Does Shareholder Proxy Access Damage Share Value in Small Publicly Traded Companies?
- Author(s): , J.W. Verret
- Date Posted: 2011
- Law & Economics #: 11-47
- Availability: Full text (most recent) on SSRN
The field of corporate governance has long considered the costs of the separation of ownership from control in publicly traded corporations and the regulatory and market structures designed to limit those costs. The debate over the efficiency of regulations designed to limit agency costs has recently focused on the SEC’s new rule requiring companies to include shareholder nominees on the company financed proxy statement to facilitate insurgent challengers to incumbent board members in board elections. A recent vein of empirical literature has examined the stock price effects of events surrounding the new proxy access rule. We present a study that focuses on small companies who expected an exemption from the rule under the Dodd-Frank legislation that preceded the adoption of the SEC rule. We consider the effect of the August 25, 2010 announcement of the proxy access rule, comparing its effect on the value of firms that expected to be subject to the full rule against its effect on the value of small firms unexpectedly given only a temporary exemption from part of the rule (Rule 14a-11) and no exemption from part of the rule (Rule 14a-8). Supporters of proxy access have long argued that it will enhance shareholder value. Critics of proxy access have argued that it will empower investors with conflicted agendas that will destroy shareholder wealth. The unexpected application of the rule to small-cap companies on August 25 provides a natural experiment for this question and allows us to examine the differential effect of the rule on firms above and below the arbitrary SEC cutoff of $75 million dollars in market capitalization. We find that the unanticipated application of the proxy access rule to small firms, particularly when combined with the presence of investors with a 3% interest able to use the rule, resulted in negative abnormal returns. We present multiple methods to measure that effect and demonstrate losses for our sample of roughly 1,000 small companies of as much as $335 million.