Faculty Working Papers
Bound print copies of George Mason School of Law’s working paper series on law and economics are available in the Law Library. The bound set often includes initial drafts of papers. Search Mason’s Catalog to locate a working paper.
Research Paper Series
Recent Working Papers:
Judicial Nominations in President Trump’s Second Term: Form and Substance
Drawing on my experience as a former Trump White House lawyer responsible for judicial nominations during the initial two years of President Trump’s first term, this essay will address three dimensions of the judicial nominations landscape at the start of his second term: (1) federal judicial selection in recent years; (2) the claims about what judicial selection will purportedly look like during President Trump’s second term; and (3) as someone with some visibility into the current White House Counsel’s Office’s process, what I anticipate judicial selection will actually look like during President Trump’s second term.
Three False Rumors About Federal Judicial Clerkships
Since 2019, over 200 of my former students secured federal judicial clerkships. Over sixty Scalia Law graduates will commence federal clerkships from 2025-28, and we secured four U.S. Supreme Court clerkships through the 2022-26 terms. During the 2024-25 term, Scalia Law had over seventy graduates clerking for judges across the country, including thirty-two on federal courts, with fifteen of them on the U.S. Courts of Appeals and one on the U.S. Supreme Court. Because Scalia Law graduates only around 130 students per year, it’s one of the top law schools in the country for clerkships by percentage of class. And that certainly applies if you want to clerk for a judge appointed by President Donald J. Trump—trust me. That said, I’d like to bury three myths about clerkships that I hear from students every year—but never seem to die.
Time for a New Restatement
Facilitating Fintech’s Future: How Congress and Regulation can Support Innovation in Fintech, Earned Wage Access and Buy Now, Pay Later Products
Title VI Hostile Environment Law in the Shadow of Antisemitic Violence
The Misuse of the Bayh-Dole Act and the Folly of Price Controls on Drug Patents
This chapter in Bring Medicines to Life: How Intellecutal Property Enables Innovation in the Life Sciences analyzes and critiques the “price control theory of the Bayh-Dole Act,” demonstrating that this decades-long campaign to use the Bayh-Dole Act to impose price controls on drug patents is both statutorily unjustified and policy folly. First, it provides novel statutory analyses of the Bayh-Dole Act to show once again that the text, structure, and function of the march-in power in § 203 precludes the National Institutes of Health (NIH) from using it to grant licenses to generic drug companies to reduce prices of prescription drugs. Second, it addresses the economic errors underlying this price-control agenda even when the NIH is legally authorized in other provisions of the Bayh-Dole Act to impose conditions in its grant agreements and licenses, such as affordability mandates or reasonable price restrictions. Invoking this other statutory power in the Bayh-Dole Act, the Biden Administration adopted an “affordability” mandate in all licenses of NIH-owned patents in early 2025, and the Trump Administration officially implemented this policy on October 1, 2025. But this is policy folly. Contrary to conventional wisdom, almost all R&D funding for prescription drugs is from private sources. Given this economic data on drug R&D, a similar price-control policy adopted by the NIH failed. In 1989, the NIH adopted a “reasonable pricing” condition in its research grant agreements and licenses for any resulting prescription drug. This policy resulted in a collapse of NIH research agreements and licenses. NIH Director Varmus thus withdrew the “reasonable pricing” mandate in 1995, recognizing that it was contrary to the commercialization goals of the Bayh-Dole Act. The 2025 “affordability” mandate in NIH licenses will similarly undermine the commercialization of biomedical innovations created by NIH scientists. In sum, price controls on drug patents contravene the Bayh-Dole Act’s statutory text and function in harnessing the patent system as an engine of healthcare innovation through patent licensing and technology transfer.
Immigration is Not Invasion
In recent years, state governments and the second Trump Administration have increasingly advanced the argument that illegal migration and cross-border drug-smuggling qualify as “invasion” under the Constitution, and the Alien Enemies Act of 1798 (AEA). If these arguments are accepted by courts, or if they rule the issue is committed to the unreviewable discretion of the executive, the consequences will be dire. Such an outcome would pose a grave threat to the civil liberties of both immigrants and US citizens. It would also enable state governments to initiate war without federal authorization. This article makes the first comprehensive case against claims that illegal migration and drug smuggling qualify as “invasion.” As James Madison explained in 1800, “Invasion is an operation of war.” Illegal migration and drug smuggling do not qualify.
Part I summarizes the history of the “invasion” debate and currently ongoing litigation over it. Part II explains why the broad interpretation of “invasion” is manifestly wrong under the text and original meaning of the Constitution. The concept does not include illegal migration or drug smuggling. This conclusion is supported by the constitutional text, extensive evidence from the Constitutional Convention and the ratification process, and references to “invasion” in the Federalist Papers.
In Part III, I consider the meaning of “invasion” in the Alien Enemies Act of 1798. The text and public meaning indicate it is essentially the same as that in the Constitution. Under the Act, an invasion requires a military attack. This reality is not changed by the fact that many Americans die as a result of overdosing on illegal drugs, or by recent US military attacks on suspected drug smugglers in international waters.
Part IV outlines the dire implications of the broad view of invasion. State governments would have the power to wage war in response to undocumented migration and smuggling, even if such warfare were not authorized by Congress. This would be a major undermining of Congress’ power to declare war, and threatens to involve the United States in warfare at the behest of a single state government. Even worse, the broad view would also effectively give the federal government the power to suspend the writ of habeas corpus at any time. These dangerous implications strengthen the originalist case against a broad definition of “invasion.” They also cut against the broad definition from the standpoint of various living constitution theories of interpretation.
Finally, Part V explains why courts should not defer to the president or to state governments on either the meaning of “invasion” or the factual issue of whether an “invasion” – properly defined – has actually occurred.
International Finance and the Geopolitics of Market Infrastructures
This Article examines how financial market infrastructures (FMIs)—long regarded as neutral, technocratic utilities—have become instruments of geopolitical influence and economic statecraft. Drawing on three case studies—SWIFT sanctions, EU-UK post-Brexit equivalence disputes, and the EU’s withdrawal of FMI recognition for India, South Africa, and the United Arab Emirates—this article shows how FMIs are increasingly ‘weaponized’ as tools of financial diplomacy. It argues that mutual recognition and equivalence regimes, originally designed to foster cross-border regulatory coordination and financial stability, have evolved into levers of jurisdictional power. These mechanisms now serve both ‘offensive’ purposes (such as sanctions) and ‘defensive’ strategies (such as re-shoring euro clearing), revealing their political and discretionary nature. Yet, this transformation is not necessarily a design failure. Rather, it reflects the adaptability of these regimes to a pluralistic international legal order where sovereignty and market access must be balanced. The Article contributes to the literature on international financial governance by analyzing how FMI access decisions sit at the intersection of law, markets, and geopolitics—and by suggesting how these dynamics might reshape global financial integration.
How Speech-Based Immigration Restrictions Threaten Academic Freedom
Lessons for Antitrust from the Capital One-Discover Merger: Is There a Subprime Market in Credit Cards?
Religious Freedom as Freedom
In recent decades, the exercise of religious freedom is increasingly associated with oppression. This is not only due to the disagreement between religions and some governments concerning sexual expression matters—contraception, abortion, same-sex relations, and transgender identity—but is also due to diverging convictions about the substance and sources of freedom. This Article will examine a current and highly visible set of convictions about the contents of human freedom, which together suggest that a thriving religious witness threatens freedom itself. These convictions often surface in the context of laws touching upon sexual expression. It will then contrast these convictions with those found in earlier and largely non-sexual-expression law, according to which religious witness enhances human freedom. Finally, it will offer four observations about these contrasting notions of freedom.
Law Enforcement with Rent Dissipation
We consider a framework which brings together losses arising from rent-dissipation and the workhorse model of law enforcement. Governmental actors engage in a contest to share the proceeds from the enforcement of the law through monetary fines, which leads to rent-dissipation. This causes monetary sanctions to be costly, rendering the model used for studying nonmonetary sanctions a better fit for their analysis. The effect of rent-dissipation on optimal sanctions is directly related to the sanction elasticity of offenses measured at the classic optimum (i.e., where the expected sanction equals the direct harm from the offense). When offenses are inelastic, the optimal sanction is smaller than the classic optimum and it is decreasing in the degree of rent-dissipation; and a legislator who does not fully internalize contest costs chooses an overly-punitive sanction which is smaller than the classic optimum. The opposite results are obtained when offenses are elastic. We discuss implications and extensions.
Revocation on Divorce and the State as Heir: Fixing the Uniform Probate Code
Suppose that, prior to a divorce, a testator devises the residue of his estate to his spouse if she survives him, otherwise "one half to my heirs and one half to my spouse's heirs." If the testator dies after the divorce and without revising the will, who is entitled to the residue? The answer under the Uniform Probate Code (UPC) will come as a surprise. One half of the residue will escheat to the state as the heir of the former spouse. The result arises from a glitch in the UPC inadvertently introduced when the UPC was revised in 1990. This Article identifies and analyzes the glitch and proposes a statutory solution for the Uniform Law Commission and the legislatures of enacting states.
Natural Property Rights
Natural Property Rights presents a novel theory of property based on individual, pre-political rights. A just system of property protects people's rights to use resources, and it also orders those rights consistent with natural law and the public welfare. Drawing on influential property theorists such as Grotius, Locke, Blackstone, and early American statesmen and judges, as well as recent work in normative and analytical philosophy, Natural Property Rights shows how natural rights guide political and legal reasoning about property law. It examines how natural rights justify the most familiar institutions in property, including public property, ownership, the system of estates and future interests, leases, servitudes, mortgages, police regulation, and eminent domain. The book studies examples familiar from the law covering tangible resources; chattels, real property, energy, and water law. Thought-provoking and comprehensive, Natural Property Rights shows how property at once secures individual freedom and serves the common good.
Although Natural Property Rights repays study on its own, it also offers an important alternative to contemporary perspectives on property. In relation to philosophy and political-theory scholarship, Natural Property Rights justifies property as the object of a right. But the right is not grounded in autonomy as it is in the political theories of Robert Nozick and many other libertarians; it is grounded instead in foundations associated with perfectionism, eudaimonism, and human flourishing. And the book reminds philosophers and political theorists how many factors besides analytic concepts and normative foundations matter in property; it shows how legal property rights develop from practical reasoning and the specification of general prepolitical rights.
In relation to legal scholarship, Natural Property Rights offers an important alternative to the normative theories that loom largest today—Progressive property, law and economics, and expertise-driven approaches to property (as in Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council v. Tahoe-Regional Planning Agency (2002) and Kelo v. New London (2005)). Consistent with Progressive property, natural law and rights link property to human flourishing. But natural law and rights still justify property as the object of an individual right, and not as an entitlement to do what regulators or judges think will contribute to flourishing in the relevant community. Consistent with the best law-and-economics scholarship, natural law and rights guide reasoning about the effects of recognizing property rights in law. But natural law and rights address familiar challenges faced by law and economics—about when and why legal systems have legitimate political authority to coerce citizens, with the state’s monopoly over violence, to obey efficient rules. And natural law and rights reconcile individual property rights with the public welfare as called for in expertise-driven approaches—without threatening individual freedom as those approaches do.
Is Racial Discrimination Ever Charitable?
Is racial discrimination permissible for a charity? The question is salient and timely. Our nation faces a stark choice between two competing visions of how the law should assess racial discrimination. One view, articulated by Professor Ibram X. Kendi, among others, is that racial discrimination in favor of members of minority groups is an appropriate response to society’s prior discrimination against them. A competing view, articulated by the Supreme Court in SFFA v. Harvard, is that racial discrimination is odious tout court: eliminating racial discrimination means ending all of it.
This Essay tackles an aspect of the question that has not received much scholarly attention. The Supreme Court’s decision in SFFA v. Harvard has prompted commentary on racial discrimination and the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the latter of which prohibits discrimination by programs and activities receiving federal financial assistance. The commentary after SFFA v. Harvard also extends to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits discrimination in employment, and Section 1981, which prohibits discrimination in, among other things, the making and enforcing of contracts. Recent actions taken by the Trump Administration vis-à-vis Harvard University raise the issue of racial discrimination as a basis for revoking federal tax-exempt status under Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. But little attention has been given to the law of charity, which derives from the law of charitable trusts. In order to qualify for tax exemption as a charity, a charity must be a charity. What does and should the law of charity say about racial discrimination after SFFA v. Harvard?
This Essay proceeds in four main parts. Part I examines the law of charity and its requirement that a charity must not violate public policy. Part II explores three Supreme Court decisions salient to public policy and racial discrimination. The public policy limitation in the law of charity derives from the law of charitable trusts, but it is influenced by federal law, including the Court’s decisions; also, state law influences federal law when federal courts determine the issue of federal tax-exempt status. Part III examines the legal landscape after the Court’s decision in SFFA v. Harvard. Part IV proposes a path forward, arguing that the time has come for state and federal courts and taxing authorities to declare that racial discrimination by a charity violates public policy irrespective of the race of the individuals harmed by it. A brief conclusion follows.
Public Choice Theory and Law
Public choice theory applies economic principles—especially rational self-interest, incentive structures, and methodological individualism—to the study of political and legal institutions. While traditionally used to explain legislative and regulatory behavior, this entry explores how public choice insights apply more broadly across the legal landscape. Concepts such as concentrated benefits and dispersed costs, rational ignorance, and rent-seeking help explain how legal actors—judges, litigants, bureaucrats, and interest groups—interact within institutional constraints. The entry examines how these dynamics shape the evolution of litigation, the behavior of administrative agencies, and even constitutional change. By grounding legal processes in the same incentive-driven analysis used in economics, public choice theory offers a powerful explanatory framework for why legal outcomes often diverge from publicly stated goals.
Should We Fear Personalized Pricing?
The practice of personalized pricing involves using information about a consumer to more accurately estimate an individual’s willingness-to-pay for a product to calibrate pricing to that individual. If the practice grows, what does this imply for consumer welfare—particularly for digital markets where there is an abundance of user data? While some consumers may end up enjoying lower prices and having greater access to markets, other consumers will likely end up paying higher prices relative to the counterfactual, that is, a world without personalized pricing but likely some other forms of price discrimination. Nonetheless, it is unlikely that all consumers are made worse off relative to the counterfactual. Additionally, there are reasons that mitigate the concern that the practice of personalize pricing will grow. First, there could be competitive pressure to not engage in the practice—as firms that explicitly avoid personalized pricing will have a competitive advantage in the eyes of consumers. Relatedly, firms that do engage in personalized pricing will likely be stigmatized in the market, which creates a strong disincentive to widely adopt the practice.
Wither Consumer Welfare? Antitrust in the Biden Years
The consumer welfare standard has been the lodestar of antitrust policy for more than four decades, ensuring predictable decision making by the Government’s antitrust agencies and the courts. From the beginning of his term, however, President Biden and his administration signaled their intent to embark on a different and more aggressive approach to antitrust policy. The FTC and the Antitrust Division of the DOJ proceeded to issue many new guidelines and policy statements, and to pursue novel theories in merger enforcement actions and civil litigation. The FTC also issued a substantive competition rule for the first time in decades, and significantly increased the information required to be submitted by firms seeking approval of a merger. The agencies deemphasized consumer welfare and economic analysis more generally, instead elevating the importance of market structure and other populist goals such as the preservation of small businesses. This, in turn, diminished the agencies’ persuasiveness in court, where they lost half of their merger cases. The most effective parts of the Biden administration’s agenda were those that aligned most closely with traditional economic principles, particularly in monopolization cases. The lesson to be drawn is that antitrust enforcement still is most successful and best preserves competition when it is guided by economic principles — in particular, the consumer welfare standard — rather than other goals.