

A reminder that “public use” is contextual, and not a permanent imprimatur of approval, is contained in a case arising from a troubled New York revitalization project, the Destiny USA Mall.281 In Kaufmann’s Carousel, Inc. v. City of Syracuse Industrial Development Agency,282 a retail store claimed that easements that it owned could not be condemned as part of reconfiguring rights in the project, those easements had been acquired as the result of an earlier condemnation for retransfer. Although Kauffman’s claimed that the earlier condemnation in its favor certified its use as being a “public use” that could not subsequently be disturbed, it was unable to convince the court.

277 Robert C. Ellickson, Suburban Growth Controls: An Economic and Legal Analysis, 86 YALE L.J. 385, 439 (1977) (“Development charges ... are widely used by small suburbs because they cream off the surplus of a particular group of landowners who have little political power.”).

278 Saul Levmore, Just Compensation and Just Politics, 22 CONN. L. REV. 285, 306-07 (1990) (contrasting small, isolated, property owners in special need of constitutional protection from large, institutional owners, that easily could become involved in the political process).

279 Kelo, 545 U.S. at 493 (Kennedy, J., concurring).


In the Supreme Court’s recent opinion in *Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Department of Environmental Protection*, one of the issues before the Court was whether judicial actions could constitute regulatory takings. The Court did not decide the “judicial takings” issue. However, in a part of Justice Scalia’s opinion for the Court joined by only Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas and Alito, he declared that “the Takings Clause bars the State from taking private property without paying for it, no matter which branch is the instrument of the taking. To be sure, the manner of state action may matter . . . But the particular state actor is irrelevant.” In *Dolan v. City of Tigard*, the Court held that exactions of property required for development approvals had to be based on “individualized determination” and “rough proportionality” to the burden of the locality that they imposed. But these requirements applied only to administrative determinations, not to legislative exactions. To the extent that subsequent cases adopt Scalia’s view in *Stop the Beach* that the State act, and not the State actor, is what matters, the distinction drawn by *Dolan* becomes eroded.

2. **Pretext Defenses and Discovery**

In *Franco v. National Capital Revitalization Corp. (Franco I)*, the District of Columbia’s redevelopment agency condemned Franco’s store in the Skyland Shopping Center in the southeast quadrant of the District. The center contained about 30 stores, and a draft bill introduced in the Council of the District of Columbia called for its condemnation as “necessary and desirable for the public use.” The bill “did not explain why the properties were ‘necessary’ or to what ‘public use’ they would be devoted.” There were no public hearings before the bill was passed, but the enacted version contained a

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283 130 S.Ct. 2592 (2010).
284 Id. at 2602.
286 See Parking Ass’n of Georgia, Inc. v. City of Atlanta, 515 U.S. 1116, 1116 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (asserting that there is no relevant difference between administrative and legislative exactions).
287 930 A.2d 160 (D.C. 2007) (*Franco I*).
288 Id. at 163.
289 Id.
set of findings of blight, including underutilization, neglect, poor maintenance, and absentee ownership facilitating the accumulation of trash, and crime. The Council also found that ‘[t]he assemblage of the properties comprising the Skyland Shopping Center and the construction of a new shopping center on the site ... will further many important public purposes,’” including alleviation of the factors noted above.

The District of Columbia Court of Appeals exercised jurisdiction because the trial court had granted the redevelopment agency immediate possession, and had exercised pendant appellate jurisdiction because the issues in the dispute were “inextricably intertwined.”

Proceeding to the merits, the court first noted that *Kelo* reiterated the Supreme Court’s “‘longstanding policy of deference to legislative judgments in this field.’” However, *Kelo* recognized that there may be situations where a court should not take at face value what the legislature has said. The government will rarely acknowledge that it is acting for a forbidden reason, so a property owner must in some circumstances be allowed to allege and to demonstrate that the stated public purpose for the condemnation is pretextual. It may be difficult to make this showing, and the Supreme Court's decision may raise many more questions than it answers, but a pretext defense is not necessarily “foreclosed by *Kelo*.”

The court observed that “Justice Kennedy focused hypothetically on the insubstantial quality of touted public benefits, stating “that transfers intended to confer benefits on particular, favored private entities, and with only incidental or pretextual public benefits, are forbidden by the Public Use Clause.”

*Franco I* noted that it could not “indulge baseless, conclusory allegations that the legislature acted improperly,” but that it “could not summarily deny without a hearing a

\[\text{\textsuperscript{290} Id.}\]
\[\text{\textsuperscript{291} Id.}\]
\[\text{\textsuperscript{292} Id. at 165.}\]
\[\text{\textsuperscript{293} Id. at 168 (quoting *Kelo* v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 480 (2005)).}\]
\[\text{\textsuperscript{294} Id.}\]
\[\text{\textsuperscript{295} Id. at 171 (citing United States v. 416.81 Acres, 514 F.2d 627, 631-32 (7th Cir. 1975)).}\]
property owner’s detailed objections.”\(^{296}\) It held that “this case the defense may not be rejected as a matter of pleading,” vacated the order granting the agency immediate possession, and remanded.\(^{297}\) On remand, the trial court granted broad discovery on Franco’s takings claim, but deprived him of his substantive pretext defense by applying collateral estoppel based on another Skyway Shopping Center condemnation case.\(^{298}\) The appellate court held, in *Franco II*, that collateral estoppel was inapplicable.\(^{299}\)

*Franco II*\(^{300}\) also rejected the District’s motion to dismiss the pretext claim, treating it as a claim for summary judgment, since it involved matters outside the pleadings.\(^{301}\) It observed that “[e]ssentially, Franco was seeking the same opportunity to complete discovery related to his pretext claim” has he had enjoyed in his condemnation case “on virtually the same question, i.e., his pretext defense,” and remanded.\(^{302}\)

3. The Role of Twombly and Iqbal

Pretextuality is more difficult to plead as a result of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions in *Bell Atlantic Corp. v Twombly*,\(^{303}\) and *Ashcroft v Iqbal*.\(^{304}\) In 1957, in *Conley v. Gibson*,\(^{305}\) the Supreme Court enunciated “the accepted rule that a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.”\(^{306}\)

\(^{296}\) *Id.* (citing United States v. 58.16 Acres of Land, More or Less, 478 F.2d 1055, 1057, 1059 (7th Cir. 1973)).

\(^{297}\) *Id.* at 175.

\(^{298}\) *Franco II*, 3 A.3d at 303.

\(^{299}\) *Id.* at 306. In a related procedural issue, *Franco II* held that the landowner was not collaterally estopped from asserting his pretext defense because a similar defense had not prevailed in a separate lawsuit filed by another condemnee in the same revitalization project in which Franco had not participated. *Id.* at 305.

\(^{300}\) 3 A.3d 300 (D.C. 2010) (*Franco II*).

\(^{301}\) *Id.* at 307.

\(^{302}\) *Id.* at 308.


\(^{304}\) 129 S.Ct. 1937 (2009).

\(^{305}\) 355 U.S. 41 (1957).

\(^{306}\) *Id.* at 45-46.
explained in *Iqbal*, the Court adopted a stricter standard *Twombly*, requiring that, in order to survive a motion to dismiss, the complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. The plausibility standard is not akin to a “probability requirement,” but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. Where a complaint pleads facts that are “merely consistent with” a defendant’s liability, it “stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement to relief.’”  

*Franco I* stated that the *Twombly* standard had been met. However, *Twombly* played a substantial, if not fully specified, role in *Goldstein v. Pataki*. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit declined to explore the parameters of the case, since the appellants accepted its applicability and “[a]s all parties acknowledge, at a bare minimum, the operative standard requires the ‘plaintiff [to] provide the grounds upon which his claim rests through factual allegations sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.”’” The Second Circuit concluded that, [i]n view of what they have effectively conceded in prosecuting this lawsuit, the appellants cannot meet this standard.”

*Goldstein v. Pataki* considered whether the plaintiffs’ Atlantic Yards claim sufficiently alleged that the taking of his property by eminent domain violated the Public Use Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The court stated that they had effectively acknowledged the project’s public benefits, but contended that these “serv[ed] as a ‘pretext’ that masks its actual raison d’être: enriching the private individual who proposed it and stands to profit most from its completion.” It noted as the essence of the plaintiffs’ argument:

\[\text{307} \quad *Iqbal*, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (quoting *Twombly*, 550 U.S. at 556-570).\]
\[\text{308} \quad *Franco I*, 930 A.2d at 170 (noting that “Franco made many specific factual allegations to support this claim”).\]
\[\text{309} \quad 516 F.3d 50 (2nd Cir. 2008).\]
\[\text{310} \quad \text{Id. at 56} (quoting ATSI Commc’ns. v. Shaar Fund, Ltd., 493 F.3d 87, 89 (2d Cir. 2007) (quoting *Twombly*, 127 S.Ct. at 1965)).\]
\[\text{311} \quad \text{Id. at 56-57.}\]
\[\text{312} \quad \text{Id. at 52-53.}\]
Defendants’ decision to take Plaintiffs’ properties serves only one purpose: it allows Ratner to build a Project of unprecedented size, and thus reap a profit that Defendants, tellingly, have attempted to conceal at every turn. This is not merely favoritism of a particular developer... Here, the “favored” developer is driving and dictating the process, with government officials at all levels obediently falling into line.\textsuperscript{313}

These claims, the Second Circuit continued, related to Bruce Ratner being the impetus behind the Project, that his proffered civic improvements were post hoc justifications, and that the Empire State Development Corporation’s review was a “sham” in which the outcome was long “predetermined.”\textsuperscript{314} The gravamen of the plaintiffs’ contentions is, the court continued, that benefits objectively related to public use “should nevertheless be rejected as ‘pretex tual,’ not because they are false, but because they are not the real reason for the Project’s approval.”\textsuperscript{315}

The court stated that pre-\textit{Kelo} instances in which federal courts addressed pretextuality “contested whether \textit{any} public use would be served by the taking.”\textsuperscript{316}

In contrast, the particular kind of “pretex t” claim the plaintiffs in this case advance bears an especially dubious jurisprudential pedigree: The plaintiffs have effectively acknowledged the Project’s rational relationship to numerous well-established public uses, but contend that it is constitutionally impermissible nonetheless because one or more of the government officials who approved it was actually—and improperly—motivated by a desire to confer a private benefit on Mr. Ratner... [Plaintiffs] seek depositions of pertinent government officials, along with their emails, confidential communications, and other pre-decisional documents. They also dispute various plausible assumptions underlying the Project’s budget.

Allowing such a claim to go forward, founded only on mere suspicion, would add an unprecedented level of intrusion into the process... Accordingly, we must reject the notion that, in a single sentence, the \textit{Kelo} majority sought \textit{sub silentio} to overrule \textit{Berman, Midkiff}, and over a century of precedent and to require federal courts in all cases to give close scrutiny to the mechanics of a taking rationally related to a classic public use as a means to

\textsuperscript{313} \textit{Id.} at 55.
\textsuperscript{314} \textit{Id.} at 56.
\textsuperscript{315} \textit{Id.} at 58-59.
gauge the purity of the motives of the various government officials who approved it.317

Another approach was taken by the Supreme Court of Hawaii in County of Hawaii v. C & J Coupe Family Limited Partnership.318 The court asserted that the presence of even a “classic” public use would not obviate the possibility that the “actual purpose” was to confer private benefit, and thus permitted a pretextuality defense.319 On the other hand, it agreed with the Second Circuit in Goldstein v. Pataki320 that the appellants there were seeking “an unprecedented level of intrusion into the process.”321 It then noted that the C. J. Coupe plaintiff did not seek such intrusive review, but rather “as contemplated by Goldstein, questions ‘the basic legitimacy of the outcome’ and seeks a ‘close objective scrutiny of the justification being offered.’”322

Other cases, too, have indicated that the lower courts have yet to come to grips with the tension between the heightened scrutiny implied in Justice Stevens’323 and Kennedy’s324 Kelo opinions and the deferential rational basis approach the Court otherwise uses in land use and takings cases.325 These include Carole Media, LLC, v. N.J. Transit Co.,326 where the Third Circuit disregarded evidence inconsistent with the Midkiff “rationally related to a conceivable public purpose” standard,327 and Rhode Island Economic Development Corp. v. The Parking Company, L.P.,328 where the court upheld a claim of pretextuality in a case where the State Department of Transportation would gain from termination of its contractual obligation. None of the cases considered in this discussion

317 Id. at 62.
318 198 P.3d 615 (Haw. 2008).
319 Id. at 648.
320 516 F.3d 50 (2nd Cir. 2008).
321 198 P.3d at 649 (quoting Goldstein, 516 F.3d at 63-64).
322 Id. (quoting Goldstein, 516 F.3d at 63-64).
324 Id. at 490 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
325 Id. at 480 (noting “longstanding policy of deference”).
326 550 F.3d 302 (3rd Cir. 2008).
327 Id. at 309.
328 892 A.2d 87 (R.I. 2006).
contained any clear indication of whether the court was applying a rational basis or heightened scrutiny standard, or clear guidance on how trial courts were to proceed on remand or in future cases.

“Neither the courts ruling against pretext claims, nor the courts ruling in favor of such claims, have any consistent, thorough, and rigorous doctrine governing their adjudication and the scrutiny to be applied.” 329 The Supreme Court’s failure to grant certiorari in *Kaur v New York State Urban Development Corp.* 330 represents a lost opportunity to provide such clarity.

In the end, the result of analyses such as that of the Second Circuit would preclude almost all public use pretextuality claims from receiving meaningful scrutiny. Plaintiffs would be required to submit pleadings showing, with specificity, evidence of *no* public use, or else a “smoking gun” demonstrating pretextual motivation. Any large revitalization project, however, would produce at least some public benefit. Even in the case of a small project, it would not be clear that pretextual explanation equates to invidious pretextual intent. 331 A “smoking gun” would make fine evidence, but developers and officials collaborating on a project of substantial scope likely would be sufficiently seasoned and discrete to make this possibility highly unlikely. 332 The outcome would vindicate Justice O’Connor’s sense of cynicism, or resignation, that “[w]hatever the details of Justice Kennedy’s as-yet-undisclosed test, it is difficult to envision anyone but the ‘stupid staff[er]’ failing it.” 333

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331 *See supra* notes 210-214 and associated text for discussion.
332 *See infra* notes 398-399 and associated text for discussion.
IV. Goldstein, Kaur and Public Policy Problems

The previous section of this article described how, in its application of *Kelo v. City of New London*[^334] in *Goldstein v. New York State Urban Development Corp.*,[^335] and *Kaur v. New York State Urban Development Corp.*,[^336] the New York Court of Appeals abrogated its duty to examine meaningfully possible instances of eminent domain not for public use. This section concludes that this turn in law also is a blunder in public policy. The very opacity inherent in public private partnerships and redeveloper selection that contributes to making eminent domain legally objectionable in this context also makes it bad public policy.

A. Penn Central, Henry George, and Agglomeration Economics

1. Penn Central in the Court of Appeals: A Georgist Turn

The New York Court of Appeals judgment in *Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York*, favoring the New York City Landmarks Preservation Commission, and against the construction of an office building on top of Grand Central Terminal, was affirmed by the U.S. Supreme Court.[^337] The Supreme Court’s *Penn Central* opinion has been subject to much criticism, largely because its ad hoc multifactor analysis gives little real guidance to lawyers and judges.[^338]

[^335]: 921 N.E.2d 164 (N.Y. 2009).
[^338]: See, e.g., Gideon Kanner, *Making Laws and Sausages: A Quarter-Century Retrospective on Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York*, 13 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 681 (2005). “*Penn Central* lacks doctrinal clarity because of its outright refusal to formulate the elements of a regulatory taking cause of action, and because of its intellectual romp through the law of eminent domain that paid scant attention to preexisting legal doctrine. Its aftermath has become an economic paradise for specialized lawyers, a burden on the judiciary, as well as an indirect impediment to would-be home builders, and an economic disaster for would-be home buyers and for society at large.” *Id.* at 681.
Although the U.S. Supreme Court indeed has been reticent to accepting or deciding cases that would allow it to refine its takings and public use doctrine, it did criticize Chief Judge Breitel’s New York Court of Appeals decision in *Penn Central* opinion. In *Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council*, it took the New York court to task for its “extreme—and, we think, unsupportable—view of the relevant calculus” pertaining to the denominator of the takings fraction. The Court of Appeals, *Lucas* continued, had impermissibly “examined the diminution in a particular parcel’s value produced by a municipal ordinance in light of total value of the takings claimant’s other holdings in the vicinity.” But that is only the tip of the iceberg.

Chief Judge Breitel, writing for the Court of Appeals, noted the principle, “rooted in the due process clause of the Constitution,” that the State “may not, by regulation, deprive a property owner of all reasonable return on his property.” He continued, however, by questioning the extent to which government, when regulating private property, must assure what is described as a reasonable return on that ingredient of property value created not so much by the efforts of the property owner, but instead by the *accumulated indirect social and direct governmental investment* in the physical property, its functions, and its surroundings.

In his discussion of what gives property value, Chief Judge Breitel continued:

So many of these attributes are not the result of private effort or investment but of opportunities for the utilization or exploitation which an organized society of-

339 See, e.g., PFZ Properties, Inc. v. Rodriguez, 928 F.2d 28 (1st Cir. 1991), *cert denied as improvidently granted*, 503 U.S. 257 (1992) (uncontroverted claims of government destruction of development applicant’s submissions, case dismissed after oral argument); Knutson v. City of Fargo, 600 F.3d 992 (8th Cir.), *cert. denied*, 131 S.Ct. 357 (2010) (denying review after four justices urged, in San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City and County of San Francisco, 545 U.S. 323 (2005), that the Court review requirement for state litigation to ripen takings claim against municipalities); Kottschade v. City of Rochester, 319 F.3d 1038 (8th Cir. 2003), *cert denied*, 540 U.S. 825 (2003) (incongruity of allowing only regulatory takings defendant to remove case to federal court, where Eighth Circuit strongly hinted Supreme Court should grant review).


341 *Id.* at 1016 n.7 (discussing *Penn Central*, 366 N.E.2d 1271, 1276-1277 (N.Y. 1977), *aff’d*, 438 U.S. 104 (1978)).

342 *Id.*

343 *Penn Central*, 366 N.E.2d at 1272.

344 *Id.* at 1272-73 (emphasis added).
fers to any private enterprise, especially to a public utility, favored by government and the public. These, too, constitute a background of massive social and governmental investment in the organized community without which the private enterprise could neither exist nor prosper. . . . It is that privately created and privately managed ingredient which is the property on which the reasonable return is to be based. All else is society's contribution by the sweat of its brow and the expenditure of its funds. To that extent society is also entitled to its due.345

Phrases such as “indirect social and direct governmental investment” are breathtaking in their arrogation of all of the value inhering in a parcel not demonstrably attributable to activities of its landowner to the State. Under this reasoning, as Professor William Fischel noted, government was “entitled to appropriate to itself all of the advantages of civilization.”346 It is somewhat remarkable to see, at this late date, the chief judge of New York adopting such a Hobbesian view of the relationship of the individual and the State.

Whereas John Locke asserted that individuals enter into a social contract whereby they institute government to protect their rights,347 Thomas Hobbes saw anarchy as such a threat to human flourishing, and life itself, that he was willing to grant absolute power to the sovereign.348 “By the late eighteenth century, ‘Lockean’ ideas of government and revolution were accepted everywhere in America; they seemed, in fact, a statement of principles built into English constitutional tradition.”349 Even critics of the Lockean view have concluded that property rights were the “great focus” of the Framers,350 and Hobbes’ views correspondingly were disfavored.351 In a recent regulatory takings case,

345 Id. at 1273.
350 JENNIFER NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM: THE MADISONIAN FRAMEWORK AND ITS LEGACY 92 (1990) (“The great focus of the Framers was the security of basic rights, property in particular, not the implementation of political liberty.”).
Justice Kennedy made of cryptic but unmistakable reference to our Constitutional tradition of accepting Locke and rejecting Hobbes. In rejecting the assertion that the State could eliminate Takings Clause rights of new owners through the simple expedient of promulgating contrary regulations prior to their purchase, he declared: “The State may not put so potent a Hobbesian stick into the Lockean bundle.”

The Hobbesian turn of Chief Judge Breitel was abetted by vagueness and a lack of analysis. He stated “the massive and indistinguishable public, governmental, and private contributions to a landmark like the Grand Central Terminal are inseparably joint.” This led Professor Gideon Kanner to ask: “Just how one would go about distinguishing the indistinguishable, and separating the inseparable, the court never took the trouble to explain.”

2. Penn Central as Precursor to Agglomeration

Chief Judge Breitel’s insight about societal value in *Penn Central* was not altogether wrong. More accurately, it reflects that, mutatis mutandis, every owner of property derives value from the activity of his or her neighbors, and contributes to the value of their respective parcels, in return. A given property owner, therefore is not deriving a windfall, but rather is enmeshed in a relationship that Justice Holmes described as “reciprocity of advantage.”

New York City’s Midtown business district is vibrant because people gather there, which might be attributed to suburban railroad commuters desiring to work near Grand Central Terminal, and a myriad of other reasons, comprising “indirect social investment.” As Professor Robert Lucas put it, “What can people be paying Manhattan or downtown Chicago rents for, if not for being near other people?” While there is no

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355 Pennsylvania Coal Co. v Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
clear owner of the value generated by such a vibrant web of associations, it seems clear 
that those contributing to that wealth would have a strong aversion to its appropriation by 
outsiders. Professor James Buchanan illustrated this principle in pointing out that wealthy 
and distinguished individuals had a marked preference for joining those private clubs that 
were owned by the members, rather than by proprietors, since proprietors could sooner or 
later charge each member for enjoying the value of association generated by all of the 
other members.357

This kind of arrogation of relationships generating value is not limited to private 
social club owners or the New York Court of Appeals. In Brown v. Legal Foundation of 
Washington,358 for instance, the U.S. Supreme Court countenanced the commandeering 
of the principal of law clients’ trust funds into Interest on Lawyers Trust Accounts (IOL-
TA) accounts, with the interest generated by those accounts directed for use by legal ser-
VICES programs. Brown’s justification, that their lawyers were not entitled to the money, 
and the program was limited to funds where it was not practical to create separate bank 
accounts for the individual clients, means that the State is the residual claimant of all val-
ue not nailed down in law, even when those with plausible interests in it work together, 
and undoubtedly would prefer that the earnings stay within their partnership.359

3. Agglomeration and Public Policy

In the decades since Penn Central, land and housing economists have come to 
analyze the synergies that come from the propinquity of people who could learn from or 
do business with each other as “agglomeration effects.” The sub-discipline studying why 
people decide to locate in cities is referred to as “the New Economic Geography” or “ag-

357 James M. Buchanan, An Economic Theory of Clubs, 32 ECONOMICA 1 (N.S. 1965).
359 For elaboration, see Steven J. Eagle, Regulatory Takings, Public Use, and Just Compensation 
After Brown, 33 ENVTL. L. REP. 10807, 10812 (2003) (noting that “neither a host nor her guest 
might be able to prove which is the rightful owner of coins found under the sofa cushion, each 
would have a better claim to the money than a visiting government inspector of upholstered furni-
ture”).
glomeration economics.” A major problem with the dirigiste approach to land use, that marks grand projects such as CityCenter (Las Vegas), and Atlantic Yards (Brooklyn), is that it fails to take into account why people and businesses move to, within, and from, cities.

The traditional Tieboutian model assumes that individuals chose from competing suburbs or cities to find the mix of amenities provided by government, and taxes imposed by government, that suits them best. While Chief Judge Breitel was willing to credit “indirect social and direct governmental investment to the State without examining it further,” “agglomeration economics” “starts with the basic claim that individuals and businesses make their location decisions on the basis of where other individuals and businesses decide to locate.” In other words, Breitel focused on gathering places, and agglomeration economics focuses in gathering people.

Countering the attraction to the center resulting from agglomeration is the repulsion from the center that results from effects of high density, such as crowding of roads, higher rents, and lack of green space. These reductions in amenities are collectively referred to as “congestion.” Somewhat akin is the increase in social bads, such as organized crime, that have increasing returns to scale. As Professor David Schleicher suggests, these might better be termed “negative agglomerations.”

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364 Schleicher, supra note 363, at 1509.


366 Schleicher, supra note 363, at 1529.
It is worth noting that the New York Court of Appeals’ approval of a “civic project” basis for upholding the expansion of the Columbia University campus into Manhattanville in *Kaur* was based largely on its agglomerative effect. Of course, while Columbia might deem its purposes loftier, the agglomerative effect of its activities differs little from those of, say, Manhattan’s garment district. Notably, however, regulations designed to protect urban manufacturing areas have proved disadvantageous.

**B. Urban “Blight” as a Metaphor for Contagious Illness**

The word “blight” has greatly encouraged and justified condemnation for revitalization. As described in Professor Wendell Pritchett’s path breaking article, “blight” is equated to a “public menace.” “By elevating blight into a disease that would destroy the city, renewal advocates broadened the application of the Public Use Clause and at the same time brought about a re-conceptualization of property rights.” The U.S. Supreme Court accepted this model whole, stating in *Berman v. Parker* that “[t]he experts concluded that if the community were to be healthy, if it were not to revert again to a blighted or slum area, as though possessed of a congenital disease, the area must be planned as a whole.” Thus, in *Berman, Hawaii Housing Agency v. Midkiff*, and *Kelo*

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367 *Kaur v. New York State Urban Dev. Corp.*, 933 N.E.2d 721 (N.Y. 2010), *cert. denied*, 131 S.Ct. 822 (2010). “The indisputably public purpose of education is particularly vital for New York City and the State to maintain their respective statuses as global centers of higher education and academic research. To that end, the Project plan includes the construction of facilities dedicated to research and the expansion of laboratories, libraries and student housing.” *Id.* at 734.

368 See *Lucas, supra* note 356, at 38. “New York City's garment district, financial district, diamond district, advertising district and many more are as much intellectual centers as is Columbia or New York University. The specific ideas exchanged in these centers differ, of course, from those exchanged in academic circles, but the process is much the same.” *Id.*


371 *Id.* at 3.


373 *Id.* at 34 (emphasis added).

v. City of New London, the Court has espoused that the remedy for blight is condemnation and government directed redevelopment.

But, as I have elaborated upon elsewhere, abatement is the direct and proper remedy for blight, not condemnation. If the present owners, lenders, or parties with a potential interest are unwilling or unable to abate a nuisance, government may do so, impress a betterment lien upon the land, and foreclose the lien if and when unpaid. Encouraging local private initiative and transparency, both important in a well-functioning republic, augur strongly for this approach, since the foreclosure process is both public and modest in scale, as opposed to larger redevelopment projects whose developers are opaquely selected.

C. Underutilization

Much of the underpinning of the concept of “underutilization” of property as blight is based upon Professor Michael Heller’s thesis of the anticommons. But, this is the tail wagging the dog. The numerous shards of property noted by Heller that prevented the utilization of storefronts in Moscow were not endogenous to a natural evolution of private property rights, but rather were fragments resulting from the sudden implosion of the Soviet Union. The real story is that, for three-quarters of a century, Russia was governed by a regime that concomitantly repressed both individual property and individual liberty. Overly centralized control of resources deprives individuals of their incentives and ability to apply their local and tacit knowledge to coordinate resource use. Further...

377 Id. at 838.
380 See generally, Steven J. Eagle, Private Property, Development and Freedom: On Taking Our Own Advice, 59 SMU L. REV. 345 (2006) (claiming that the United States evangelizes the free market, transparency, and subsidiarity in countries including those in the former Soviet Union, but is reluctant to adhere to these principles itself).
thermore, as Heller hints at, rent control and kindred regulations imposed in the name of (contested) non-utilitarian values also may lead to underutilization.\(^{381}\)

Because of concern about ostensible blight, the courts have countenanced the use of eminent domain to acquire small parcels, with the resulting superparcel having a higher aggregate market value. It might, or might not, have a higher aggregate social value, since condemnation results in the destruction of large (albeit almost immeasurable) amounts of subjective value, as well as the imposition of high out of pocket costs.\(^{382}\)

As Professor Jonathan Barnett notes, however, market actors whose roles vary from one transaction to another have strong incentives to “resist and correct overpropertization.”\(^{383}\) In the urban renewal situation, however, actors do not switch roles. Members of minority groups, persons of moderate income, and owners of small businesses are the condemnees. Well-connected redevelopers are post-condemnation transferees, and they proxy for the upscale businesses and residents that subsequently occupy their developments. All of these groups have every reason to militate for more redevelopment.

In New York, the Court of Appeals decisions in *Goldstein* and *Kaur* seem apiece with Chief Judge Breitel’s Georgist views in *Penn Central*.\(^{384}\) Breitel saw much of the value of property resulting not from efforts of the landowner, but rather from “a background of massive social and governmental investment in the organized community without which the private enterprise could neither exist nor prosper.”\(^{385}\) Therefore, the government, and not the landowner, is entitled to this value upon the exercise of eminent domain.

A corollary of this view is that an owner who does not utilize his land productively is depriving society (*i.e.*, the State) of some value that belongs to it. A more sophisti-

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382 See *supra* notes 123-126 and associated text.
384 See *supra* Part IV.A.1.
cated form of this argument is that the errant owner is depriving his neighbors (and society) of a duty owned under some sort of reciprocity of advantage theory. One also might analogize the obligation to the right to provide lateral support to a neighbor’s land, or to be creating conditions that prevent neighbors from enjoying the enhanced value that would inure to them if those whose lands were contiguous were more industrious. The State, being the representative of society, can require good uses of land as well as prohibit bad. There is no such “affirmative police power,” however.

The Court of Appeals view also is reminiscent of that of A. C. Pigou, who recognized that it was necessary for society to rectify social harms that emanated from some parcels or activities, to the detriment of others. Ronald Coase subsequently explained that negative externalities are typically not unilateral, but that activities impinge upon one another not because one is good and the other bad, but because both activities are legitimate, but mutually incompatible. While the court’s implicit assumption seems to be that owners targeted for redevelopment who refuse to sell do so because they are “holdouts,” the alternative possibility is that “underutilization” in the eyes of redevelopment agencies represents good utilization from the perspective of the owners. In some highly publicized cases of eminent domain, the owners’ views might be a better economic choice, as well.

D. The Information Problem and Information Paradox

1. Government Disclosure is Cheap and Private Information is Expensive

A major problem with eminent domain for private economic redevelopment is asymmetry of information. In his classic article *The Economics of Public Use*, Professor Thomas Merrill notes the broadest objection to the use of eminent domain for parcel assembly, that private developers regularly assemble sites for shopping centers and com-

386 See supra note 355 and associated text.
389 The saga of Susette Kelo is instructive in this regard. See supra Part IV.G.
390 Merrill, supra note 229.
Merrill’s response is that this might work well for smaller parcels not strictly site-dependent, and where anticipated large gains could buy off rent seekers. More fundamentally, however, while conceding that straw transactions, options, and similar devices may work well for private developers, Merrill asserted that their utility for government assembly is limited. “The necessary ingredient of these techniques is secrecy, and governments, at least in an open society like the United States, are not very good at keeping secrets.”

Even if it could keep information private, the possibilities of government purchasing agents buying off holdouts in secret deals and possibly tipping off potential sellers creates a “specter of corruption” that might make it prudent for eminent domain to be used instead of private developers’ “guile.”

Another way to look at the fact that government typically must devise its plans for acquisitions in public view is that obtaining such disclosed information is cheap. Sellers and competing buyers need merely read the local newspapers or attend city council meetings to find out government’s land acquisition plans.

But how does government decide whether, and where, to institute large urban revitalization projects, in the first place? Here it is vital that it ferret out the information that would lead it to the best decision. But, as Professor Kenneth Arrow noted, information “is an economic good, in the sense that it is costly and valuable.” It is difficult to sell information, however, since the very process of informing a potential buyer of the reasons why it is valuable serves to convey the information for free. Also, “there is no general way of defining units for information,” and information is difficult to evaluate.

Yet, information about development opportunities can be quite lucrative, since one cha-

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391 Id. at 81. See, e.g., County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765 (Mich. 2004). “[T]he landscape of our country is flecked with shopping centers, office parks, clusters of hotels, and centers of entertainment and commerce. We do not believe, and plaintiff does not contend, that these constellations required the exercise of eminent domain or any other form of collective public action for their formation.” Id. at 783-84.

392 Id. at 82-82.

393 Id. at 82.

394 Id.


396 Id. at 120.
racteristic of information is an “extreme form of increasing returns.” The same bit of information that might be the key to a small project with modest profits might serve the same function for a large project with substantial profits.

From the city’s perspective, it is difficult to evaluate the consequences of accepting a redevelopment proposal. Furthermore, a little-known developer might not have good judgment or prove a reliable partner. Judgment and reliability, in this context, include avoiding potential embarrassment for local officials, and, perhaps, providing reciprocal value for contracts awarded. Sponsorship by a well-regarded team player provides the necessary reputational bonding. That is why newcomers may be told, “We don’t want nobody that nobody sent.” Redevelopers that somebody sent likely would have to justify that patronage, in ways that both are circuitous and difficult to substantiate. That one hand washes the other is the truism of crony capitalism.

2. Crony Capitalism and Urban Revitalization

Government coordination of economic activity means that some actors are encouraged in certain undertakings. These are of value, in turn, because they are forbidden others. The beneficiaries of such largess have acquired “regulatory property,” which has been placed in a limited number of hands and which is susceptible to removal or dilution by the State. According to Professor John Coffee, however, the presence of dispersed ownership is important for the autonomy both of government and of providers of capital.

397 Id.
400 See Bruce Yandle and Andrew P. Morriss, The Technologies Of Property Rights: Choice Among Alternative Solutions To Tragedies Of The Commons, 28 ECOLOGY L Q 123 (2001) (coining term and explicating concept).
This is the dark side of concentrated ownership; put simply, the separation of cash-flow rights from voting rights can serve as a means by which those controlling the public sector can extend their control over the private sector. At a minimum, the prospect of crony capitalism—that is, closely interlocked political and economic leaderships, each reciprocally assisting the other—ensures that concentrated owners will need to become deeply involved in government in order to protect their positions from existing rivals, new entrants, and political sycophants.\footnote{John C. Coffee, Jr., \textit{The Rise of Dispersed Ownership: The Roles of Law and the State in the Separation of Ownership and Control}, 111 YALE L.J. 1, 72 (2001).} As Professor Coffee adds, “Once concentrated ownership degenerates into a “crony capitalism” that unites political and economic power, the role of law is likely to become minimal.”\footnote{Coffee, supra note 401, at 81.} Professor Timothy Canova described “crony capitalism” as the “tendency of ostensible public-sector regulatory authorities reaching out to help their ‘friends’ in the private sector.”\footnote{Timothy A. Canova, \textit{Banking and Financial Reform at the Crossroads of the Neoliberal Contagion}, 14 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1571, 1583 (1999) (reporting on American crony capitalism, conflicts of interest, and lack of transparency).} Much of the concern about crony capitalism results from concern about the causes and effects of bailouts of firms by government in time of economic turmoil. For instance, the \textit{Financial Times} outlined that the rescue in the late 1990s of Long-Term Capital Management by the Federal Reserve took place in the context of a web of former colleagueship and personal friendship between top officials at the Fed and the beneficiaries of its largess.\footnote{See John Plender, \textit{Western Crony Capitalism}, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 3, 1998, at 10 (criticizing incestuous relationships between government and regulatory officials and investment bankers).} The creation of massive urban redevelopment projects, located on sites taken involuntarily from their previous owners, and retransferred to powerful and sometimes politically well-connected new proprietors, is fertile grounds for crony capitalism abuse. Such accusations played an important role in opposition to New York’s Atlantic Yards project. As suggested earlier, one might conclude that the relationship between a leading bank and New York State government regarding the World Trade Center, instantiated in
the brothers Rockefeller, was not wholly arms-length.405 The same might be said for the provenance of New York Times coverage of Bruce Ratner and Atlantic Yards.406

Another example is the recent account describing the allocation of funds from Chicago’s Tax Increment Financing (TIF) program, which is financed and administered outside the city’s annual budget. “About $500 million has gone into the TIF program in each of the last four years, and most financing decisions are made behind closed doors by top city officials and aldermen.”407

E. Government, Property, and Coordination

Condemnation for economic revitalization is, at its heart, a tool designed to bring economic resources to bear in repairing communities.408 The conceit is that the “visible hand” of government, within the context of the regulatory state, can best coordinate activities.409 It is true, as Professors Robert Ahdieh,410 Michael Heller,411 and other argue, that “[t]he operative challenge is to coordinate property-rights holders around an efficient equilibrium of consumption and use.”412 However, that does not mean that the State is the best agent to make the change. One cannot displace market-based coordination, which certainly has warts in practice, with an idealized form of government-coordinated econ-

405 See supra notes 52-54, and associated text.
406 See supra note 70.
410 Id. at 593-98.
411 Heller, supra note 378 (asserting that overspecified property rights in land preclude effective utilization of property); MICHAEL HELLER, THE GRIDLOCK ECONOMY: HOW TOO MUCH OWNERSHIP WRECKS MARKETS, STOPS INNOVATION, AND COSTS LIVES (2008) (extending Anticommons principles to air transport congestion, patent locks precluding pharmaceutical advances, etc.).
412 Ahdieh, supra note 409, at 594-95.
In particular, the fact that real property sometimes is used in what some would
deem suboptimal ways does not prove, or even imply, that State-driven redevelopment
would do better. One illustration of the failure of control to anticipate the full conse-
quences of its well-intended decisions is the attempt to preserve blue collar jobs in New
York City by prohibiting the conversion of underutilized loft buildings so as to provide
much-needing housing.

F. Agglomerate Proliferation

As was noted earlier, agglomeration provides increasing returns to scale of pro-
ductive economic and enjoyable cultural and social interactions. But, as is the case
with critical densities of fissionable nuclear material, the ensuing chain reactions set off
by agglomeration are not always socially beneficial. The bad effects include negative ag-
glomeration, congestion, and, what I will call agglomerate proliferation. While it is
conventional to use the term “congestion” as a catchall for all undesired effects of agglom-
eration, I break out proliferation for reasons similar to Professor Schleicher’s use of
negative agglomeration. “Congestion” is an apt metaphor for the disutility resulting from
the conflict between things resulting from an agglomeration that are, in themselves, de-
sirable. Highway congestion resulting from the crowding of highways by workers on
their way to new jobs within a growing agglomerate metropolitan area is the archetype.
Negative agglomeration is not a conflict among goods, and agglomeration proliferation is
not a conflict within an agglomerating area.

“Agglomerate proliferation,” as I use the term, refers not to the growth of agglo-
merates, but to their proliferation (or, more precisely, to the proliferation of aspiring ag-

413 See Harold Demsetz, Information and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint, 12 J.L. & ECON. 1, 1
(1969) (discussing and naming the “nirvana fallacy.” The fallacy first was described in R.H.
Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 43 (1960) (noting comparisons between “a
state of laissez faire and some kind of ideal world”).

414 For elaboration, see Steven J. Eagle, Kelo, Directed Growth, and Municipal Industrial Policy,
17 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 63 (2009).

415 See Hills & Schleicher, supra note 369.

416 See supra note 356 and associated text.

417 See notes 365-366 supra and associated text.

418 See note 365, supra, and associated text.
glomerates). Local officials, spurred by their own dreams, or dreams supplied by erstwhile redevelopers or sport franchise owners, decide that their towns need to become hubs of economic activity. “Need” and “desire” are not synonyms, and neither equates to “destiny.”

Owners, or developer’s investors, provide equity financing for projects that are independently economically justifiable. Often such projects consist of multiple structures and uses. These may be owned and financed separately, and bound together by covenants. The regional shopping center is the classic example. The principal economic advantage of the shopping center over the traditional main street is that the most desirable merchants are able to internalize the positive externalities they generate. On Main Street, storefront owners can free ride on esteemed retailers who bring droves of shoppers to the block. In the mall, the sought-after merchant would insist on internalizing its positive externality by paying a far lower rent per square foot than merchants who live off the traffic they generate. This observation, writ large, is the basis for claims that localities should subsidize businesses fostering agglomeration.

Where there is no reasonable assurance that the proposed new development would pay its own way, even after considering ownership structures and covenants that would provide synergies with complementary land uses, bringing in government is the logical resort. The proffered explanation involves the creation of public goods, which are both nonrival and nonexcludable. This means that, if government contributes to the new development, complementary businesses or competitors would settle in town, and more skilled workers, vendors, lawyers and accountants familiar with the industry, and others would flock in. If the city down the freeway could prosper through agglomeration, why not ours?

During the first part of the 19th Century, the severe depression that started in 1837 was due largely to a massive growth in public and private debt. “The ‘orgy of canal and railroad building and of bank organization’ was spurred by New York's success with

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420 See infra notes 425-430, and accompanying text.
the Erie Canal in 1817.\textsuperscript{421} States sought to replicate the New York success story and borrowed money to fund these internal improvements.\textsuperscript{422} Similarly, towns would compete in subsidization of railroads, in hopes of obtaining service and becoming regional distribution hubs.\textsuperscript{423} “Although these policies could create local agglomerative benefits if only one local government engaged in them, they did not produce net national economic gain, as they created inefficient subsidy competition, political manipulation of the railroad industry, and overinvestment.”\textsuperscript{424}

Just as prestigious anchor department stores in shopping malls provide positive externalities in the form of customer traffic to smaller merchants, Professors Teresa Garcia-Milà and Therese McGuire postulated that desirable firms will supply new jobs and attract synergetic enterprises.\textsuperscript{425} “Tax breaks are a means of internalizing the positive externality of agglomeration economics.”\textsuperscript{426} In theory, such tax preferences can create wealth for the city granting them and society as a whole, if the city could better capture the positive externalities than other cities.\textsuperscript{427} The principal illustration in the Garcia-Milà and McGuire article was the recent move of the Boeing Company’s headquarters from Seattle to Chicago. Some five hundred workers, mostly from Seattle, would move into an existing building in Chicago. Chicago provided Boeing $50 million in subsidies.

In commenting upon the Garcia-Milà and McGuire thesis, Todd Sinai noted that “[t]he authors label the externality ‘benefits from agglomeration,’ but it really could be anything productivity-enhancing: from greater civic pride to honest-to-goodness know-

\textsuperscript{422} \textit{Id.}
\textsuperscript{423} Schleicher, \textit{supra} note 360, at 1514 (citing Stanley L. Engerman, \textit{Some Economic Issues Relating to Railroad Subsidies and the Evaluation of Land Grants}, 32 J. ECON. HIST. 463 (1972)).
\textsuperscript{424} \textit{Id.}
\textsuperscript{425} Teresa Garcia-Milà and Therese J. McGuire, \textit{Tax Incentives and the City}, BROOKINGS-WHARTON PAPERS ON URBAN AFFAIRS 95 (2002).
\textsuperscript{426} \textit{Id.} at 114.
\textsuperscript{427} \textit{See} Hills & Schleicher, \textit{supra} note 369, at 263 n.47.
Boeing may have been a ‘loss leader’ for Chicago, not intended to make existing firms more productive, but to act as a magnet for additional firms.”

Cities motivated to become “centers of excellence” in one activity or another compete for increases in scale that would lead to them become the next Detroit or Silicon Valley or Wall Street. However, firms planning to locate facilities play the subsidy offer of one city against another (as did railroads) or threaten to leave (as do sports teams). Under these circumstances, it is easy to dissipate whatever gains might result from agglomeration.

Professor Edward Glaeser enumerated reasons for tax incentives for firms to locate in a city. These were (1) bids by localities to obtain consumer or producer surplus for existing residents; (2) agglomeration economics (the Garcia-Milà and McGuire thesis); (3) up-front compensation for future tax exploitation; (4) tax discrimination against those rooted in a community and in favor of those freer to leave, and (5) “corruption and influence.”

Thus, while agglomeration economics is the account that captures the imagination, it is difficult to discern whether it is another name for the largely obscure mixture of motives and relationships that have marked public-private urban land redevelopment.

G. Redevelopment Do Not Embody Superior Knowledge

Professor Richard Schragger notes that the New Economic Geography literature indicates “the reason some places do well economically and others do poorly may have more to do with luck or path dependency than with particular legal institutions.”

Historical accident, path dependence, spatial persistence—these features of economic geography suggest that uneven economic development is not an aberration

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428 Todd Sinai, Comment, Teresa Garcia-Milà and Therese J. McGuire, Tax Incentives and the City, BROOKINGS-WHARTON PAPERS ON URBAN AFFAIRS 124, 125 (2002).
429 Id. at 129.
but rather a salient feature of economic life. It also suggests that chance and very small perturbations in an existing equilibrium can make a big difference to outcomes. Economic growth does not start from a clean slate whereby each political jurisdiction can act to ensure its own prosperity. Geography is not incidental to economy; it is a key feature of economy.

Despite the facts that well-conceived development can obtain private financing and that poorly-conceived projects do not deserve public financing, government officials try over and over to find middle ground where public investment would make benefit the locality. The usual lure is economic development, and the positive externalities that the project will generate and that will rain upon the city or metropolitan area as a whole.

Common objects of such financing are athletic stadiums, which have a long history of public support, and not coincidentally, played an important role in the Atlantic Yards project that was litigated in Goldstein v. New York State Urban Development Corp. As Professor Kenneth Shropshire noted, the statement most often encountered when sports teams want a new home is “We should build a new facility because the economic impact will be tremendous.” However, it is almost impossible to determine whether a new stadium will have any positive multiplier effect at all. Beyond the construction phase, which often is a significant factor in mobilizing political support for an urban redevelopment project, most payroll of the sports franchise consists of high-dollar player contracts and low-paid and sporadic employment of custodial and food ven-

432 Id. at 1893.
436 See, e.g., Levine & Oder, supra note 70, at 369 (noting that “the grassroots support for Atlantic Yards came mostly from groups that received funding from the developer or expected jobs, like construction unions”).
dors’ staff. Even more important, most consumer expenditures for tickets, parking, and food substitute for alternative local uses of the family entertainment budget.437

One overarching theme of the book *Sports, Jobs and Taxes*, edited by economists Roger Noll and Andrew Zimbalist, is that no economist has conducted an independent study showing a positive economic impact on a city from arena or stadium construction, at least not in the past 30 years. There is a big difference, they encourage us lay people to understand, between economic *activity* and economic *impact.* [E]ven the gross economic activity of a franchise is relatively modest.438

Other studies have shown similar results.439 According to Professor Zimbalist, “most of the money that gets spent [on sports facilities] is [simply] re-circulated money within the town. It does not generate new value added.”440

Despite the lack of economic benefit from publically subsidized sports facilities, they are defended as ways of providing the social value and solidarity that comes from rooting for the home team, and giving the host city a national and world identity.441

Beyond stadiums, many well-known eminent domain projects simply have not worked out,442 and numerous major projects that have run into trouble. In Las Vegas, although the Nevada Supreme Court upheld condemnation for urban revitalization for the massive “CityCenter Las Vegas” project,443 the market does not share the developers’

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441 See Edelman, supra note 433, at 50-53.


443 City of Las Vegas Downtown Redevelopment Agency v. Pappas, 76 P.3d 1, 11 (Nev. 2003) (adopting expansive views of “blight” and “public use”).
enthusiasm. Perhaps more important, an industry research analyst for a leading international commercial real estate brokerage firm noted “Some of CityCenter’s revenue will be revenue that Las Vegas didn't have before, but we project that 70% to 90% will be at the expense of existing properties.” The notion that cities can be brought back to affluence and life by in-migration by suburban empty nesters and members of the young, bright, and hip “creative class,” an idea associated with Professor Richard Florida, seems to have been overblown.

Probably the most visible urban revitalization project in the country has been the Fort Trumbull redevelopment in New London, Connecticut. Pfizer has left New London, the Fort Trumbull redevelopers were unable to obtain funding, and infrastructure for any development such as roads has yet to be built. A July 2010 account in the Hartford Courant began “The empty expanse that was once the working-class Fort Trumbull neighborhood in New London is an ever-present reminder of the painful eminent domain battle that took dozens of homes — and the redevelopment that didn't follow.” The account noted the possibility of new townhouse construction, but added that they “wouldn’t be built where the properties were taken and demolished.” Earlier in 2010, The [New London] Day noted that the transfer of the underlying Fort Trumbull project land, which

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444 See, e.g., Alexandra Berzon, Contract Dispute Could Hamper City Center Finances, WALL ST. J., May 19, 2010, at B2 (“Contractor claims against City Center . . . could jeopardize the projects’ loan contracts and condo sales, the project said in a recent court filing.”).

445 Denise Kalette, Developers bete a Fortune of Vegas, NATIONAL REAL ESTATE INVESTOR, Jan. 1, 2010 (quoting Jacob Oberman, director of gaming research, CB Richard Ellis, Las Vegas).


447 See Eagle, supra note 379, at 1261-63.

448 Elaine Stoll, Fort Trumbull Developer Asks for More Time, Misses Deadline, THE (NEW LONDON) DAY, Nov. 27, 2010 at QQ.

449 Kenneth R. Gosselin, A Townhouse Plan and an Electric Boat Purchase Could Undo Some Ill Will In Lew London’s Fort Trumbull Area, HARTFORD COURANT, July 5, 2010 at QQ.

450 Id.
was mandated by state law, never had been accomplished and that officials were equivocating on what that might be done.\(^{451}\) Susette Kelo’s travails might have been for naught.

Apart from specific redevelopment projects, it might be that the entire apparatus of government direct subsidization and condemnation for sports stadiums, convention centers, shopping centers, and the like, is a chimera.

Professor Edward Glaeser’s research, including data from the 2010 Census, indicates that the basis for sustained regional growth is the personal satisfaction of residents and potential migrants.\(^{452}\) Census data indicate that population is not moving to high-income areas, or to areas with high amenity values. Instead, Glaeser states, they are moving to areas where housing is cheap because building is abundant.\(^{453}\)

V. Conclusion

Dissenting in Goldstein, Court of Appeals Judge Smith declared:

The whole point of the public use limitation is to prevent takings even when a state agency deems them desirable. To let the agency itself determine when the public use requirement is satisfied is to make the agency a judge in its own cause. I think that it is we who should perform the role of judges . . .\(^{454}\)

Condemnation for transfer for private redevelopment may or may not make sense as a political matter. As a matter of public policy, its justifications are doubtful.\(^{455}\) In a speech weeks after handing down the Supreme Court’s opinion in Kelo, Justice Stevens acknowledged his personal view that the “allocation of economic resources that result from the free play of market forces is more likely to produce acceptable results in the

\(^{451}\) David Collins, \textit{New London Should Take Title to Fort Trumbull}, \textsc{The (New London) Day}, Feb. 7, 2010 at QQ.

\(^{452}\) See Edward L. Glaeser, \textit{What Democrats Might Learn From the Census}, \textsc{N.Y. Times Economix Blog}, Jan. 11, 2011 (noting higher wages, quality of life, and “affordable housing, which typically comes from abundant supply” as the principal factors).

\(^{453}\) \textit{Id}.


\(^{455}\) \textit{See supra} Part IV.
long run than the best-intentioned plans of public officials.”\textsuperscript{456} As a matter of law, however, his promise in \textit{Kelo} that cases of alleged takings not for public use “can be confronted if and when they arise”\textsuperscript{457} has not come to pass, certainly not in New York.

\textsuperscript{456} John Paul Stevens, \textit{Judicial Predilections}, 6 NEV. L.J. 1, 3 (2005).